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 ABSTRACT 
 
THE EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT OF CONSIDERED MORAL JUDGMENTS 
by Christopher Michael Cloos 
 
 The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a 
method of moral justification.  According to the objection, considered moral judgments 
(CMJs) are not truth-conducive.  Because the method uses inputs that are not credible, the 
method does not generate justified moral beliefs.  The objection is solved by 
reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism.  The first half 
of the thesis sets up the input objection, explores potential responses to the objection, and 
uncovers the best way to solve the objection.  The second half of the thesis solves the 
input objection by defining key terms, detailing the revised RE procedure, reinserting the 
notion of a competent moral judge into the method, using intuitionist criteria for 
identifying genuine moral intuitions, creating three filters capable of sorting good from 
bad CMJs, and showing how it is possible to assign evidential weight to CMJs so that 
they can be used as standards against which moral principles can be measured and a 
justified moral theory realized.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND BIG PICTURE 
 Reflective equilibrium (RE) remains a prominent way of thinking about moral 
justification.  However, many moral theorists mention RE in their work without actually 
analyzing the method itself.  Many theorists are not aware of the current state of the 
literature.  RE has been shown to be defective.  To cite one example, Daniel Bonevac 
(2004) has shown that as a decision procedure RE fails to reach a final equilibrium state 
where beliefs are fully justified.  As a consequence of Bonevac’s paper RE must be 
revised if it is to remain viable.  Bonevac somewhat develops a pragmatic/intuitionist 
version of RE, yet he never fully develops such a version of the method.1 
 Historically, RE has been tweaked in response to a fundamental objection to the 
method known as the no credibility objection or the input objection.2  According to this 
objection the inputs of the process must be initially credible if the outputs of the process 
are to consist of justified beliefs.  Norman Daniels extended RE from its pure-Rawlsian 
interpretation in order to answer Richard Brandt’s formulation of the input objection.  
Brandt (1979) became an RE-eliminativist by opting for a rational, desire-based moral 
epistemology.  Brandt did this in response to his own criticism of the Rawlsian version of 
RE.  Brandt’s accusation amounted to pointing out that Rawls’ method had intuitionism 
                                                 
1
  Cf.  Brink 1989: 103. In fairness, it could be argued against Bonevac that he has misunderstood the 
notion of coherence and justification in RE.  That RE fails as a decision procedure comes as no surprise 
because there is no decision procedure for determining the explanatory power of beliefs.  Such a move, 
however, makes RE succeed or fail in relation to the notion of coherence.  There is reason to move away 
from a pure coherentist interpretation of RE, as I will shown later. 
2
  I cast the input objection in terms of the search for credible inputs.  Though there are many input 
problems one could raise against RE I take the search for credibility to be the preeminent input problem.  
As a result, I use the input objection and the no-credibility objection interchangeably. 
2 
in its starting points.  Daniels addressed this concern by elaborating the notion of wide-
RE, which posited foundations without foundationalism.  Daniels’ wide-RE reinforced 
the traditional interpretation of RE as a method consisting of coherentism, 
constructivism, and conservatism (CCC).  Another theorist who provided a well-
developed interpretation of RE was Michael DePaul (1993).  He created radical-RE in 
response to problems he perceived with Daniels’ embrace of conservatism.  It is 
interesting to note that none of these responses to the input objection met the objection 
head-on.  These responses side-stepped the problem and introduced a host of new 
problems into the method.  The important point is this: how one responds to the input 
objection determines the type of interpretation of RE one formulates and advocates. 
 In this thesis, I will formulate a post-Rawlsian version of RE that embraces the input 
objection and answers it head-on.  Instead of clinging to a (CCC) interpretation of RE I 
will revise RE in the direction of foundationalism and moral realism by using moderate 
ethical intuitionism to establish the credibility of the inputs.3  Recent developments in the 
literature on intuitionism make this a viable move.  Many RE-proponents have rejected 
positing special foundations.  This is because such foundations were equated with strong 
foundations.  In contrast, moderate intuitionism employs fallible foundations.  Rawls 
himself was not against positing special foundations.  In certain places in A Theory of 
Justice he refers to the starting points of RE as epistemically privileged.  There are 
further motivations for moving away from a coherentist interpretation of RE. 
                                                 
3
  Minimally, ethical intuitionism holds that some moral truths can be known without inference.  According 
to this view there are basic (non-inferential) moral beliefs.  Such a view is committed to cognitivism (i.e., 
that there are moral propositions), and typically, though not exclusively, the view is combined with moral 
realism and ethical non-naturalism. 
3 
 Two reasons to move away from coherentism are that it is no longer the dominant 
theory of justification and truth in epistemology, and technical results in formal 
epistemology have shown that pure coherentism is not truth-conducive.  Regarding the 
former, Rawls was writing at a time when Goodman and Quine made holistic 
epistemology fashionable.  Rawls himself seemed under the sway of holistic 
methodology as he moved from a more foundationalist approach to moral epistemology 
(in 1951) to a more coherentist approach (in 1971).4  Even Laurence BonJour who was 
once a leading proponent of coherentism has now embraced foundationalism.5  Yet, a 
shifting of the proverbial winds is not a sufficient reason for moving away from a 
coherentist picture.  There are also technical results that show that coherentism is not 
truth-conducive.  Most of my discussion of RE will not focus on the structural aspects of 
the method (e.g., the basing relation), though architectural questions will surface 
throughout the thesis.  I will largely embrace foundationalism without providing a 
detailed defense of foundationalism per se.6  That being said, I recognize that there is 
more work to be done after this project in defending RE from common objections to 
moderate foundationalism.  There is, however, an immediate objection to my approach 
that arises. 
                                                 
4
  See Pust 2000: 14-22. 
5
  For evidence of this shift compare BonJour 1976 with BonJour 1999. 
6
  I will also largely assume that foundationalism is committed to some form of moral realism and 
coherentism is committed to some form of constructivism.  Though this may be the standard case, it is not 
without exception (e.g., see Brink 1989 for a defense of coherentism and moral realism).  The version of 
intuitionism I endorse escapes many of Brink’s objections because Brink construes intuitionism as a 
traditional foundationalist version of moral realism.  I, however, adopt a contemporary version of 
foundationalism that is modest about the strength of the foundations. 
4 
 One might wonder whether my solution to the input objection is too obvious.  If the 
input objection to RE questions the initial credibility of the inputs, and I simply posit 
special foundations, which are by definition initially credible, then it seems my solution 
to the input objection is not a substantive solution.  Surely not all theorists before me 
could have missed such an obvious solution.  More specifically, Brandt’s objection 
accused coherentism of intuitionism.  An objector might balk: all you are claiming is that 
intuitionism rather than coherentism is true, so saying that intuitionism is true does not 
establish why coherentism cannot be accused of intuitionism.  It appears that I am 
positing too easy of a solution and missing answering Brandt’s objection directly.   
 Looking closer at Brandt’s objection, it is not an argument against Rawls’ 
coherentism that accuses Rawls of adopting intuitionist-style foundations.  If this were 
the case, this objection would be problematic because RE’s input data (i.e., considered 
judgments), as understood by Rawls, are not compatible with intuitionism’s starting 
points, which according to Brandt requires indefeasible foundations.  The input data on 
any viable interpretation of RE is revisable and not strongly foundational.  Instead, 
Brandt was requesting that the input data, however that data is conceived, be of the sort 
that could support the weight of justification.  Brandt was requesting better epistemic 
foundations for an ethical theory than the kind Rawls had posited.  Brandt’s objection 
could be seen either as requesting something more foundational, though not indefeasible, 
or requesting a refinement of the coherentist picture; otherwise, the output of the process 
would not achieve the objective of the method—justifying a moral theory. 
5 
 Most theorists have either misinterpreted the input objection and simply reinforced 
the point that considered judgments are not strongly foundational (i.e., fixed data points), 
or they have sought to bolster the starting points under a coherentist scheme by re-
interpreting RE so that considered judgments have some prima facie (i.e., initial) 
credibility and further worries about the judgments’ credibility vanish due to the vast 
revision pressure brought to bear against them.  It is telling that no one has opted to 
directly answer the objection by establishing considered judgments as proper foundations 
for justifying a moral theory.  This move has not been attempted because it is only within 
the last decade that the theoretical apparatus needed for such a move has been credibly 
established. 
 My solution to the input objection may seem obvious, but it is far from easy.  It may 
seem obvious that if considered moral judgments (CMJs) are special foundations then 
they are credible and the input objection does not hold water.  The difficulty, then, is 
formulating the story of their reliability.  Even Daniels recognized the need for such a 
project, “To be sure, it would be good if we could supply a philosophically satisfactory 
set of credentials for the reliability of considered judgments.”7  Instead of directly 
addressing why CMJs can be assigned justificatory weight (i.e., granted epistemic status) 
Daniels opted to use the judgments in a beneficial way.  His solution to the objection is 
methodological.  It does not establish the credibility of the CMJs themselves.  It is my 
contention that assuming that appeal to CMJs is unavoidable and that they can be used 
constructively does not go far enough to explain why they are best suited to be starting 
                                                 
7
  Daniels 1996: 6. 
6 
points and something against which we should test other aspects of our belief system.  
Given this consideration, solving the input objection involves formulating an analysis of 
the reliability of CMJs.  What is the story we can tell about why these judgments are 
reliable or worthy elements in a theory of moral justification? One has to tell how these 
foundations get their unique epistemic value and how they avoid common traps to good 
reasoning, such as social bias, personal prejudice and wishful thinking.   
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE METHOD 
 In this section, I will situate RE within theoretical rationality, outline the typical 
formulation of RE, and highlight how the method gives rise to the input objection. 
 Reflective equilibrium is a method of moral justification.  The focus of RE is 
theoretical rationality.  That is, RE seeks to justify moral theories—comprised of moral 
beliefs and principles—to gain a more accurate picture of right and wrong.  This 
endeavor can be contrasted with practical rationality, whereby the focus is on actions that 
one might undertake to satisfy desires.  Though RE might be concerned with moral 
actions it is not used to determine what it is right to do in a given case.  It need not be the 
case that one actually does RE.  What matters is that RE can be done throughout deep 
historical time, not that it can be done in a particular case.  One might wonder, “Why 
attempt to justify a moral theory thorough a process that no one actually does?”8  The 
importance of studying RE is that it is a theory that has been used to justify certain moves 
in moral and political philosophy.  Whether RE is in principle possible (or theoretically 
viable) sheds light on the use of the method to justify conceptions of justice and moral 
                                                 
8
  I thank Anand Vaidya for pressing me on this point. 
7 
issues (e.g., perspectives on euthanasia and biotechnology).9  RE is also important 
because it involves an attempt to manage and discover new moral principles.  Though 
one might not be able to carry out RE pragmatically, something like the RE process does 
describe a great deal of moral theorizing.  Gilbert Harman has regarded RE as one of the 
top three trends in moral and political philosophy because trying to find moral principles 
to account for moral intuitions can lead to new discoveries.10  Analyzing whether RE is a 
theoretically rational method for justifying moral theories calls into question a great deal 
of philosophical practice.  Now I will explain the method. 
 The RE process begins with a set of initial judgments.  These judgments seem 
correct upon reflection.  They include judgments made at all levels of generality—from 
judgments about particular cases to judgments about abstract general principles.  These 
judgments are filtered to eliminate judgments made under conditions unfavorable to the 
exercise of undistorted cognitive functioning.  This eliminates judgments made in a state 
of emotional duress, incomplete knowledge of relevant facts, or excessive concern with 
one’s own self-interest.  Judgments that survive this filtering process are termed 
considered moral judgments (CMJs).  In the next stage, moral principles are formulated 
that systematize (i.e., account for) the CMJs.  The goal is to achieve a coherent package 
of beliefs.11  Where there is inconsistency between principles and CMJs one works from 
both ends, as needed, revising judgments and principles until one achieves a state of 
narrow-RE whereby judgments and principles are consistent.  Progressing from narrow to 
                                                 
9
  Rawls 1971, Daniels 1996, St. John 2007. 
10
  Harman 2003. 
11
  I often use the term ‘belief’ as a general term that covers the three types of beliefs in one’s belief-set 
(i.e., CMJs, principles, and background theories).  Nothing important hinges on this convention.  When I 
use ‘belief’ as technical term I will notify the reader of this more precise locution. 
8 
wide-RE one considers background theories.  Background theories are comprised of 
moral and nonmoral judgments about the nature of persons, the role of morality in 
society, and so on.  Background theories place the judgments and principles in one’s 
belief-set under different moral conceptions, which serve as arguments for or against 
one’s working moral theory.  One continues ironing out inconsistencies and revising the 
CMJs, principles and background theories until a maximally coherent belief-set is 
achieved.  This set consists of an ordered triple of CMJs, moral principles, and 
background theories.  When one arrives at this state one has reached wide-RE.  Beliefs 
that reach wide-RE are fully justified in light of being members of the maximally 
coherent belief-set. 
 RE gives rise to the input objection because CMJs are used as data points against 
which other beliefs are tested and revised throughout the procedure.  Fit with CMJs is 
considered a good thing.  It seems reasonable to think that moral theories are better when 
they accord with credible moral judgments.12  RE is a method of moral epistemology that 
exploits this intuition.  Moral theories, which are comprised of moral principles, are 
brought into a state of mutual support with CMJs (or moral intuitions).13  However, many 
critics of RE have argued that moral intuitions are not fit to serve as evidence for or 
                                                 
12
  This point is made by Hooker 2002.  There are a couple of ways to understand why the fittingness 
relation between theories and credible judgments benefits theories.  If the judgments are credible, then fit 
with those judgments corroborates or confirms the theories to a certain degree.  Fit with credible data points 
increases the justification (i.e., grounds or support) for the theories.  Another way to understand this point is 
in terms of data coverage.  In general, if theory A better accounts for the data when compared to theory B, 
then A is to be preferred over B.  Fittingness delivers justificatory goodness because fit with credible data 
increases the likelihood of the correctness of the theory.   
13
  I will follow precedence set within the literature and use ‘considered moral judgments’ and ‘moral 
intuitions’ interchangeably (Lemos 1986: 504; Lenman 2007: 63-64).  However, CMJs are rightly 
understood to be a species of moral intuitions, as considered judgments are intuitions that have survived a 
filtering process. 
9 
against moral principles.14  It is argued that testing moral principles against CMJs will 
never lead to justification because CMJs possess no evidential weight.15  This is a 
problem for normative ethics because, “Reflective equilibrium remains the usual way that 
philosophers think about the vexed status of intuition in normative ethics.”16  A potential 
response to this problem is to be an eliminativist and exclude from RE any special class 
of CMJs.  However, RE is incompatible with this move.17  Instead, I will argue that moral 
intuitions derived from certain ideal conditions and cognitive competences can justify 
moral principles.  In arguing for this conclusion I will consider objections against CMJs 
and refine and develop the requisite conditions and competences. 
1.3 WHY BOTHER WITH REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM? 
 Reflective equilibrium is often regarded as a natural way to think about justification 
in moral theorizing.18  Despite the initial attractiveness of RE the method is riddled with 
problems.  These issues include, but are not limited to, those identified in the table on the 
next page. 
                                                 
14
  See, e.g., Hare 1973; Singer 1974: 494, 516; 2005: 344-346; Lyons 1989: 146-147; Brandt 1979: 16-23; 
Brandt 1990; Copp 1984: 160-161; Little 1984: 384-385; Sencerz 1986; Timmons 1990: 107.  
15
  Commonly called the no credibility objection (see Daniels 2003) various critics have used a variety of 
terms for what considered judgments lack: probative force, evidential value, and evidential force.  I adopt 
‘evidential weight’ to cover all such references out of conceptual simplicity and technical feasibility.  That 
is, ‘weight’ readily lends itself to technical (i.e., probabilistic) conceptualization. 
16
  Appiah 2008: 78. This topic is also of relevance to epistemology, as experimental philosophers claim it 
is illegitimate to appeal to intuitions as evidence (e.g., Swain, et al. 2008).   
17
  Scanlon 2003: 151. Scanlon’s example is that RE is incompatible with the idea, “that ‘intuitions’ about 
what is just or unjust in particular cases should not be given any weight in justifying general principles but 
must be derived from them.” 
18
  RE is “natural” because it formalizes the common sense notion that one’s belief system is in flux, 
consistency between beliefs is a good thing, and that beliefs must be revised in light of new beliefs. 
10 
Table 1:  Problematic Components of Reflective Equilibrium 
Problematic Component Problematic Domain 
Considered Moral Judgments No Credibility (evidential value), Justificatory Role 
(pragmatic vs.  epistemic), Underdetermination of 
Principles and Theory, Indexing Confidence, Specification 
of Filtering Conditions, Calibration. 
Revision Procedure Path Dependence (order of addressing discrepancies), 
Intuitive Judgment, Open Problems in Belief Revision, 
Degrees of Justification (vulnerability to revision), 
Nonmonotonicity. 
Final (Resultant) Equilibrium 
State 
Inexhaustibility (beliefs outstrip representation in final form 
or theory), Indeterminacy, Undecidability (halting 
problem). 
Versions of the Method Narrow vs.  Wide, Conservative vs.  Radical, Domain-
dependent Appropriations (bioethics, epistemology, 
morality, mathematics, etc.). 
Method in General Disagreement, Conservatism, Emptiness, Architecture 
(coherentism), Classification of Elements (judgments, 
principles, background theories, and constraints), 
Competent Judge (characteristics required for a viable 
inquirer), Begging the Question Against the Moral Skeptic. 
 Given the problems associated with reflective equilibrium the question becomes, as 
Michael DePaul tersely wonders, “Why bother with reflective equilibrium?”19  DePaul’s 
answer to this question is that other methods of philosophical inquiry are irrational 
                                                 
19
  DePaul 1998. 
11 
because they involve either abandoning reflection, leaving out of reflection certain beliefs 
or not allowing the results of inquiry to inform what one believes.  DePaul provides a 
negative argument in support of RE because he does not think RE can be positively 
defended as a method that will act as a reliable guide to truth or produce justified beliefs.  
Instead, he imposes a rationality criterion and holds that all other approaches are 
irrational.  This move requires DePaul to defend RE by arguing that rationality is the 
primary value that ought to guide moral inquiry and that all other approaches to moral 
epistemology are irrational.20  Until DePaul defends rationality as the primary value of 
inquiry, which is a huge undertaking, it is reasonable to assume that inquiry should be 
structured around the traditional goals of aiming at truth and achieving justification.21  
For now I will set aside the question of truth and focus on justification.  What is 
justification? 
 In its epistemic form justification seeks to answer the question, “Under what 
conditions is a subject S epistemically justified in believing a proposition that p?” 
Generally speaking, epistemologists answer this question in one of two ways: the 
conditions are internal or external to the subject.  As an example of internalism, Earl 
Conee and Richard Feldman argue that one is justified only if one’s doxastic attitude (i.e., 
                                                 
20
  Ibid: 307. About the primacy of rationality to inquiry DePaul confesses, “the truth is that I am not at all 
sure what to say.” 
21
  To be sure, the rationality of RE and irrationality of alternatives is an attractive feature of RE, but it is 
not likely to convince an RE-skeptic who wants to know whether a positive account of RE can be 
formulated to defend its use in pursuing the epistemic goals of forming beliefs that are true and justified.  
Granted, the epistemic value of truth and justification are contested.  However, if moral inquiry does not in 
some minimal sense involve truth and justification, then one has already assumed a particular version of 
inquiry (e.g., moral skepticism) which is incompatible with RE.  Thus, one has begged the question against 
RE as a valid method of inquiry.   
12 
attitude of belief), which meets certain conditions, fits a body of evidence.22  As an 
example of externalism, Alvin Goldman holds a belief is justified if and only if it is the 
product of a reliable belief forming mechanism.23  What unites these epistemologists is 
that they are seeking to explain justification in relation to knowledge.  Traditionally, 
justification is what gets added to true belief to yield knowledge.24  Epistemic 
justification is connected with the goal of truth.  Believing true beliefs and not believing 
false beliefs can be viewed as the primary epistemic goal in the pursuit of knowledge.25  
Epistemic justification is crucial to achieving this goal because it involves providing 
reasons for our beliefs in relation to what is true. 
 Moral justification can also be understood in relation to truth.26  In fact, the input 
objection is centered around a truth claim: without CMJs being credible (i.e., true to some 
degree) one may only end up with a coherent package of false beliefs.  A belief is reliable 
if it is truth-conducive or able to evidence truth.  Solving the input objection involves 
showing that CMJs are reliable.  If CMJs are reliable indicators of the truth of their 
contents, then they will be good inputs and tend to generate justified outputs.  The 
difference between epistemic and moral justification is in the content of the beliefs.  
Moral beliefs evidence truth in relation to moral factors (e.g., justice, care, moral 
sentiments, promise keeping, and the good and the right).  This makes moral justification 
related to epistemic justification, but moral justification cannot be completely subsumed 
                                                 
22
  Conee and Feldman 2004. 
23
  Goldman 2008. 
24
  Cf.  Williamson 2000. 
25
  It is an open debate whether truth is the primary epistemic goal (e.g., Steup and Sosa 2005: Ch. 10).  I 
only claim that it is possible to view it as such.   
26
  Cf.  Freeman 2007: 31. 
13 
under epistemic justification because the propositions will evidence different content and 
different truths.  With these considerations in place it is natural to ask, “In what way is 
RE a method of moral justification?” 
 T.M. Scanlon claims that justification can be understood with regard to beliefs or 
with regard to persons.  In the first sense, principles or judgments can be justified by 
being supported by sufficient reasons.  In the second sense, a person can be justified in 
holding the beliefs within her belief system, but it may remain an open question whether 
the beliefs within her system are justified.  As Scanlon explains: 
A person may be justified in accepting a principle if it accounts for his or her 
considered judgments in reflective equilibrium and the person has no reason to 
modify or abandon these judgments.  But it does not follow that this principle is 
justified.  Whether it is or not will depend on the status of these considered 
judgments.27 
 A person can be justified in accepting a principle into her belief-set without the 
principle itself being justified.  A principle’s justification stems from the status of the 
CMJs it is connected to.28  This highlights the importance of the current project of 
establishing the evidential weight of CMJs.  If a principle is tested against a CMJ that 
possess no prima facie credibility, then the principle is not necessarily justified even 
though the person may be justified in holding the principle.  To circumvent this problem 
one must either (i) establish that the justification of beliefs and persons change in concert, 
or (ii) establish the initial credibility of CMJs.  The better option is (ii) because it is 
                                                 
27
  Scanlon 2003: 140. 
28
  One may also wonder at what time a belief becomes justified.  Are beliefs only justified once they are in 
the final state of equilibrium? Or, does justification come in degrees? These are important questions but a 
bit premature and would take us too far afield at this point.  I will argue in a later section that my 
reformulation of RE allows for degrees of justification, which circumvents  criticisms that tie justification 
to the achievement of a final equilibrium state (e.g., Bonevac 2004). 
14 
possible for beliefs and persons to come apart when it comes to justification (e.g., a 
person might be justified in holding her beliefs but her beliefs might not be justified).  
Thus, without establishing (ii) RE is not a method capable of justifying moral beliefs. 
 A generous skeptic could grant that RE might be a method of moral justification, yet 
she could rightly press, “What’s the upshot of this undertaking? Why bother finding a 
method to justify moral beliefs?” To reply to such a skeptic I turn to Rawls. 
 There are three assumptions that underlie taking a broadly Rawlsian approach to the 
justification of moral beliefs.29  The fallibility assumption holds that moral theories are 
not perfect or infallible.  There is no assurance that a presently accepted moral theory will 
not, at some point, be supplanted by another theory that better explains the relevant data.  
The best a moral theorist can do is to search for the theory that best explains the moral 
data (i.e., the CMJs) at hand.  In this way, moral theory is akin to science in terms of 
theory change.  The practicality assumption eschews any attempt to restrict moral 
justification to the meta-domain.  Moral theories are not solely accountable to higher 
order meta-beliefs concerning the nature of justification but must also be made consistent 
with first-order claims about justice, civil disobedience, discrimination, fairness, and so 
on.  Moral theory must deal with substantive moral issues and cannot retreat to the meta-
domain or ignore practical interests.  The applicability assumption claims that despite the 
reality that most people do not have a formal system of moral beliefs, but rather a group 
of beliefs loosely held together with logical relationships, there is great value in 
attempting to formalize moral beliefs.  Making CMJs consistent with basic regulative 
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  Harris 1974: 137-138.  
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principles can lead to the solution of new moral dilemmas.  As one tries to formulate 
principles, the application of which would lead to the considered judgments at hand, one 
is equipped with regulative principles that can be applied to further moral problems.  I 
endorse all three assumptions as reasons to “bother” with RE, although I do not defend 
the assumptions here.30 
1.4 WHAT TYPE OF JUSTIFICATION DOES RE OFFER? 
 As previously mentioned, option (i) for establishing the evidential weight of CMJs 
holds that the justification of beliefs and persons changes in concert (i.e., when a belief is 
justified a person is justified in holding the belief, and vice versa).  By contrast, the input 
objection is an example of how beliefs and persons can come apart in justification.  The 
input objection plays on the difference between a person being justified in holding a 
belief and a belief  being justified.  This can be illustrated by way of an argument: 
1. Subject S can be justified in accepting principle q as long as q accords with S’s 
CMJs in reflective equilibrium.  (premise) 
2. The justification of q depends on the prima facie credibility (not the mere 
believability) of the CMJs that support q.  (premise) 
3. When S is justified in accepting q it does not necessarily follow that q is 
justified.31  (1, 2 Conj) 
4. CMJs cannot be established to be prima facie credible.  (input objection) 
5. Thus, q cannot be justified.  (2, 4 MT) 
 The outcome of the argument above is that RE cannot justify principles and theories.  
My thesis can be viewed as a denial of premise 4 so that RE can justify beliefs.  The 
argument above claims RE cannot justify beliefs when beliefs and persons come apart in 
                                                 
30
  I do not, however, endorse the specifics of the moral commitments that Rawls thinks we have.  For 
example, Rawls’ commitment to the substantive principle that, “it is fair to submit people to principles they 
themselves would have chosen” (Little 1984: 374). 
31
  The justification of principles is something extra that must be established in relation to CMJs. 
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justification.  When proponents of RE respond to the input objection by focusing on how 
people can justify CMJs—without the proponents establishing the prima facie credibility 
of CMJs—they fail to directly respond to the input objection.  This position is commonly 
put forward as person-centered credibility (PCC):  
(PCC)  Considered judgments are initially credible because they are the judgments 
that persons affirm upon reflection under ideal conditions.32  
 PCC implies that we establish the initial credibility of CMJs by making the 
judgments under ideal conditions (i.e., that we hold the beliefs with confidence gives 
them credibility).  Such a move is often made to resist CMJs being foundations of some 
stripe yet to affirm CMJs being initially credible.  An assumption underlying (PCC) is 
that credible persons will tend to select credible beliefs.  However, the process through 
which credibility is passed from persons to beliefs must be explained and defended.  In 
defending this claim one will need to argue that persons and beliefs do not come apart in 
justification.  This requires arguing against premise 3 by negating either premise 1 or 
premise 2.  Negating premise 1 requires claiming a belief can be accepted for some 
reason other than whether it fits with other beliefs (i.e., CMJs).  Taking this approach 
moves the theorist in a foundationalist direction, which moves the theorist away from RE 
as traditionally formulated.  Negating premise 2 requires claiming that the justification of 
beliefs does not depend on credibility being injected into the process from the start.  I will 
argue against this “wait and see” approach to justification later.  For now I will mention 
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  As typically understood on an RE model, these conditions could be physically instantiated by one being 
in a situation of emotional equanimity, sobriety, full knowledge of relevant facts, and possessing sufficient 
intelligence to be able to understand the concepts and issues about which one is making a judgment.  The 
upshot of ideal conditions is that they are conditions conducive to good judgment making and by inference 
conditions conducive to capturing the moral facts. 
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that the justification of a principle does depend on whether or not the standard against 
which it is assessed is to some degree credible.  Claiming that a CMJ is prima facie 
credible is claiming that it is credible to some degree and that the CMJ is capable of 
serving as a standard against which principles can be justified.  In the end, negating 
premise 2 is merely affirming premise 4—claiming that CMJs are not prima facie 
credible.  So, this response is not a response to the input objection but an affirmation of it.  
Finally, directly negating premise 3 begs the question against the argument by holding 
that beliefs and persons cannot come apart during justification when it is often the case 
that they do come apart and the argument is merely playing on this fact.  It is possible 
that we can be justified in accepting a principle even though the principle is not 
justified.33  Similarly, we can be justified in accepting a CMJ even though the CMJ is not 
credible because, for instance, other factors undercut the justificatory force of the 
judgment.  Such factors we might not be, nor could we be expected to be, aware of no 
matter how reasonable and impartial we are.34  
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  This distinction could be upheld by borrowing a distinction from epistemic justification: deontological 
justification versus perspectival internalism (Pappas 2005).  If justification is a deontological concept, then 
it is a matter of fulfilling one’s intellectual duties.  A scientist, for example, has a duty to follow the 
evidence where it leads and not cling to propositions incompatible with a hypothesis due to emotional, 
political or religious attachments.  The scientist would be justified in holding the belief if she lived up to 
her intellectual duties.  However, whether or not the belief in question is a justifier or is itself justified is a 
separate, though perhaps interrelated, issue.  One could fulfill one’s intellectual duties but fail to possess a 
justified belief as a result.  The deontological concept of justification is a thesis about the term “justified” 
and this may not have an impact on what the justifiers turn out to be.  In contrast, perspectival internalism 
is a thesis about what type of beliefs count as justifiers for other beliefs; namely, only justified beliefs can 
justify beliefs.  This is a thesis concerning beliefs, not a thesis concerning whether the person has 
conducted herself in such a way that she is “justified” in the beliefs she possesses.  Similarly, a person 
could be justified in accepting a principle without the principle thereby being justified. 
34
  One could stipulate omniscience or perfect impartiality to the notion of ideal inquirers, but it is not clear 
these provisions would apply to persons as such. 
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 Two considerations emerge from this discussion: (1) if one wants to rest the 
credibility of CMJs on persons one must argue that persons and beliefs do not come apart 
during justification (i.e., where you have a person justified in holding a belief you also 
have a justified belief), or (2) one must argue directly for the credibility of beliefs (i.e., 
even if persons and beliefs come apart during justification you can still have justified 
principles because the judgments on which they are ground are credible).  Consideration 
(2) is the only viable way to directly respond to the input objection.  It can be 
accomplished by negating premise 4 by showing that CMJs can be established as prima 
facie credible.35  An upshot of arguing for consideration (2) is that I will be able to make 
sense of RE being a deliberative method of moral justification. 
 There is a difference between a descriptive versus a deliberative interpretation of 
RE.36  This distinction concerns what the method is aimed at regarding justification.  On 
a descriptive interpretation RE aims at capturing the moral beliefs of a person or group of 
people.  On a deliberative interpretation RE aims at deciding what is correct to believe 
about moral matters.  The former interpretation is descriptive and the latter interpretation 
is prescriptive or normative.  
 Each interpretation lends itself to a different interpretation of how ideal conditions 
are functioning during the filtration of initial judgments to make up the set of CMJs.  For 
the descriptive interpretation judgments one is confident in under ideal conditions best 
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  Though the history of the debate over the credibility of CMJs has centered around prima facie credibility 
(i.e., credibility on a first pass), my solution to the input objection will be stronger—something in the 
neighborhood of secunda facie credibility (i.e., credibility after a thoroughgoing process of reflection and 
filtration).  As an upshot, establishing secunda facie credibility allows me to capture prima facie credibility 
as a consequence.  For most of this thesis, however, I will keep with standard convention and only discuss 
prima facie credibility. 
36
  Scanlon 2003: 142-148. 
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express one’s ability to make moral judgments.  The conditions accept judgments that 
represent this capacity well and reject judgments that tend not to represent this faculty 
well.  For the deliberative interpretation the ideal conditions function to get at what is 
correct and avoid what is unreliable.  Judgments made while ill-informed of the facts or 
under emotional duress will tend not to correctly reflect moral matters because they will 
tend to reflect performance errors, personal biases and cultural conditioning; whereas, 
judgments made under ideal conditions will tend to, “state those things that seem to us 
most clearly to be true about moral matters if anything is, and that unless there is some 
ground for doubting them it is reasonable to grant them initial credibility (leaving open 
the possibility that they may be revised or rejected later in the process).”37  I agree with 
Scanlon that the deliberative interpretation of RE is the primary interpretation of the 
method.  Under the deliberative interpretation CMJs evidence what seems true about 
moral matters and because of this they are initially credible.  In seeking to establish CMJs 
as prima facie credible one is seeking to establish the primary goal of RE as a method of 
justification.  Seeking the truth and evidential weight of CMJs allows one to answer the 
input objection, which requires that the CMJs are, “initially credible—and not merely 
initially believed—for some reason other than their coherence, say, because they state 
facts of observation.”38  Thus, answering the input objection directly aligns with the 
correct interpretation of RE’s ability to produce justified beliefs. 
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  Brandt 1979: 20. 
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2. THE INPUT OBJECTION 
2.1 CMJS POSSESS NO EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT 
 In this section I will briefly explain the input objection, present different ways of 
responding to the objection, and showcase some of the dialectic on the objection in an 
attempt to gain clarity about what is at stake in the debate. 
 Broadly speaking, the input objection can be captured by the following claim: CMJs 
possess no evidential weight because of reason R.  The main placeholder for R is the 
charge that CMJs are purely subjective.  That is, CMJs do not possess sufficient distance 
from an inquirer’s other beliefs or the beliefs of the inquirer’s culture.  This subjectivity 
charge is a request for greater objectivity, and it can be understood in terms of theory-
ladenness.  CMJs are subjective because they are determined by one’s educational 
training, childhood development and cultural norms.  Instead of being responsive to the 
moral facts in a given case, it is alleged that CMJs are inappropriately responsive to 
contingent factors.  Because CMJs do not possess sufficient objectivity they are not fit to 
serve as evidence for or against moral principles or theories.  Now I will make sense of 
the claim that CMJs possess no evidential weight. 
 Evidence is a standard against which claims can be measured or justified.  Evidence 
that supports a theory confirms that theory, and evidence that tells against a theory 
disconfirms that theory.  Any piece of evidence can confirm or disconfirm a theory to a 
greater or lesser degree.  Weight, roughly speaking, is the degree to which a piece of 
evidence can confirm or disconfirm a theory.  In RE, the evidence in question is a CMJ.  
If, for example, CMJ x is weightier than CMJ y, then x has a greater ability than y to serve 
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as evidence for or against a moral principle, or a set of moral principles, comprising a 
moral theory.  When a claim is made against CMJs that they do not possess evidential 
weight this means they are not suited to be a standards against which moral theories can 
be assessed.  This claim is typically taken to be totalizing in that CMJs possess no 
evidential weight.  Proponents of RE often respond to this claim by showing that CMJs 
possess some evidential weight, even if the precise weight possessed cannot be 
formulated.39  David Brink illustrates this tendency: 
All I claim is that considered moral beliefs have initial credibility.  I do not claim 
they enjoy maximum initial credibility; such a claim is not necessary in order to 
claim that coherence with considered moral beliefs is evidential.  If we can show 
that moral beliefs with some initial credibility cohere with other beliefs, including 
beliefs of still greater initial credibility, we have reason to accept those moral 
beliefs and others that they support.40 
 To adequately respond to the input objection it is important to show how CMJs 
possess enough evidential weight to be used as justifiers in the RE process.  Showing that 
CMJs possess some evidential weight is not an adequate response to the subjectivity 
charge because merely consistent CMJs could possess prima facie evidential value yet 
fail to be objective or responsive to the moral facts.  If the source of those CMJs is 
distorted, then the CMJs will not possess enough evidential weight to produce adequate 
justification.41  This means that answering the subjectivity charge must screen CMJs for 
not only consistency but also for judgments that stem from corrupt sources.  Such a move 
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  Because ‘weight’ is used metaphorically a further problem is determining how much weight a CMJ must 
possess to serve as evidence for or against a theory.  Is there a minimum threshold or are all RE-proponents 
committed to an “anything above zero” understanding of weight? There is a further problem with ‘weight’ 
used as metaphor: does weight reside in the belief or in the inquirer? Does a belief possess weight or is 
weight an attraction to a belief that resides in the propositional attitude of the inquirer? 
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  Brink 1989: 139. 
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  I owe this point to feedback I received from Anand Vaidya. 
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not only captures prima facie evidential weight but also moves CMJs into the arena of 
secunda facie evidential weight (i.e., evidential value resulting from surviving a 
thoroughgoing process of reflection and filtration).   
2.2 WAYS TO ESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY OF CMJS 
 There are three general ways one could try to establish the credibility of CMJs.  The 
first move is to show that CMJs are non-inferential foundations.  The second move is to 
establish an analogy with observation reports.  The third move is to use CMJs in a useful 
way without telling the story of the credibility of moral intuitions per se, instead just 
showing how CMJs play a vital role in RE methodology.  I will focus on the last move in 
a forthcoming section entitled “the methodological response." In the rest of this section I 
will look at the non-inferential foundation move and the observation report move.  
Looking at the dialectic on these moves it becomes clearer what is at stake and what 
option remains viable for establishing the evidential weight of CMJs. 
 Establishing CMJs as non-inferential foundations is one way to solve the input 
objection.  The requirement that CMJs be credible might be the requirement that at least 
some CMJs be non-inferentially justified.  This response to the input objection stems 
from viewing the objection as positing that intuitionism, as a version of foundationalism, 
is true rather than coherentism.  Brink considers this response and claims that it makes 
RE take-on all objections to foundationalism as a general theory of the structure of 
justification.42  Brink argues foundationalism is untenable in all its versions, so 
establishing CMJs as non-inferential foundations is not a viable option.  Brink saddles 
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intuitionism with strong foundationalism and concludes non-inferential foundations are 
incompatible with RE, which is a method that allows for the revisability of beliefs in an 
effort to generate coherence.  In contrast, contemporary intuitionists need not be strong 
foundationalists.  Weak or modest foundations can be used within a framework that also 
employs coherentism to increase the justification of the belief-set.  Brink’s response to 
the charge of intuitionism involves reinforcing RE’s coherentism.  For Brink, if CMJs 
were intuitionistic moral judgments they would be self-justifying, but CMJs are 
ultimately justified through coherence with other beliefs, so they are not self-justifying or 
a product of intuitionism.  Brink’s move does not work because a contemporary 
intuitionist like Robert Audi allows intuitionistic moral judgments to have evidential 
grounds of justification.  Audi clarifies this by saying:  
I have already explained how intuitive moral judgments may have evidential 
grounds and, even though non-inferential, may be defended by inferences in many 
cases where a need for justification arises.43 
 So, it is not the case that intuitionism means moral judgments are purely self-
justifying.  Although at some time non-inferential moral judgments must have been 
justified without being inferred from premises, at a later time, and as part of a body of 
beliefs, they can receive support from other propositions.  Thus, establishing CMJs as 
non-inferential foundations is still a viable move for solving the input objection because 
such foundations can be incorporated into a belief system in a way that allows them to 
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serve as foundational justifiers and receive support from inferential connections with 
other beliefs.44 
 Another way to solve the input objection is to consider an analogy between moral 
intuitions and observation reports.  Daniels notices that Brandt’s version of the input 
objection gains greatest plausibility when CMJs are compared with observation reports in 
empirical science.45  This is because putting these entities side-by-side it becomes 
apparent that there is a causal story to tell about the reliability of observations, but there 
is not an analogous story to tell about the reliability of moral judgments.  Due to this 
contrast in reliability, initial credibility can be assigned to observation reports but not to 
moral judgments.  To combat this reading of the input objection Daniels claims that the 
analogy between moral intuitions and observation reports generates only a pseudo-
objection.  Moral concepts, like rightness and wrongness, are not basic properties of 
moral states of affairs, whereas observational properties are basic properties of causal 
states of affairs.  So, observation statements play a different role in the story we tell about 
causal reliability than moral judgments do in the story we tell about moral reliability.  
Daniels concludes that moral judgments do function differently than observation reports, 
so an objection that points out that they do function differently is not a genuine objection 
against moral judgments.  In effect, Daniels explains away the input objection without 
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  I understand ‘non-inferential’ to mean judgments that are not ultimately justified by inference from other 
beliefs.  Though non-inferential judgments can be strengthened by receiving support from other beliefs 
their justification is independent from the support they receive from other beliefs (Cf.  Streumer 2007).  If 
non-inferential judgments are regarded as strongly foundational, then such judgments cannot have their 
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  Daniels 1979: 269-273. 
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directly arguing against the disanalogy between observation reports and moral intuitions.  
Claiming that the analogy generates a pseudo-objection leaves open a move in the 
dialectic whereby a theorist can argue directly for the disanalogy as a way to sustain the 
input objection.  Such an approach is taken by Daniel Little. 
 Little argues for the disanalogy between observation reports and CMJs, and he 
concludes that this disanalogy is a bad thing.46  Little does this by providing three reasons 
why the disanalogy generates an asymmetry in the credibility of observation reports and 
CMJs.  First, according to Little, the causal basis of perception allows us to think that 
observations are largely correct.47  The origins of moral judgments are, by contrast, not as 
likely to be correct because, “accidents of familial, religious, and educational experience 
seem to have a major influence on the particular constellation of beliefs which eventually 
express our moral competence.”48  Second, considered moral judgments involve greater 
reflection and are more likely than observation reports to be theory-laden.  Considered 
judgments are arrived at by weighing relevant facts and principles, so the judgments are 
more likely to reflect the background theories of the inquirer.  Third, “Whereas 
observation reports serve to validate or refute empirical theories, concrete moral 
judgments are themselves often validated or refuted by appeal to more general moral 
theories.”49  Moral judgments require justification from moral theories more frequently 
than they justify moral theories, whereas observation reports frequently serve to justify 
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  A counter-example to this point was raised by Anand Vaidya.  Speaking literally, all observation reports 
are false because they report on space as if it is Euclidean, yet we live in a non-Euclidean space.  This is 
one way to press Little’s unexamined faith in the veridicality of observation reports. 
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  Little 1984: 378-379. 
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  Ibid: 379. 
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empirical theories.  Little’s reasons in support of the disanalogy drives home the input 
objection more forcefully.50  
 Even though Little has provided reasons to think that the disanalogy between 
observation reports and CMJs is problematic for RE, it is informative to return to why 
Daniels thought the disanalogy was unproblematic for RE.  Looking at a response to 
Daniels sets-up the move I am going to endorse for establishing the credibility of CMJs. 
 Daniels attempts to turn a liability into an asset.  That is, Daniels tries to turn a 
reason RE lacks objectivity (i.e., theory-ladenness) into a source of credibility for the 
method.  Background theories might prove an independent check on the acceptance of 
moral principles and judgments.  The theory-ladenness of CMJs results from being 
unaware how background theories, largely shaped by cultural indoctrination, control the 
judgments that are formed.  Daniels requires the inquirer to not only reflect on her 
favored background theories but also to reflect on competing background theories.  By 
doing this Daniels introduces some degree of independent support for principles and 
judgments and requires the inquirer to be more aware of how theories are controlling her 
reasoning.  Considering a wide range of competing theories is thought to provide a 
justificatory gain over a more narrow approach that only systematizes the beliefs the 
inquirer already subscribes to.  Such inter-theoretical support is thought to provide 
traction in cases of moral disagreement.  Inquirers can point to an independent theory and 
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  These points reinforce the importance of my thesis to normative theory.  If CMJs are epistemically inferior to 
observation reports because they lack the reliability of perceptual reports, then there is not much reason to place 
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debate the theory instead of going in circles about moral disputes, which to cite one 
example—the abortion debate—often endlessly cycle without achieving consensus.  
Little raises a problem with Daniels’ approach: it merely shifts the problem of credibility 
to the background theories.  What constitutes the independent grounds on which the 
background theories can be established as credible? Little makes this problem clear using 
the case of Smith and Jones: 
Smith and Jones.  Consider discussants Smith and Jones who disagree over 
moral theories T and T’.  Suppose T and T’ are equally consistent with all 
considered judgments shared by Smith and Jones, so both discussants may 
continue to hold their distinct views without inconsistency.  But when we 
introduce philosophical theory P which Smith and Jones both accept, it may 
emerge that P supports T and is inconsistent with T’.  In this case Smith and Jones 
must come to agree on the correctness of T on pain of inconsistency.  Thus appeal 
to background philosophical theories may permit us to achieve consensus over a 
moral theory; but (unless we have independent reasons for believing these 
theories to be correct) such an appeal does not increase the rational warrant we 
may attach to the moral theory.51 
 The Smith and Jones case implies that consensus is purchased without a gain in the 
warrant of moral theories.  It simply shifts the credibility question to the philosophical 
background theories.  However, the history of philosophy shows that establishing the 
credibility of a philosophical theory is far from a conclusive matter or a matter that lends 
itself to conclusive independent credibility.52  Philosophical theories frequently reflect 
theoretical commitments instead of objective facts.  It seems that wide-RE only justifies 
moral theories to the degree that inquirers share the philosophical theories appealed to in 
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  Some philosophical theories can be checked against the results of scientific experiments.  Psychological 
experiments can inform philosophical theories, but I agree with Timothy Williamson that the best way to 
formulate philosophical theories is from the armchair.  This does not mean, however, that all philosophy 
must be done from the armchair (see Williamson 2007: 6-8). 
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the argument.  This is at best a lateral move in terms of justificatory strength.  Little 
completes his analysis by deepening the distinction between ethics and science when it 
comes to coherentist epistemology. 
 For Little the objectivity of theory is determined, in part, by the independence of the 
evidence supporting the theory.  Observation reports are more objective than moral 
judgments because perception is independent from background theory.  CMJs and 
philosophical theories are not independent controls on moral theory.  CMJs emanate from 
one’s background theory and philosophical theories only increase rational warrant to the 
degree that there are independent reasons to think the theories are correct.  This means 
that moral theory and science are not equally objective; thus, they have different 
epistemic standing.  Little summarizes his findings by restating the input objection and 
drawing out the relativistic implications of his conclusion: 
There is thus a crucial disanalogy between the two areas: empirical theory is 
constrained by evidence which is in a rough and ready sense independent of the 
theoretical conclusions we eventually arrive at, whereas moral deliberation is not.  
But if there is no class of beliefs which have an antecedent credibility independent 
of their relations to other statements, then how does any epistemic warrant enter 
the system of moral deliberation? We must conclude that the method of reflective 
deliberation provides only a very weak scheme of justification; it depends heavily 
and unavoidably on the particular considered judgments and background beliefs 
with which we begin, and these are themselves unjustified.  The most this process 
can do is to bring to the surface the principles which underlie the moral practices 
of the existing community, and subject those practices to a limited form of 
rational criticism.53 
 The dialectic between Daniels and Little reinforces the move I am going to make in 
arguing for the credibility of CMJs: establishing them as non-inferential foundations.  No 
matter how sophisticated the RE procedure becomes by incorporating in background 
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theories one cannot escape the input objection if the starting points are not credible.  In 
the preceding quote Little requests a set of beliefs that possess “an antecedent credibility 
independent of their relations to other statements” so that justification enters the belief 
system.  Though it is possible to argue against the input objection by establishing 
symmetry between observation reports and CMJs the best option for solving the objection 
is to establish CMJs as non-inferential foundations.  This is the option I endorse.  Before 
providing a positive account of this solution I will look at the third option for solving the 
input objection: holding that CMJs are credible because they play a vital methodological 
role. 
3. THE METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSE 
3.1 KEY DISTINCTIONS 
 In this section I will draw a distinction between the methodological role versus the 
epistemic status of moral intuitions or CMJs.  I also will frame the input objection more 
succinctly.  First, let me reframe the input objection using a different distinction. 
 Mark Nelson draws a distinction between a strong and weak version of the input 
objection.54  The strong version holds that one has a positive reason to think moral 
intuitions are false.  This version of the objection falls under the category of a tainted 
well argument.  If you place a well on a nuclear waste dumping site it will tend to yield 
water contaminated with radionuclindes or other elements of radioactive waste.  A defect 
in the origin of the water will tend to yield bad water.  The same might be said of moral 
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intuitions: if there is a defect in the origin of moral intuitions, then they will tend to be 
false.55  Peter Singer puts forward a strong version of the input objection when he 
considers that many moral convictions derive from, “discarded religious systems, from 
warped views of sex and bodily functions, or from customs necessary for survival of the 
group in social and economic circumstances that now lie in the distant past.”56  Holding 
that intuitions are tainted sources of justification—likely to be false—yields a strong 
conclusion.  According to Singer, “it would be best to forget all about our particular 
moral judgments.”57  There is reason to avoid such a strong statement. 
 Nelson mentions four points a tainted well argument must establish.58  First, such an 
argument must explain why CMJs are likely to be false because of their nature and origin.  
Second, the explanation of the falsity of CMJs must be the best explanation of this 
phenomenon, not simply a possible explanation of why CMJs are false.  Third, the 
explanation needs to apply to all CMJs, not just certain types of CMJs.  Fourth, tainted 
well arguments must show that the defects in the nature and origin of CMJs 
systematically resists correction; otherwise, recognizing that some concepts, theories and 
cognitive faculties can taint CMJs is compatible with designing a filter to only allow 
good CMJs to pass through to the next stage.  This does not make arguing for a strong 
interpretation of the input objection impossible, but it does make it a less attractive 
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mountain to scale.  It is possible, however, to use the strong version to motivate the weak 
version of the objection. 
 The weak version of the input objection holds that there is no reason to think CMJs 
are true, regardless of whether there is reason to think of them as false.  This form of the 
objection holds that CMJs possess no evidential weight.  To respond to this version 
Nelson proposes an argument from practice.  He reminds us that there are not non-
circular reasons to regard perceptual observations as true, but we still regard them as 
credible and use them in scientific reasoning.  So, even if CMJs are not true, it is 
permissible to regard them as credible and use them in moral reasoning.  This is a less-
articulated version of the analogy between observation reports and moral intuitions.  As 
previously explained, such a move does not address whether CMJs are credible.  It 
simply reminds us that we can use them as if they are credible.  A better response 
involves showing CMJs are credible or capable of serving as evidence for the truth of 
moral theories.  In addition, solving the weak version of the objection takes care of the 
strong version of the objection.  If there are reasons to think that CMJs are true, then 
those reasons can be used to rebut reasons to think that CMJs are false. 
 A successful defense of RE against the input objection must rebut the weak version 
of the objection by establishing CMJs in relation to moral truth.  It must do this in a way 
that makes CMJs suitable as evidence for or against theories.  This can be done by 
showing that CMJs possess epistemic weight.  By being evidence of the truth of moral 
theories, and true themselves, CMJs can provide rational grounds for preferring one 
theory over another theory.  CMJs gain positive epistemic status by being true in virtue of 
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possessing positive epistemic status, and, as a result, being fit to provide rational grounds 
for moral theories. 
 The next distinction I want to explore is between methodological role and epistemic 
status.59  Some theorists hold that only if a CMJ possesses positive epistemic status 
should it be used in a justificatory capacity.  Proponents of RE like Norman Daniels and 
Michael DePaul take a different approach.  They argue that even if CMJs do not possess 
positive epistemic status they can still serve an important methodological role that, in the 
end, leads to justification.  This is done by allowing CMJs to serve a role in RE 
methodology (e.g., acting as fire-starters or sustainers of reflection) regardless of their 
epistemic status.  After CMJs play this role it is possible to see what survives the 
reflection process and claim that what survives is what is justified (i.e., what remains 
when a point of reflective equilibrium is reached is justified).  On such a reading it is 
possible to hold the view that CMJs possess no positive epistemic status (i.e., they merely 
reflect one’s prejudices) yet to affirm that the best way to justify a moral theory is by 
using CMJs.  Further motivating the methodological response to the input objection is the 
idea that possessing positive epistemic status does not provide a guide to moral inquiry.60  
The result is that one can have CMJs with a positive epistemic status that do not play a 
methodological role, and vice versa.  It is possible to argue for one without arguing for 
the other. 
 I agree that the epistemic status and the methodological role of CMJs are two 
different avenues of justification CMJs can be used to pursue.  However, I hold that any 
                                                 
59
  DePaul 2006: 598-599. 
60
  Ibid: 598.  
33 
successful response to the input objection is going to have to establish CMJs within both 
avenues of justification.  One must have reliable or truth-apt CMJs and properly use the 
CMJs in a methodological role that exploits their truth-aptness to increase the 
justification of the belief system.  This provides a full response to the input objection.  
The need for both avenues of justification can be elaborated by returning to the 
distinction between epistemic status and methodological role. 
 A truth-apt CMJ corresponds to taking justification as aiming at truth or reliability.  
A CMJ that is well-utilized by having a clearly identified methodological role 
corresponds to taking justification as providing rational grounds for or against moral 
theories.  The problem with the history of RE is that theorists have focused on either an 
epistemic or a methodological response to the input objection and never fully answered 
the objection.  In the next section I want to provide two examples of how theorists have 
avoided the epistemic status of CMJs and focused solely on methodological solutions.  
These theorists tried to remain agnostic about meta-ethical questions and strictly assigned 
a methodological role to CMJs to show that CMJs can serve as rational grounds for 
theory choice.  As is now apparent from the distinction between strong and weak versions 
of the input objection such positions do not claim CMJs are true, they simply try to use 
CMJs in a useful (i.e., pragmatic) way.  Omitting the positive epistemic status of CMJs 
results in a failure to address the weak version of the input objection and provide a 
rebuttal against the strong version of the objection.  
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3.2 POSITIONS EMPHASIZING A METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSE 
 The two theorists I will use as examples of taking a methodological approach are 
William Shaw and Norman Daniels.  These theorists remain agnostic about the truth-
aptness of CMJs.  Failure to establish the positive epistemic status of CMJs results in an 
inability to solve the input objection.  In this section I will establish that the theorists 
avoid meta-ethical issues and argue against such an approach. 
 For Shaw reliance on intuition in moral philosophy is unavoidable.61  Shaw 
understands moral intuitions not in the Moorean sense as being self-evident but in the 
Rawlsian sense as being firmly-held moral judgments.  The epistemic status of moral 
intuitions is left an open question, as firmly-held moral judgments do not necessarily 
signify the apprehension of objective moral properties.  Shaw agrees with Rawls that 
there are only two alternatives to reliance on moral intuitions: positing self-evident first 
principles or taking a naturalistic approach by defining moral concepts in terms of non-
moral concepts.  The other alternative is to start from our firmly-held moral convictions 
and try to bring all of our beliefs into one coherent view.  Using intuitions as unavoidable 
starting points is acceptable for Shaw because these intuitions are not gut-reactions.  Such 
moral intuitions are, “delivered after calm consideration and reflection, undisturbed by 
personal interest or emotion.”62  Considered moral judgments are not making contact 
with objectively true moral facts, instead they are emanating from experience and our 
reflective capacities. 
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 The slogan of Shaw’s perspective is: if the conditions are right, the intuitions are 
credible.  Ideal conditions of reflection guard against judgments simply reflecting gut-
reactions based on cultural indoctrination.  It is possible, however, to generate a problem 
for Shaw’s slogan. 
 Though an inquirer is reflecting under ideal conditions one problem is that the 
mechanism doing the reflecting (i.e., the mind) has not been shown to be reliable or to 
yield judgments with positive epistemic status.  Telling a story about the reliability of 
CMJs involves telling a plausible story about the reliability of the psychology behind 
moral judgments.  Placing reflection in an ideal context does not tell the story of the 
reliability of the psychological mechanism producing the judgments.  Even in ideal 
conditions one may be systematically wrong in determining which judgments are 
credible, not because the conditions are not ideal, but because our minds are hard-wired 
for certain biases.63  If this could be the case even in ideal situations, the only way to 
form a reliable judgment is to not use the mechanism that is systematically unreliable.  
However, because one must use the mind to form judgments the only other option is to 
tell the story of the reliability of the judgments themselves.  That is, despite intuitions 
stemming from an unreliable source the intuitions are still credible in virtue of exhibiting 
certain characteristics that are truth-conducive.  Shaw avoids the hard problem of 
establishing that CMJs are truth-conducive by avoiding taking a meta-ethical stand on the 
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epistemic status of CMJs.  This is demonstrated by Shaw’s response to Brandt’s claim 
that firmly holding a judgment gives the judgment a status no better than a fiction.  As 
Shaw wonders: 
[B]ut do not any normative judgments—like our shared conviction that the torture 
of innocent children for fun is immoral—rightly enjoy prima facie credence? The 
view that such considered judgments, even when they are widespread, lack any 
initial credibility is hard to swallow.  If, rather, as I think, judgments generated 
under such [ideal] circumstances do emerge for that reason with some plausibility, 
then the problem which Brandt poses for the intuitionist’s coherence theory of 
justification disappears.64 
 A quick response to Shaw’s statement is that credence is not equal to credibility: 
possessing prima facie credence is not equal to possessing prima facie credibility (i.e., 
truth-aptness).  This is exactly Brandt’s point: credence does not correspond to 
credibility.65  Instead of viewing Shaw as having misunderstood Brandt’s objection I will 
posit a more charitable reading and hold that Shaw misspoke when he said that 
“normative judgments...rightly enjoy prima facie credence.” Let me now look at a more 
charitable response. 
 According to Shaw the input objection disappears under the influence of ideal 
conditions.  Against this I argue that the problem does not disappear, it simply reappears 
in a different place as the status of CMJs is outsourced to the project of defending the 
ideal conditions under which CMJs are made.  However, such conditions have been 
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systematically analyzed and have been found incapable of generating credibility.66  The 
methodological response makes the input objection take on greater force.  As the rug is 
pulled out from under ideal conditions all that is left is a direct response to the epistemic 
status of CMJs, but a methodological response is unable to directly address the epistemic 
status of CMJs.  Without showing that CMJs possess independent prima facie credibility 
the problem is not solved.  This means that the methodological solution is not sufficient 
to establish CMJs as credible.  Shaw does, however, acknowledge that there is an 
alternative to the methodological response when he mentions, “Earlier intuitionists met 
this problem head-on by arguing that our faculty of intuition yields knowledge of 
objective, non-natural moral properties.”67  Despite seeing this option there is good 
reason why Shaw and Rawls did not think an epistemic response was a viable option. 
 Equating an intuitionist model with positing strong foundations prevented theorists 
from embracing an epistemic response to the input objection.  Because Shaw equated the 
intuitionist model with boldly asserting strongly axiomatic foundations (i.e., self-evident 
Moorean intuitions) neither he nor Rawls saw this as a viable alternative.  The literature 
on intuitionism has recently progressed to open-up a third alternative to axiomatic self-
evidence or reductive naturalism.  This option is moderate intuitionism.  I embrace 
moderate intuitionism as a way to directly address the input objection by positing modest, 
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non-inferential foundations.  Such an alternative will be explored in relation to Robert 
Audi’s work during the positive account I formulate of the credibility of CMJs.  Now, to 
show that the narrow rendering of only two alternatives to the use of intuitions, as 
understood by Shaw and Rawls, does not establish the positive epistemic status of CMJs I 
will turn to Noah Lemos.  As Lemos says of the argument that there are only two 
alternatives to relying on moral intuitions:  
Neither of these alternatives, it is argued, hold out much hope for fundamental 
ethical principles, and since there are no other alternatives we must rely on our 
considered moral judgments.  This argument, however, does not show that any of 
our considered moral judgments have any positive epistemic status.  At best it 
shows that if fundamental moral principles are to be justified, then considered 
moral judgments must play some sort of justificatory role.  But the argument does 
not show that some fundamental moral principles can be justified or that 
considered moral judgments can play an epistemically justificatory role.68 
 Lemos’ statement is a good summary of how Shaw and Rawls fail to establish the 
positive epistemic status of CMJs and, hence, their fitness to serve as evidence for or 
against moral principles.69  Now I will consider Daniels attempt to establish the initial 
credibility of CMJs by providing a methodological solution. 
 To analyze Daniels’ approach I will take a meta-ethical vantage point.  I will largely 
follow Mark Timmons’ treatment of Daniels.70  Timmons’ approach is useful because he 
raises two objections to RE that illuminate the importance of providing an epistemic 
solution to the general input objection (i.e., credences do not correspond to credibilities). 
 The first objection Timmons raises is the moral input objection.  It is a version of the 
general input objection that focuses on meta-ethical issues, as it is an attempt to force the 
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RE-realist to become a constructivist concerning moral facts.  The objection states that 
CMJs are not likely to correspond to inquiry-independent moral truths.  Under an RE-
realist interpretation, CMJs provide evidence of inquiry-independent moral truths; CMJs 
point at truth or correspond to an inquiry-independent realm of moral facts.  The RE-
realist must hold that CMJs are reliable, as evidence, in corresponding to such moral 
facts.  For the RE-constructivist, CMJs do not correspond to moral facts beyond inquiry; 
instead, moral facts are a construction of inquiry.  On the RE-constructivist model there is 
no need to tell the story of how CMJs reliably point at an inquiry-independent realm of 
moral facts.  If the moral input objection can box-in a theorist to RE-constructivism then 
the methodological response gains traction because it aligns with constructivism.  By 
contrast, the epistemic response aligns with realism because it holds that CMJs are truth-
conducive whereas the methodological response does not assume nor does it take a stand 
on the truth-aptness of CMJs.  One way to circumvent the moral input objection is to 
establish that CMJs reliably correspond to an inquiry-independent realm of moral 
properties and facts.  This can only be accomplished by abandoning a pure coherentist 
interpretation of RE. 
 The moral input objection works because it assumes RE is a coherentist model of 
justification.  The objection works as follows.  It requires an adequate theory of 
justification to be truth-conducive to some degree.  This will work for RE as a coherentist 
model only if one embraces a constructivist, not a realist, conception of moral truth.  RE 
cannot guarantee truth in the realist sense; it can only set up conditions under which 
CMJs are likely to be true.  CMJs will not necessarily correspond to an external (non-
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conceptual) reality.  So, coherentist moral epistemology must adopt a constructivist 
account of moral truth.  This is because coherence is a matter of beliefs mutually 
supporting one another.  Maximizing coherence does not necessitate input from a realm 
external to the belief-set because it is a standard internal to the belief-set—it is a matter of 
how the beliefs fit together and mutual support one another.  Without external input the 
beliefs will not necessarily correspond to what is true in terms of non-conceptual reality.  
Thus, according to the objection, for a theorist to get an adequate theory of justification 
using RE the theorist must be a constructivist about truth.   
 This is a problem for responding to the general input objection because 
constructivism is aligned with the methodological response, and the methodological 
response is inadequate for solving the input objection.  One way of circumventing this 
problem is not to assume that RE is a pure coherentist methodology.  I will argue for this 
position and cast RE as a foundationalist method with coherentist elements, which opens-
up a realist interpretation of CMJs whereby they correspond to inquiry-independent 
moral facts and truths. 
 The many alternative systems objection, like the moral input objection, forces the 
coherentist to be a constructivist about moral truth.  To meet the criterion of truth-
conduciveness the coherentist needs to be a constructivist about truth in the face of many 
alternative coherent moral systems.71  To understand this objection it is important to note 
that a normative theory consists of a consistent set of moral principles.  Using different 
sets of moral judgments it is possible to generate different sets of consistent moral 
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principles.  Seeking coherence will not necessarily facilitate a clear choice between 
different moral theories.  This makes it difficult to achieve intersubjective agreement on a 
pure coherentist rendering of RE.  The method takes-on relativism and suffers from an 
inability to establish on an independent basis the warrant of the whole belief system.  If 
interpersonal disagreement persists and RE-truth is construed in a realist sense, then 
coherentist epistemology will not necessarily be truth-conducive.  That is, unless truth is 
construed relative to a given system, unless one becomes an RE-constructivist. 
 Two observations come out of the forgoing discussion.  First, solving the many 
alternative systems objection it is not enough to provide a methodological solution.  Even 
if interpersonal agreement could be generated, a methodological solution would not show 
which of the alternative coherent moral systems is to be preferred.  This is because truth 
is relative to each system and choice between equally coherent systems is bound to be 
arbitrary to some degree.  To overcome this one could argue that the coherent system to 
be preferred is the system that contains CMJs that possess positive epistemic status 
because they are credible or truth-apt in the realist sense.  A second observation is that 
remaining a constructivist is not a plausible option for solving the general input objection.  
A constructivist provides a methodological solution by not taking a stand on the existence 
of inquiry-independent moral truths.  The input objection is solved only if CMJs are in 
fact true.  A methodological solution is not able to establish that CMJs are guaranteed to 
be true or sufficient to provide evidence of truth; they are only likely to be true if 
conditions are ideal.  However, even ideal conditions are not enough to secure the 
probative value of CMJs.  On the other hand, an RE-realist can resist the moral input 
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objection and the many alternative systems objection by adopting a foundationalist 
architecture and providing an epistemic solution that establishes the prima facie 
credibility of CMJs.  This also results in a solution to the general input objection.  I now 
turn to the work of Daniels to show that being a constructivist and providing a 
methodological solution does not establish the credibility of CMJs. 
 Daniels adopts a don’t worry strategy upon confronting the input objection.  This 
strategy says: don’t worry about the epistemic status of CMJs or trying to solve the moral 
input objection; instead, focus on the many alternative systems objection by providing a 
methodological solution, then see if this solution provides a story about the credibility of 
CMJs.  Daniels seeks to show that coherentist methodology can lead to interpersonal 
convergence, and then he will deal with the input objection after convergence is 
established.  As Daniels says: 
It is plausible to think that only the development of acceptable moral theory in 
wide reflective equilibrium will enable us to determine what kind of "fact," if any, 
is involved in a considered moral judgment.  In the context of such a theory, and 
with an answer to our puzzlement about the kind of fact (if any) a moral fact is, 
we might be able to provide a story about the reliability of initial considered 
judgments.  Indeed, it seems reasonable to impose this burden on the theory that 
emerges in wide reflective equilibrium.72 
 Only after reaching wide-RE can a theorist, looking backwards, establish whether 
CMJs constitute moral facts.  Daniels’ solution is initially attractive because in getting to 
wide-RE one must bring CMJs and principles in-line with background theories.  These 
theories are largely nonmoral.  So, disputes over nonmoral theories may prove more 
tractable than disputes over CMJs and moral principles.  It looks plausible that greater 
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consensus could result from moral inquiry on such an account.  There are three problems 
Timmons identifies with this strategy. 
 First, there is the problem of ever achieving convergence.  Without an account of the 
initial credibility of CMJs there is reason to doubt whether reaching convergence is 
possible.  Turning to background theories to try to reach convergence and solve the many 
alternative systems objection does not eliminate the fact that background theories rely on 
CMJs for their justification.  The filter that is imposed on initial moral judgments screens 
for general sources of error in judgment making.  These general conditions involve 
freedom from bias, emotional duress, ignorance of facts and so on.  Judgments that 
surviving this general filtering process and become CMJs are reliable in some sense, but 
there are many incompatible sets of CMJs that meet the general filtering conditions.  So 
searching for convergence using background theories without selecting in advance the set 
of moral facts represented by CMJs is not likely to result in moral convergence.  The 
second worry Timmons has about Daniels’ don’t worry strategy is that it reverses the 
order of addressing the two objections necessary to secure a solution to the input 
problem.  Ultimately, a solution to the input objection must establish CMJs as true from a 
realist perspective.  Daniels’ methodological strategy is unable to do this because: 
Unless we have some reason to suppose in advance, and independently of the 
results of wide RE that this sort of methodology has all along been guided by 
inquiry-independent moral properties and facts that serve to constrain the inquiry, 
I see no reason to construe CMJs realistically—as by and large representing 
reliable input from an objective reality.73 
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 Even if the methodological approach is cashed out in coherentist/realist terms there 
is a problem with epistemic potency.74  Coherentists generally hold that RE possesses 
some epistemic credentials.  If an integral part of RE’s ability to have epistemic potency 
is in question until the end-point of the method, then there is no reason to accept the 
epistemic potency thesis until the end-point of the method.  Without establishing the 
positive epistemic status of CMJs prior to the end-point of the method the epistemic 
potency of RE must be taken on blind faith.  It is like saying: there is not currently reason 
to believe RE is epistemically credulous, but wait until the end of the process and your 
faith in RE will be vindicated.  This means a coherentist/realist must make a weaker 
claim about the power of coherence methodology in ethics, namely if CMJs are currently 
reliable, then the end-point of RE will vindicate the reliability of CMJs. 
 The final concern of Timmons about the don’t worry strategy involves the idea of 
theory-ladenness.  If an observation is theory-laden, then being able to make the 
observation depends on having made some theoretical assumptions.  Instead of 
observations purely reflecting sense experience they are mediated by theories.  This does 
not destroy the ability to make scientific observations as long as the observations are 
independent of the theories they are being used to test.  If the observations are not neutral 
evaluations of the theory, then they cannot be reliable guides to the truth of the theory.  A 
similar thing can be said about moral theories.  CMJs should not be weighted in favor of 
one of the competing theories they are used to evaluate.  Otherwise, CMJs are biased and 
not reliable evidence of moral truths.  The don’t worry strategy involves waiting until one 
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has a moral theory in reflective equilibrium and then using that theory to explain the 
reliability of the CMJs that were used to select the theory.  A casualty of this approach is 
the type of objectivity the realist wants to capture.  The CMJs do not stand at a proper 
distance from the theories, as the theories are used to explain the reliability of the CMJs 
that are used to justify the theories.75  In contrast, a reliability story can be told about 
scientific observations in advance of scientific inquiry, and this story is properly 
independent of the results of such inquiry.  This means that Daniels must abandon the 
don’t worry strategy and start the process with a group of CMJs and a story about their 
reliability.  Both the story and the CMJs will be subject to revision, but because the 
epistemic status of the CMJs is established independently from the results of the inquiry 
the theory will be tested against inquiry-independent facts.76  
 In conclusion, looking at Shaw and Daniels produced the following results.  A viable 
approach to addressing the input objection is to posit modest, non-inferential foundations 
by adopting some form of moderate intuitionism.  Such an approach exploits a realist 
interpretation of CMJs whereby they correspond to an inquiry-independent moral realm.  
Taking a “wait and see” methodological approach to solving the input objection will not 
result in converge between inquirers on moral theory selection.  To solve the input 
objection one must attack the moral input objection first.  The don’t worry strategy must 
be abandoned because it first attacks the many alternative systems objection.  Ignoring 
the epistemic status of CMJs in an effort to focus on their methodological role will 
undermine one’s efforts in the end.  It is not enough to take CMJs as an unavoidable 
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alternative in starting moral inquiry, as Shaw does, and it is not enough to ignore the 
epistemic status of CMJs, as Daniels does, until the method itself has been revised and an 
instance of employing the method has reached its conclusion.  The status of CMJs must 
be established first, then the justificatory role CMJs play within the method of RE can be 
solidified.77 
4. ARCHITECTURE AND TRUTH 
4.1 VARIOUS COMBINATIONS 
 The previous section touched on architecture (i.e., the structure of justification) and 
truth.  This section will elaborate on those themes by answering the following question, 
“What combination of architecture and truth is best suited to solving the input 
objection?” The two options I will consider are: coherentism or foundationalism, and 
realism or constructivism.  After exploring various combinations of truth and architecture 
I will defend the combination of realism and foundationalism as the best combination to 
solve the input objection. 
 Toward the end of the last section it was concluded that a coherentist/realist must 
address the moral input objection before tackling the many alternative systems objection.  
What are the prospects for such an approach? 
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 A representative of a coherentist/realist approach is David Brink.78  Brink tries to 
establish the credibility of CMJs contextually prior to reaching the end-point of RE.  
There are three problems with his approach.  The first problem is that the entire RE 
process is ridden with intuitive judgments.  Unless the capacity to make intuitive 
judgments is defended as reliable it is not clear that an inquirer can establish the 
credibility of CMJs within a context in an objective fashion.  Second, Brink’s analogy of 
CMJs with observation reports is inadequate.  It is not obvious that using CMJs as 
auxiliary hypotheses to test a moral theory establishes that moral beliefs are credible 
along realist lines.  This may only show that CMJs can be used methodologically in such 
a capacity, but whether using them in such a capacity provides a credible check against 
the truth of moral theories is another story.  This relates to the notion of objectivity as 
independence from the theory being tested.  Observation reports can be established as 
credible independent of inquiry to a degree that CMJs cannot.  Third, if CMJs are 
ultimately credible in virtue of being ground in empirical properties and facts (or being 
evidence of such facts), then it may turn out that the system ultimately embodies a 
foundationalist architecture.  If there is no external input into the system of beliefs, then 
the system may not make contact with non-conceptual reality.  These considerations 
point the coherentist/realist in the direction of either foundationalist architecture or 
constructivist truth.  What are the merits of being a coherentist/constructivist and can 
such a position solve the input objection? 
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 Under a coherentist interpretation a CMJ is justified if it is part of a coherent system 
of beliefs.  These beliefs include CMJs at all levels of generality.  For a constructivist 
moral facts are constituted by the beliefs held in reflective equilibrium.  A constructivist 
holds that the truth of CMJs is explained by reference to the process by which they are 
constructed, which includes human stances (e.g., attitudes and conventions) specific to 
RE methodology.79  A constructivist wants a well-justified system and may remain 
agnostic about the ultimate truth-value of the components of the system.  In solving the 
input objection, however, a constructivist cannot remain silent on meta-ethical issues.  
Because constructivism equates the moral facts with coherent beliefs held in reflective 
equilibrium the best fit for a theory of truth is a coherence theory.80  The truth of beliefs 
is determined by coherence with other beliefs, not correspondence to a realm outside the 
beliefs.  This makes the coherentist/constructivist establish the truth of CMJs in relation 
to a coherence theory of truth.  The problem with this move is that recent technical results 
tell against the notion of coherence being truth-conducive. 
 Recent developments in formal epistemology show that coherence alone is not truth-
conducive.81  I will mention a couple results from this area of research.  Erik Olsson has 
argued that any theories that depend on the truth-conduciveness of coherence must put 
forward a doxastic, or testimonial, truth connection instead of a propositional one.  Even 
then, there is only a very weak connection between an increase in coherence and an 
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increase in the likelihood of truth.82  Tomoji Shogenji has argued against justification by 
coherence from scratch.  Shogenji considers individual pieces of evidence that possess no 
individual credibility and wonders if making them coherent makes the evidence credible.  
Most theorists agree that independent evidence that possesses individual credibility when 
brought together in coherence can make the evidence more credible.  But Shogenji argues 
that independent evidence that does not possess individual credibility when brought 
together in coherence does not generate credible evidence.  Justification by coherence 
from scratch is impossible.83  This is a problem for pure coherence theory because it 
assumes no credibility of the initial data.  The coherentist/constructivist must explain how 
beliefs that have no independent credibility can become truth-conducive by being brought 
into coherence with one another.   
  The probability calculus results just mentioned tell against the 
coherentist/constructivist picture.  The coherentist/constructivist takes on a theory of truth 
that is not truth-conducive and takes on a theory of justification that cannot generate 
justification.  This reinforces the importance of establishing the initial credibility of 
CMJs.  Typical RE theorists do not posit the independent credibility of CMJs but only a 
weaker version of credibility that is uniquely tuned to ideal conditions.  Assigning weak 
credibility to CMJs is problematic: general filter conditions are not selective enough to 
screen amongst many incompatible sets of CMJs that satisfy the conditions, and 
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confidence alone in judgments that survive filtration is not enough to make CMJs initially 
credible.  This seems to push the RE theorist in the foundationalist/realist direction.84 
 A moral realist believes moral claims can be taken literally.  This means that there 
are moral facts and true moral propositions.  CMJs try to instantiate moral facts and assert 
moral propositions.  There are two senses of objectivity involved in moral realism.  The 
first kind involves realism about moral facts and the truth (or falsity) of moral 
propositions.  The second kind of objectivity holds that moral facts exist irrespective of 
persons believing things about right and wrong.  This last sense of objectivity 
distinguishes moral realism from moral constructivism.  Constructivism makes truth both 
belief and evidence-dependent.  Realism holds that the truth of moral propositions exists 
independently from anyone’s beliefs and evidence.  An inquirer can, on the realist model, 
discover the truth of moral propositions, but the truth of those propositions is not 
constructed relative to the inquirer’s beliefs and evidence. 
 There is a natural link between realism and foundationalism.  Foundational non-
inferential beliefs are justified irrespective of their evidential relations to other beliefs.  
Non-inferential beliefs can provide evidence of moral facts.  These moral facts are 
inquiry-independent, yet CMJs used within inquiry can provide evidence for the truth of 
those moral facts.  On the foundationalist/realist model, the truth of moral facts can be 
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directly apprehended through intuition.85  These truths are discovered through a process 
of understanding and reflection, not inference.  On this account, RE is a method for 
achieving a better understanding of moral facts and the truth of moral propositions, yet 
the truths that are discovered are inquiry-independent moral facts.86  Endorsing this 
perspective moves my approach away from the coherentist/constructivist picture whereby 
moral facts are constituted by an inquirer’s propositional attitude at the end-point of 
reflective equilibrium—when a set of beliefs are held to mutually support one another in 
maximal coherence.  Now I must explain how RE is possible within the foundationalist 
framework and how such a post-Rawlsian interpretation of RE still captures some of 
Rawls’ intuitions. 
4.2 RE IS COMPATIBLE WITH FOUNDATIONALISM 
 Foundationalism is the thesis that justification is asymmetrical.  A distinction is 
made between basic and non-basic beliefs.  Basic beliefs are epistemically privileged.  
This means that their positive epistemic status does not come from their inferential or 
evidential relations with other beliefs.  A non-basic belief is justified by bearing an 
appropriate relation (evidential or inferential) to a basic belief.  What is important for the 
foundationalist is that there are non-inferentially justified beliefs that provide the 
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justification of other beliefs.  Inference to basic beliefs can provide justification for non-
basic beliefs, but inference from non-basic beliefs to basic beliefs is not required for the 
justification of basic beliefs. 
 Different types of foundationalism emerge depending on the strength of the 
foundations.  Strong foundationalists of the Cartesian variety hold that basic beliefs must 
be certainties that cannot be doubted and that deductive validity is required to transmit 
justification upward from the basic beliefs.  By contrast, Audi has created a doubly 
moderate version of foundationalism: the foundations possess some credibility but not 
absolute certainty, and justification can be transmitted upward by inference, not 
deduction alone.87  If RE is to accommodate some form of foundationalism it cannot be 
the strong variety.  RE is not compatible with positing CMJs as indefeasible foundations.  
CMJs must be revisable.  They must possess some epistemic privilege in the form of 
credibility but be capable of being revised in the face of new beliefs and experiences.  
Regarding moderate foundationalism, basic beliefs are nonderivatively yet defeasibly 
justified.  As Audi says about moderate foundations, “the relevant beliefs may apparently 
have a far wider range of types of content, and certainly they need not be infallible, 
indubitable, or immune from revision in the light of new beliefs.”88  One advantage 
modest foundationalism has over its strong counterpart is that it has a wider range of 
grounds at its disposal.  This facilitates a larger tool-set for providing justification.  
Despite linking RE with foundationalism being both possible and desirable it is important 
to consider an objection to the idea of uniting RE with foundationalism. 
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 It is possible to argue that RE and foundationalism are not “positions on the same 
topic.”89  This idea can be defended based on the distinction between the methodological 
status and the epistemic status of CMJs.  RE is properly conceived as a method for 
organizing our beliefs, and foundationalism concerns the epistemic status of our beliefs.  
Though the topics of status and method are related, the connection between the two is not 
simple.  Distinguishing between different types of foundationalism DePaul concludes that 
narrow-RE is not committed to foundationalism, as it is often assumed, and wide-RE is 
compatible with foundationalism.  This flips the standard conception on its head because 
it is typically assumed that narrow-RE is committed to foundationalism and wide-RE 
coherentism.  First, I will outline DePaul’s argument, and then I will use my own 
considerations and some considerations from Roger Ebertz to undercut DePaul’s 
argument.  Next I will claim Ebertz’ argument must be sharpened if a necessary 
connection between RE and foundationalism is to be drawn. 
 The argument that narrow-RE is not necessarily connected to foundationalism rests 
on showing there is equivocation in the use of the term “considered moral judgment.” To 
assume that a person’s beliefs in narrow-RE exhibit a foundational architecture two 
claims are made (i) CMJs are not formed based on the relation they have to other beliefs 
a person holds (ii) other moral beliefs are formed in relation to foundational CMJs, and 
such beliefs (i.e., principles) are held because they best account for foundational CMJs.  
The first claim is accurate in relation to the initial set of CMJs (CMJ1) the person holds 
because set CMJ1 is formed through a filtering process and not in relation to other beliefs 
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the person holds.  The second claim is accurate in relation to the final set of CMJs (CMJn) 
the person holds because set CMJn is formed through a process of revision in relation to 
other beliefs (i.e., principles).  To achieve a coherent set of moral beliefs it is possible 
that CMJ1 and CMJn are not going to be the same.  Through radical revisions it may turn 
out that none of the beliefs in CMJ1 are in CMJn.  So, it is argued, CMJ1 cannot serve as 
the foundation for other beliefs because once one has arrived at the final set of moral 
principles (MPn) that would best systematize CMJ1 it is unlikely that one will still hold all 
or any of the beliefs in CMJ1.  Also, CMJn cannot serve as the foundation because this set 
of beliefs is likely to have been constructed in relation to other beliefs, and the beliefs in 
MPn might have been formed for reasons aside from their relation to CMJn.  This puts a 
person wanting to maintain narrow-RE is connected to foundationalism in a bind.  The 
only way out that allows one to hold onto claims (i) and (ii) is to equivocate between 
CMJ1 and CMJn.  The two claims will only be satisfied if one does not draw a distinction 
between initial judgments and final judgments.  If one equivocates one can hold that 
CMJs in general are capable of being foundations and MPs can be justified in relation to 
those foundations.  If one draws a distinction between varieties of CMJs one cannot 
satisfy the two claims of foundationalism.90  
 The best way to undercut DePaul’s argument is to make more accurate claims on 
behalf of foundationalism.  A more accurate specification of the two claims is that (i’) 
CMJs are not formed by using other beliefs as premises (ii’) other beliefs are formed as 
inferences from foundational CMJs.  DePaul’s two claims on behalf of foundationalism 
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are too general.  It is not simply that a belief is related to another belief that makes it non-
basic; rather, how the belief is related to the other belief must be part of the distinction 
between basic and non-basic.  As long as the beliefs in the set of CMJn are non-
inferential, then they can be used as foundations for the principles that systematize them 
throughout the process.  So, the key is not whether CMJs are ever revised in relation to 
other beliefs, but that when they are revised they are not revised through explicit 
inference. 
 For Ebertz, RE is best interpreted as a form of modest foundationalism.91  The prima 
facie credibility of CMJs derives not from their relation to other beliefs but by indicating 
the way beliefs seem to the person morally.  The beliefs that survive the filtering process 
can serve as standards against which principles can be tested.  These beliefs have prima 
facie direct justification, but they can be undercut during the reflection process.  If beliefs 
survive to the end of the process they are ultima facie justified, and there is no reason to 
think that they lose their direct justification.92  Relating this point back to DePaul’s 
argument, just because the final set of principles in narrow-RE (MPn) are pointing at a 
different set of beliefs (i.e., CMJn instead of CMJ1) this does not mean that MPn is 
pointing at beliefs that are not directly justified.  The radical interpretation of RE 
challenges this point. 
 The radical interpretation of RE challenges the idea that the final set of principles is 
pointing at a justified set of CMJs.  Given that CMJ1 and CMJn might be completely 
                                                 
91
  Ebertz 1993. 
92
  For more on the prima facie/ultima facie distinction see Senor 1996. 
56 
different, yet CMJn might be nevertheless justified, this means it is wrong to say that the 
justification is coming from the prima facie justification of the initial CMJs.  Instead, it 
seems correct to hold that the notion of coherence is driving the justification, not the 
beliefs that are posited to be foundations.  Initial CMJs survive the process based on 
coherence considerations, not based on possessing positive epistemic status.  Thus, it 
seems that coherence and not foundationalism is generating justification. 
 Ebertz argues against the previous challenge by focusing on the inescapable role 
CMJs play.  CMJs are necessary components in RE, and principles must cohere with 
CMJs if they are to be justified.  Rawls himself even claimed, “There is a definite if 
limited class of facts against with conjecture principles can be checked, namely, our 
considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.”93  Having considered judgments about 
moral situations is more direct than applying a general principle to a situation.  These 
judgments continue to have direct justificatory force because a person can continue to 
make direct judgments even when the procedure leads to radical shifts in the beliefs.  
Ebertz lets go of the search for truth and epistemic privilege and holds that it is our ability 
for moral perception and judgment that gives the CMJs a directness that begets 
justificatory force.  Ebertz takes a turn in the constructivist direction.  He finds this 
approach corroborated in Rawls’ Kantian Constructivism.  As Ebertz says, “The goal is 
not to find principles that are true, but to find principles which are reasonable for us to 
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live by, given our own common situation and assumptions about persons and society.”94  
This leads Ebertz into two problems. 
 Taking a constructivist turn in defending modest foundationalism exposes one to the 
problem of social indoctrination and establishing the normativity of modest foundations.  
The first problem occurs if one embraces RE as seeking practical, not epistemic, 
justification.  The principles accepted are those which match something like an 
overlapping consensus of core values in a society.95  The values that a society shares 
eventually become the principles by which it is reasonable for those in the society to 
accept and live by.  These principles do not derive their force from being in coherence 
with other beliefs (CMJs).  They derive their force from reflecting the reasonable 
overlapping consensus that makes a well-ordered society possible.  One problem with 
this approach is found in societies where slavery and prostitution are norms.  If a shared 
value in society is that people should be held to do labor against their will based on their 
race or that it should be legal for persons to sell sex for money, then one has to ask 
whether such CMJs should play the role of being criteria principles are based on.  If this 
society is not representative of societies around the globe, and it does not seem that 
prostitution and slavery ought to drive the justification of principles everyone should 
accept and live by, then a generality problem rears its head.  How does one cut the notion 
of a society to get at the normative values? Are the values all relative to a society? If so, 
then how does one fight the problem of pernicious prejudice and cultural indoctrination? 
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How does one identify the core values that ought to govern a society if one simply takes 
the deeply engrained values as the ones that drive the formation of moral principles?  
 The second problem that results in taking a constructivist turn in defending modest 
foundationalism is that one is led into a don’t worry strategy.  Ebertz’ strategy involves 
restating the inescapable methodological role CMJs play in justification.  This, however, 
avoids addressing the problem of the epistemic status of CMJs.  That CMJs can possess 
direct justification because they are made on the basis of moral perception does not 
establish the beliefs so formed as credible.  It just shows that whatever the beliefs are the 
beliefs can be reproduced throughout the RE process.  That is, as humans we do not lose 
the ability to replace a revised CMJ with another CMJ, so throughout the process we can 
always keep in place a thing that plays an important role in justification, namely, a CMJ.  
Again the question returns, what is it about the nature of a CMJ that gives it the ability to 
play this role? That CMJs can play a special role does not mean that they should play that 
role.  Applying a don’t worry strategy only takes-on further difficulties with cultural 
indoctrination and cutting the societal pie to know where to find the correct moral values, 
not to mention the specific difficulty of being unable to solve the input objection. 
 The reason Ebertz shied away from a foundationalist/realist combination of 
architecture and truth is because he held that intuitionism is committed to infallible 
foundations.  This is the same mistake made by Shaw and Rawls.  As Ebertz says about 
Rawls’ quote equating CMJs with moral facts, “Clearly, they should not be understood as 
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committing Rawls to the existence of self-evident or unchangeable moral truths.”96  In 
discussing Rawls’ move away from truth and toward a practical conception of 
justification Ebertz says, “Although this conception of the justificatory task does take 
Rawls further from classical ‘intuitionist’ foundationalism, it is not at all clear that is 
takes him away from foundationalism per se.”97  Realizing RE is compatible with 
foundationalism the best way to argue for this is to hold that the foundations are prima 
facie true pending further reflection.  Without embracing foundationalism/realism in the 
form of moderate intuitionism the epistemic status of CMJs remains in question.  RE is 
never placed on solid footing. 
 I conclude this section by affirming some of Rawls’ intuitions.  I affirm Rawls’ 
intuition that CMJs are facts against which principles are to be evaluated.98  The problem 
for affirming this intuition is, at the same time, affirming Rawls’ coherentist intuition that 
justification is a matter of everything fitting together—it is a matter of mutual support.  
This intuition can be accommodated.99  Moderate (fallibilist) foundationalism is able to, 
“account for the main connections between coherence and justification, and it can 
provide principles of justification to explain how justification that can be plausibly 
attributed to coherence can also be traced—by sufficiently complex and sometimes 
inductive paths—to basic sources in experience and reason.”100  Despite the compatibility 
of coherentist elements (i.e., mutual support) along with foundationalism I argued in this 
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section that, “reflective equilibrium is a model not of coherentism but of modest 
foundationalism combined with the claim that coherence between beliefs is an additional 
necessary condition for justification.”101  This sets-up a question that needs to be 
answered.  What version of RE best fits with moderate foundationalism? 
4.3 AGAINST WIDE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONALISM 
 There are two main versions of RE: narrow and wide.  Given that the most plausible 
way of solving the input objection involves taking a realist/foundationalist stance it is 
possible to wonder whether narrow or wide-RE better accommodates this stance.  
Narrow-RE better accommodates this stance because narrow-RE is typically cast in 
intuitionist terms whereas wide-RE is typically cast in non-intuitionist terms.  Narrow-RE 
looks at CMJs as non-inferential sources of justification whereas wide-RE looks at 
nonmoral background theories as sources of justification.  For a wide-RE foundationalist 
model the background theories constitute foundations proper.  Though narrow-RE is a 
better fit for a combination of architecture and truth capable of solving the input objection 
wide-RE poses a problem for my approach. 
 A challenge to my view that an intuitionist version of foundationalism is best suited 
for RE is that a non-intuitionist version of wide-RE is able to be foundational without 
positing non-inferentially justified beliefs.  This does not give CMJs full-fledged 
epistemic standing independent of other beliefs, but it does challenge whether there is a 
way around the input objection—a way of introducing credibility into the system without 
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telling a “realist” story.  What Timmons calls wide ethical foundationalism is such an 
attempt.102 
 Non-intuitionist wide ethical foundationalism posits nonmoral background theories 
as foundations in the architecture of justification.  It holds that certain moral principles or 
judgments are privileged relative to other moral beliefs because they depend on nonmoral 
background theories to receive their justification.  This makes it possible to justify moral 
beliefs independent from reliance on other moral beliefs.  It positions nonmoral 
background theories as the standard for choice between moral theories.  I will argue 
against wide ethical foundationalism. 
 For Timmons a foundationalist about ethical justification adopts what is called the 
independence thesis (IT), which can be elaborated as follows: 
 (IT) Relevant background theories, sufficient for constraining a choice among 
competing moral systems, can be developed independently of moral 
considerations.103 
 According to Timmons, accepting or rejecting (IT) determines whether one is 
foundationalist or non-foundationalist concerning the architecture of justification.  For a 
coherentist like Daniels (IT) is not possible because a nonmoral theory, say of persons, 
cannot be developed apart from moral considerations.  The goal for the foundationalist, 
according to Timmons, is to develop a theory of persons that satisfies (IT).  This would 
show that wide ethical foundationalism is possible because a nonmoral background 
theory can be formulated without reliance on moral beliefs, and such a theory can serve 
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as an independent check on moral beliefs.  If this can be accomplished then there is no 
need to posit CMJs as foundational because CMJs can receive their justification from 
such background theories.  CMJs need not possess initial credibility.  The problem with 
Timmons’ formulation is that he bases his version of foundationalism on a coarse 
distinction between immediately and mediately justified beliefs.  His version of ethical 
foundationalism runs as follows: 
For any person S at time t, if S is justified in believing any moral proposition at t, 
then the set A of S’s moral beliefs that make up that justified set has the following 
justificatory structure: 
i. There is a nonempty subset A* of A such that S’s believing each member 
of A* is immediately justified; 
ii. All other members of A (all non-A*s) are such that in believing each 
member of that set, S is mediately justified where such justification 
involves at least one member from A*.104 
 It is possible to draw a distinction between propositions that are immediately versus 
mediately justified.105  A foundational belief need not be immediately justified.  For 
example, a self-evident proposition can be mediately justified.  Such a proposition need 
not be inferred through the mediation of other beliefs.  It can be non-inferentially justified 
through the mediation of reflection.  An immediately justified proposition does not 
require such reflection.  Mediately justified beliefs are knowable without relying on 
inferences as their grounds, but they may require reflection in order to see their truth or to 
see that the proposition is self-evident.  Thus, the propositions that serve as foundations 
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in set A* need not only be immediately justified.106  It is possible that S’s believing each 
member of A* is immediately and mediately justified. 
 Using moderate intuitionism as an example of a commitment to foundationalism it 
shows that Timmons’ construal of foundationalism is not general enough to cover what 
all moral theories are committed to when they adopt a foundationalist structure.  Bringing 
this discussion back to (IT), one could be an intuitionist/foundationalist and reject (IT).  
Foundationalists need not accept (IT) or wide ethical foundationalism.  It is possible for 
an intuitionist/foundationalist to reject that nonmoral background theories in RE can be 
developed independent from moral considerations.  It may be that nonmoral theories can 
constrain theory choice based on moral considerations, namely, fit with moral 
propositions that are foundational.  Timmons use of (IT) to divide foundationalists from 
non-foundationalists belies an adoption of a particular structure of ethical justification—
wide ethical foundationalism.  However, the problem with wide ethical foundationalism 
connects to the problem with Timmons’ version of foundationalism, even when 
formulated in wide foundationalist terms.  The subset A* of A need not be formulated so 
that each member of A* can be justified independently of any other member of A.  It may 
be the case that during justification members of A* can be clarified by appealing to 
members of A, as in law when one uses a prior case as precedence to see the truth in the 
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case at hand without inferring from precedence to the justification of the case at hand.107  
So, wide ethical foundationalism is not the only type of foundationalism that can be 
accommodated by RE.  It seems possible to accommodate an intuitionist version as well. 
 If it is reasonable to opt for positing CMJs as foundations and avoid positing 
nonmoral background theories as foundations, it seems one is left with only narrow-RE 
as the best version of RE.  This might be viewed as a non-progressive step for RE.  Much 
of the justificatory power of RE is thought to consist in the wide range of considerations 
and the detailed revisions it urges.  The justificatory gain from this searching and fearless 
moral inventory is thought to make RE a defeasible theory of moral justification.  Have I 
not robbed RE of its justificatory force by claiming that wide-RE is not tenable as a 
theory of foundationalism? 
4.4 WIDE-RE IS NOT SUPERIOR TO NARROW-RE 
 The first reason it seems wide-RE (WRE) is preferable to narrow-RE (NRE) is that, 
“WRE allows us to make a weaker and more defensible claim about the initial credibility 
of our considered moral judgments.”108  As noted throughout this paper many 
philosophers have objected that initial CMJs (CMJ1) have no credibility.  Brandt makes 
this claim and Daniels takes this objection as a reason to move in the WRE direction.  
Instead of granting judgments in CMJ1 a privileged status (i.e., calling them non-
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inferential intuitions), it is better not to grant these judgments credibility.  However, both 
WRE and NRE require making claims about the credibility of initial CMJs.  Some of our 
judgments (e.g., beliefs about astrology) will have no credibility.  NRE does not require 
our principles and theories to systematize these judgments.  It only requires that we 
systematize judgments with prima facie credibility.  WRE must also ascribe prima facie 
credibility to initial CMJs if it is capable of justifying moral theories.  If the principles in 
WRE only derive their credibility from nonmoral background theories, then the best way 
for moral principles to derive credibility would be to deduce the principles from the most 
plausible current background theories.  However, in effect, this would be to abandon 
WRE.109 
 Proponents of WRE might respond to the argument above in the following way.  
They might grant that as a whole initial CMJs possess initial credibility but argue that 
many of these judgments are likely to be incorrect.  Daniels, for instance, points out that 
many of these judgments are likely to reflect, “cultural background, self-interest, or 
historical accident.”110  Because NRE only asks that principles are brought in-line with 
initial CMJs it requires that most of the initial CMJs are correct.  WRE, on the other 
hand, makes a weaker claim about the correctness of CMJs because it uses background 
theories as a further mechanism in weeding out incorrect CMJs.  So, WRE makes a more 
plausible claim about how credible initial CMJs are.  Responding to this argument one 
must remember that NRE is not without a filtering mechanism capable of eliminating 
judgments conducive to error.  Both methodologies possess this feature.  If the filter can 
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be improved it is possible to filter out incorrect CMJs with a high degree of accuracy.  It 
is also possible to use empirical studies to help decide when CMJs are correlated with the 
factors Daniels mentions (i.e., reflect cultural background, self-interest or historical 
accident).111  
 There is another reason why NRE and WRE are on equal footing when it comes to 
being committed to the credibility of CMJs.  In either NRE or WRE theories can act as a 
corrective on CMJs.  Sometimes it is difficult to know when to revise a moral principle to 
accommodate a moral judgment and when to revise a moral judgment in light of a moral 
principle.  One way that it would be preferable to revise a judgment is if a compelling 
theory is created that accounts for the judgment but the theory requires the inquirer to 
revise the judgment.  Reinterpreting the data in this way is typical in science.  Similarly 
in moral theory, “a compelling moral theory may explain why a given intuition seemed 
correct initially, although from our new theoretical perspective we can see that it should 
be revised.”112  Given that moral theory is more theory-laden, as Daniels has suggested, 
then this type of revision may happen more often in moral theory than in science.   
 If a WRE-proponent continues to press that WRE allows for a more qualified claim 
about the degree of credibility that CMJs possess, then this requires the proponent to 
defend the superiority of WRE to NRE using two claims.  These claims are the other two 
reasons why one might hold WRE is superior to NRE.  WRE might be shown to 
eliminate more of the mistaken initial CMJs if it can be proven that (1) moral principles 
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in WRE gain their credibility from nonmoral background theories and these theories are 
more reliable than moral judgments, and (2) WRE avoids accidental generalization of 
CMJs as moral theories are formulated.113  I return to the don’t worry strategy of Daniels, 
which holds that a stance on the credibility of CMJs is forthcoming from going through 
the process of WRE.  Once we know “what kind of fact, if any, is involved in a 
considered moral judgment” we will be able to describe why such a judgment is typically 
warranted.  For Daniels, people might also converge on a specific equilibrium point, and 
CMJs could be referenced as credible to explain why there is convergence on objective 
moral truth.  I have already discussed the problem with this approach in relation to 
Timmons’ work.114  Holmgren, however, takes a different approach to rebutting Daniels. 
 Holmgren brings the discussion of the superiority of WRE over NRE back to the 
question of why a proponent of NRE could not adopt the same provisional stance toward 
the credibility of CMJs as the proponent of WRE.  The proponent of NRE could discover 
what kind of fact is involved in a CMJ by reference to a moral theory.  Inquirers from 
diverse background might also converge on a narrow equilibrium point.  So, a reason for 
the credibility of CMJs could emerge from NRE in much the same way as WRE.  The 
WRE proponent might respond that looking at background theories increases the 
possibility of converge because people can debate background theories instead of moral 
judgments and principles.  This argument hinges on the reliability of background theories 
and their supposed superiority to moral theories.  It, again, requires the WRE proponent 
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to establish the truth of claims (1) and (2) mentioned above.  However, even if a 
convergence point is reached, the moral theory at the point of convergence cannot be 
used to account for the credibility of the CMJs in the way Daniels proposes.  If a moral 
theory establishes the credibility of CMJs it must be sufficiently independent from the 
CMJs it is used to establish the credibility of.  But, if one waits until a theory is selected 
in WRE to explain the credibility of CMJs, then the credibility of CMJs can only be 
defended in reference to assumptions that favor the moral theory selected.  This means 
that CMJs cannot play a role in moral theory selection in the way that observation reports 
in science help select correct scientific theories.  If one waits to explain the credibility of 
CMJs, selects a theory in WRE, then explains the credibility of CMJs using that theory, 
then the CMJs cannot be used to select a moral theory without undermining the ability to 
objectively explain their credibility.115  
 Holmgren goes on to argue against claims (1) and (2).  Against the idea that 
background theories are more reliable than moral theories Holmgren argues that both 
WRE and NRE use nonmoral background theories.  Epistemological theories can be used 
to show that moral principles can derive support from nonmoral background theories.  
Such an argument might run as follows:  
1. There is a truth of the matter about morality. 
2. If a moral principle economically systematizes a greater range of our 
considered moral judgments than competing principles, it constitutes our 
best available approximation of a true moral principle. 
3. That principle P economically systematizes a greater range of these 
judgments than competing principles, we can conclude that P is our best 
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approximation of a true moral principle and ought to guide our actions in 
cases in which it clearly seems to apply.116  
 This argument derives a moral conclusion from a nonmoral background theory.  The 
epistemological principle supports the use of RE methodology, but it does not do so 
within the context of WRE.  Nor does the principle differentiate between NRE and WRE.  
Holmgren identifies that, “Moral intuitionists have always drawn on logical and 
epistemological background theories to justify the methodology they use to justify moral 
theories.”117  Thus, it seems that moral intuitionists who employ the NRE methodology 
can still use nonmoral background theories to justify moral theories. 
 It is possible to produce further arguments that show that WRE and NRE fail to use 
nonmoral background theories in a way that is structurally different.  WRE and NRE 
might still differ in how much weight they place on CMJs, but this difference can be 
located within the role moral background theories play in WRE.  So, it seems both WRE 
and NRE can accommodate the use of nonmoral background theories, and nonmoral 
background theories do not enhance the credibility of moral principles by playing a 
unique role in WRE.  Both methods can accommodate claim (1). 
 Holmgren also argues against claim (2).  Claim (2) asserts that WRE is preferable to 
NRE because it minimizes the problem of moral principles being accidental 
generalizations of CMJs.  The implication is that the CMJs in WRE might be more 
credible than the CMJs in NRE.  The plausibility of this idea derives from Daniels 
introduction of the independence constraint.  This constraint requires that the set of CMJs 
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systematized by background theories is disjoint from the set of CMJs systematized by 
moral principles.  This makes moral principles secure from being accidental 
generalizations from initial CMJs because the moral principles, “have been shown to 
have some kind of logical connection (entailment or inference to the best explanation) 
with background theories which systematize another set of considered moral 
judgments.”118  So, the principles that pass through NRE to WRE are less likely to 
represent ad hoc generalizations from one’s CMJs.  Against this claim Holmgren argues 
it does not establish that WRE is preferable to a sophisticated moral intuitionism.  
Because Holmgren has shown that WRE does not differ from NRE in its use of moral 
background theories this means the WRE proponent must hold—along with the 
intuitionist—that CMJs have prima facie credibility and moral theories gain their 
credibility due to the fact that they systematize these CMJs.  This makes it possible for 
the intuitionist to adopt WRE as a more advanced moral methodology, but it does not 
mean that using WRE allows one to avoid moral intuitionism.  Thus, Daniels’ WRE is 
not an alternative methodology to NRE that avoids the stance an intuitionist takes on the 
prima facie credibility of CMJs.  Holmgren continues to argue against WRE. 
 NRE is capable of avoiding accidental generalization because principles are accepted 
based on the epistemic desiderata of explanatory power.  The more explanatory power a 
principle P possesses the less likely it is an accidental generalization of the judgments it 
describes.  The more CMJs a principle P accounts for the greater the explanatory power 
of P.  The goal is to formulate and retain principles with the largest degree of explanatory 
                                                 
118
  Ibid: 57. 
71 
power.  WRE even seems to increase the possibility of accidental generalization.  In NRE 
the goal is to find a moral principle P that accounts for the widest range of the CMJs that 
have not been discarded or revised.  The goal in WRE is to account for the widest range 
of CMJs and to account for a plurality of principles (e.g., Q, R, S and T).  A subset of 
these principles (Q, R and S) might be used as background theories to support another 
moral principle (T).  The independence constraint requires Q, R and S to systematize 
CMJs that are disjoint from the CMJs systematized by T.  Because of this there is no 
single principle within the set that Q, R, S and T can be reduced to.  Imagine in NRE a 
theory N is created that has a single principle P.  Imagine in WRE a theory W is created 
and it supports the plurality of principles, Q, R, S and T.  If the widest range of CMJs is 
captured by both N and W, then N has more explanatory power than W because the 
principle in W cannot all be reduced to a single principle in W.  The explanatory power in 
W is more dispersed because it must rely on two sets of disjoint principles to explain the 
same wide range of CMJs as N is capable of doing using a single principle.  Because of 
this P is less likely to be an accidental generalization of our CMJs than either Q, R, S or 
T.  The credibility of the principles derives from systematizing the judgments and P is 
able to systematize the entire range of the CMJs whereas Q, R, S or T are not able to do 
so.  Thus, there is reason to prefer N over theory W because P is more likely to be a 
correct systematization of the CMJs.119 
 Holmgren has shown that standard reasoning for preferring WRE to NRE is 
unfounded.  There are certain cases where WRE is preferable to NRE, but these cases are 
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up to the discretion of the inquirer and the work that has been done in the area of moral 
theory one is exploring.  The sophisticated moral intuitionist can hold that NRE and 
WRE are complimentary methods.  They are not to be seen as providing better access to 
the prima facie credibility of CMJs.  Holmgren has shown that WRE affirms the two 
basic ideas of a sophisticated moral intuitionism, namely (i) CMJs posses prima facie 
credibility and (ii) moral theories gain their credibility from systematizing CMJs.  
Whether NRE or WRE should be employed in a given circumstance depends on which 
theory is better at avoiding accidental generalization in that context.  The methodological 
principle that links accidental generalization with explanatory power (EP) is as follows: 
(EP) Search for a principle possessing the greatest possible degree of explanatory 
power in order to minimize the risk of accidental generalization.120 
 Most RE-proponents argue that WRE is preferable to NRE, but Holmgren argues 
WRE is not better than moral intuitionism and that NRE is preferable for avoiding 
accidental generalization of one’s CMJs.  For the foregoing reasons I will focus on NRE 
as the primary interpretation of RE.  I will also use moral intuitionism as a moral theory 
guiding the positive reformulation of my version of NRE.  This is not because moral 
intuitionism is a priori true as a normative theory with methodological implications; 
rather, intuitionism seems best suited to inform RE in a direction capable of rebutting the 
input objection.  There is another reason to focus on NRE as the primary interpretation of 
RE. 
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 One reason to favor NRE over WRE is because it makes RE a method that is more 
than a mere metaphor.  Scanlon argues that WRE is open to the charge of emptiness.  
Because WRE instructs us to conduct such a broad and sweeping moral inventory it 
seems that, “we should decide what views about justice to adopt by considering the 
philosophical arguments for all possible views and assessing them on their merits.”121  
This seems to broaden RE to the point of emptiness.  It demands of the inquirer that he 
consider all potential conceptions and all the arguments for those conceptions.  What 
counts as considering “all possible views” and the pros and cons of each of those views? 
Surely this does not mean consider all possible views of justice and consider the pros and 
cons of each of those views.  Aside from concerns of cognitive and temporal limitations 
there is the question of how to limit one’s inquiry to just the relevant views.  If one fails 
to consider a relevant theory T that could alter one’s final equilibrium point E, has one 
truly reached a justified equilibrium point or somehow been deficient in doing one’s due 
diligence? What identifies a view as relevant to moral inquiry? By contrast, NRE does 
not ask that one brings to bear all possible conceptions and all possible arguments that 
could potentially disrupt one’s equilibrium.  The relevant considerations are those that 
count toward systematizing one’s CMJs with the goal of adopting principles that satisfy 
(EP) and other methodological desiderata. 
 NRE also returns RE to its foundations in Goodman.  Goodman articulated 
something like NRE when he stated that, “The process of justification is the delicate one 
of making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the 
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agreement achieved lies the only justification needed for either.”122  Goodman was 
talking about induction: inductive inferences are justified based on fit with general rules 
and general rules are justified based on fit with accepted inductive inferences.  
Substituting “induction” for “moral theory” it is the mutual support of principles and 
considered judgments that generates justification, not the system’s fit with something that 
gains its support from outside the system.  NRE allows for input from outside the system 
in the form of experience and new judgments, but it does not require one to go on a 
search for all views that might relate to the beliefs within the system, and it does not 
require that justification stems from such a search. 
4.5 NRE IS COMPATIBLE WITH MODERATE INTUITIONISM  
 By focusing on NRE it is important to establish that NRE is compatible with 
moderate intuitionism.  This has been largely assumed in discussion, but it has not been 
argued for.  Now I turn to that task. 
 According to Audi, a general form of moderate intuitionism—ethical reflectionism—
is compatible with RE.123  The compatibility of NRE with moderation intuitionism can be 
defended using a distinction between justification from above and justification from 
below. 
 In justification from below one derives intuitive moral principles from supporting 
grounds.  The principles are not presupposed.  They are derived from something deeper.  
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In justification from above one presupposes the principles and sees what consequences 
one can infer from them.  This involves, for instance, seeing what kind of lives we would 
lead if we were guided by the principles presupposed.  From these considerations we 
notice our intuitions about the possible lives and the principles that guide those lives.  If 
our intuitions are satisfactory, then the principles are confirmed.  Justification from above 
can lead to the revision of principles.  As Audi says, “We may find that if, for example, 
we restrict the cases in which promising yields a prima facie duty—say, to situations in 
which it is fully voluntary—we get a better principle.”124  Using reflection to generate 
and test intuitions about cases may result in the revision of one’s view or in greater 
justification of principles.  This type of reflection is compatible with RE in the following 
way:  
One can compare one’s intuitions with each other, with those of people one 
respects, and with the results of applying plausible generalizations to the 
situations that the moral intuitions are about; and one can strive to get all these 
items—revising them if necessary—into a stable, coherent whole: this is the 
equilibrium resulting from one’s comparative reflections.  The intuitionist might, 
to be sure, use the procedure more to refine moral principles already accepted 
than to discover moral principles; but this is a contingent matter that depends on 
what principles are accepted at the start of the process and on how many new 
principles or refinements of old ones it produces.125 
 Audi’s revised ethical reflectionism is clearly in conflict with RE.  It applies to the 
revision portion of RE, but not to the initial direction RE urges us to pursue.  RE asks us 
to start with CMJs, filter CMJs and find principles to systematize our CMJs.  Audi holds 
that one may begin reflection in any fashion.  One may start from principles and consider 
intuitions about consequences or one may do the reverse.  The way ethical reflectionism 
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mirrors RE is that it requires that everything be made coherent.  However, once we have 
derived principles from CMJs Audi’s method is compatible with RE.  From the outset, 
although, RE urges justification from below whereby intuitive moral principles are 
derived from their supporting grounds—prima facie justified CMJs.  Reflection is used in 
RE not just to arrive at intuitions about cases and principles but to arrive at initial moral 
convictions that serve as a basis for the justification of principles.  Given this correction 
to Audi’s compatibility with RE by positing an order of initial reflection (e.g., from CMJ 
to principles) there is reason to think Audi favors NRE as opposed to WRE.   
 One reason Audi’s ethical reflection lends itself to NRE is because when Audi 
mentions WRE it is in the context of the method of reflection that proceeds without 
directionality (i.e., whatever the circumstances seem to dictate).  But we have shown that 
there is directionality to RE that proceeds with justification from below initially, though it 
may use justification from above once one is trying to achieve mutual support.  The goal 
in NRE is to generate the strongest principles possible that systematize the CMJs.  The 
directionality of the procedure is a primary consideration, whereas the mutual fitting 
together of judgments and principles is a secondary consideration.  The order matters 
because CMJs as prima facie credible foundations act to constrain and guide the 
formation of principles.   
 Another reason Audi’s method lends itself to NRE is because Audi holds that it is 
possible to increase the justification of a judgment by systematizing it and extending it.  
This also might allow a CMJ with some degree of justification to become one that is well 
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justified and capable of guiding action or constituting knowledge.126  Audi also holds that 
it is possible for the intuitionist to allow RE to systematize principles into something 
more general.  It might even be desirable because, “that systematization might provide 
reasons for the principles and a possible source of correctives for certain intuitions or 
apparently intuitive moral judgments.”127  With slight modifications the union of NRE 
with ethical reflectionism seems a natural fit.  The goal is to use some of the features of 
ethical reflectionism (e.g., the notions of understanding and non-inferential intuitions) 
within NRE to fill out the details of NRE and systematize and strengthen the CMJs with 
which the process begins.  Audi nicely summarizes the synergy between NRE and 
moderate intuitionism in the following quote: 
There is much to commend a fallibilist, intuitionistic moral rationalism that uses 
reflection as a justificatory method in the ways described here, encompassing both 
intuitions as prima facie justified inputs to ethical theorizing and reflective 
equilibrium as a means of extending and systematizing those inputs.128 
 In summarizing chapter 4, I have argued the best combination of architecture and 
truth is realism/foundationalism, RE is compatible with foundationalism, wide ethical 
foundationalism is not a viable way to solve the input objection, wide-RE is not superior 
to narrow-RE and narrow-RE is compatible with moderate intuitionism.  With these 
points in mind I turn to providing a positive formulation of a solution to the input 
objection.   
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5. SOLVING THE INPUT OBJECTION 
5.1 KEY OBJECTIVES 
 Providing a solution to the input objection could quickly become unwieldy if I do not 
focus my solution around some core objectives.  I will start by clearing away topics that I 
will not address but that do need to be addressed at some point to provide a complete 
solution.  Though I will borrow and adapt ideas from moderate intuitionism I will not 
attempt a defense of moral perception, moral knowledge, moral realism and moral 
reasons.  Though I am adopting moderate foundationalism, I will not defend my solution 
against general objections to moderate foundationalism.  The focus of this section is on 
defending a solution to the input problem.  Here are some of the objectives of my 
solution: 
• Define and Explain Key Terms 
• Realize Methodological Objectives 
o Bring back Rawls’ notion of a competent judge to solidify the conditions 
of inquiry that make it successful. 
o Create an upgraded filter capable of separating good intuitions from 
intuitions emanating from tainted sources.   
 Use the revised filter to answer Sencerz’ objection that filtering 
does not add to the epistemic status of CMJs. 
o Clearly define the confidence index and the processing of CMJs from the 
stage of initial judgments to considered judgments. 
• Realize Epistemic Objectives 
o Utilize intuitionist criteria that facilitate the identification of genuine 
moral intuitions.   
o Establish that genuine moral intuitions, as moderate foundations, are truth-
apt. 
o Explain how positive epistemic value is possessed by CMJs. 
o Connect positive epistemic status with truth.   
o Establish how CMJs with positive epistemic value can be assigned weight 
in relation to credences.   
o Explain how weight works in the face of expanding experience and 
revision pressure.   
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o Explain how credences correlate to the balance of evidence. 
o Show how CMJs are fit to serve as evidence for or against certain 
principles. 
• Yield a Correct Prediction 
o Explain how the revised RE procedure yields correct predictions for the 
cases in question. 
5.2 SLAVERY AS A CASE STUDY 
 A case that is often upheld as an example of mistaken moral intuitions is slavery.129  
Slavery was morally permissible for thousands of years, yet it is a practice that is morally 
problematic on many levels.  Slavery can be used as a case against the objectivity of 
moral facts.  If there are objective moral properties, then how come whole people groups 
found the practice of slavery morally permissible when it is a practice that violates basic 
moral rights? For the sake of argument, a CMJ worth capturing might be, “I judge that 
slavery is unjust.” In the United States slavery was practice from about 1654 until 1865.  
The majority of slavery was practiced in the southern United States where slaves were 
cogs in an agricultural machine.  The treatment of slaves was harsh and inhumane.  How 
could someone living in the Deep South during the time of slavery form the correct moral 
judgment that “slavery is unjust” even though slavery is morally permissible according to 
upbringing and culture?130  Can my version of RE correctly handle a mistaken moral 
judgment, such as, “I judge that slavery is morally permissible,” in light of a person’s 
moral principles and morally-relevant background beliefs? Conversely, could my version 
of RE properly justify a correct moral judgment, such as “I judge that slavery is unjust,” 
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in light of a person’s moral principles and background beliefs? Both cases are considered 
in relation to explaining how someone in the Deep South during the time of slavery could 
use RE, in the face of morally wrong enculturation and personal bias, to justify the moral 
truth that slavery is unjust.  The upshot of yielding a correct prediction is that engaging in 
RE methodology leads to correctly capturing moral truth.  Now I will present and explain 
the relevance of the two cases. 
Case 1  Dr. B is an atheist physician in the South during the time of slavery.  After 
careful consideration, which includes reflection on the context in which he 
was raised and lives, Dr. B forms the following CMJ, “I judge that slavery 
is morally unjust.” Dr. B has not deduced this judgment or formed it on the 
basis of principle or premise.  It just seems correct to him upon due 
reflection.   
 
Case 2  Laura Engels is a Christian homemaker in the South during the time of 
slavery.  After careful consideration, which includes reflection on the 
context in which she was raised and lives, Laura forms the following CMJ, 
“I judge that slavery is morally permissible.” Laura has not deduced this 
judgment or formed it on the basis of principle or premise.  It just seems 
correct to her upon due reflection. 
 Both cases highlight the importance of assigning proper evidential weight to CMJs.  
In case 1 the CMJ needs to be weighty enough to survive the RE process when brought 
in-line with atheist principles.131  In case 2 the CMJ needs to be less weighty so that 
through the RE process it is revised to become consistent with basic Christian principles.  
For the sake of argument, I will assume atheist principles (e.g., survival of the fittest) 
tend to be more accommodating of the idea of slavery, and I will assume Christian 
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principles (e.g., love your neighbor as yourself) tend to be less accommodating of 
slavery.132  In case 1 atheist principles put revisionary pressure on the intuition that 
slavery is immoral.  In case 2 Christian principles put revisionary pressure on the 
intuition that slavery is morally permissible.133  A successful RE methodology must 
preserve and justify the CMJ in case 1, and it must revise the CMJ in case 2.  Both Dr. B 
and Laura are considering the context in making their CMJ.  For Laura enculturation is 
allowing her to have a false intuition.  She is attaching too much weight to a false 
intuition.  If she assigns less weight to her intuition it will be revised when it comes into 
conflict with intuitive Christian principles.  Dr. B is not swayed by enculturation, but 
unless he assigns enough weight to his intuition it will be revised, perhaps reversed, when 
brought into equilibrium with intuitive atheist principles.  These considerations illuminate 
several important factors required for a reasonable inquirer to properly intuit and handle 
moral truth. 
 To establish the evidential weight of CMJs I must clearly explain how weight can be 
assigned to CMJs.  I must show how it is possible to separate genuine from false 
intuitions.  The RE filtering mechanism must be strengthened to bolster RE’s ability to 
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capture CMJs with probative value and eliminate CMJs that lack probative value.  The 
notion of a competent judge also needs to be established.  Laura might have formed her 
moral judgment in ignorance of the specific facts of slavery.  Perhaps she views slavery 
as good for the Southern economy but is unaware of the historical and present-day 
injustices committed in perpetuating the slave industry.  Judging the morality of slavery 
must be done in light of the specific facts of slavery.  It might also be the case that Laura 
is less open-minded and aware of how prejudice and bias are influencing her judgment 
that slavery is morally permissible.134  In addition, it would be worthwhile for a 
competent judge to possess sympathy and imagination to properly assess the moral worth 
a particular policy or action has on a person or people group.  Before accomplishing these 
goals it will be important to get clear on some key terms. 
5.3 A TAXONOMY OF KEY TERMS 
 To keep my analysis on-track I will define some key terms: intuitions, beliefs, 
judgments, considered moral judgments, intuitiveness, intuitive judgment, evidence, 
credence, balance, weight, specificity, and weight of evidence. 
 An intuition is a non-inferentially believed proposition that asserts an attraction to 
assent.135  The intuition is believed on the basis of an adequate understanding of its 
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content.136  It is not held based on any premises nor is it held as a theoretical hypothesis.  
Reflecting on the proposition—with adequate understanding—the specific content of the 
proposition exerts an attraction to assent to the truth of the proposition.  Intuitions are not 
necessary or a priori.  Intuitions possess epistemic weight but they are fallible, as 
reflection can lead them to be corrected, improved or defeated. 
 A belief is a propositional attitude.  It comes in degrees of confidence to affirm the 
truth of the proposition.  To believe a proposition one must be sufficiently confident in 
the proposition.  Belief requires a degree of confidence of the truth of the proposition that 
is above a certain threshold.137  
 A judgment is a cognitive act of affirmation.  Whether one holds an intuition or a 
belief depends on whether one is disposed to affirm the proposition intuited or believed. 
 A considered moral judgment is an intuition that one affirms under ideal conditions 
after having reflected on the proposition with an adequate understanding of the content of 
the proposition. 
 Intuitiveness is a property of a proposition that elicits “the sense of non-inferential 
credibility”138 under certain conditions.  This term marks an important distinction 
between an intuition and something being intuitive.  An intuition may non-inferentially 
seem true (i.e., seem to have a credibility of its own) and be intuitive, yet one may fail to 
believe the intuition is true.  It can fail to be believed to be true, yet it can seem to be true.  
                                                                                                                                                 
intuitions.  I am most closely aligned with Sosa, though parts of my account of intuitions have an Audi-
emphasis. 
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  See Audi 1999 for a good explication of the notion of adequate understanding. 
137
  A threshold is a notion that might be contextually established.  Though, one must admit that there is not 
readily a non-arbitrary way of identifying a threshold. 
138
  Audi 2008: 477.  
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An intuition may also non-inferentially be believed and assert an attraction to assent, but 
it may fail to possess intuitiveness because the intuition is based on a complex 
proposition that does not readily elicit a sense of non-inferential credibility.  In such a 
case, it can be believed to be true, yet it can fail to seem true. 
 An intuitive judgment is an act of affirmation that is accompanied by a sense of non-
inferential credibility.139  Throughout the RE procedure intuitive judgments are made in 
the process of filtration, revision and seeking harmony between judgments and principles.   
 Evidence for a belief is that which can increase the likelihood of the truth of the 
belief.140  Evidence can also tell against the truth of a belief.  Evidence can come in a 
range of strengths.  Putting together confidence and evidence, it might be rational to 
proportion one’s confidence in a proposition to the strength of one’s evidence.  An 
epistemic goal might be to believe all propositions to a degree of confidence that is 
appropriate, which could mean, “believing everything with the exact degree of 
confidence that the evidence warrants.”141  Evidence can shape what one is justified in 
believing or it is reasonable to believe.  It can also confirm or disconfirm a theory or 
hypothesis.142  
 Credence is a subjective estimate of the truth-value of a belief.  It is a probabilistic 
notion that allows for an expression of the level of confidence a person places in the truth 
of a belief.  Credence is a term that covers these confidence levels: degrees of belief, 
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  Ibid: 476-477. 
140
  This general, probabilistic notion of evidence is found in Fantl and McGrath 2002.  This account does 
not commit one to a Bayesian, evidentialist or E = K thesis. 
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  Foley 1987: 126-127. 
142
  For an informative treatment of the probabilistic version of “evidence” see Williamson 2000 and 
Achinstein 2001. 
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subjective probabilities, and grades of uncertainty.  Specifically, “a person’s credence in 
X is a measure of the extent to which she is disposed to presuppose X in her theoretical 
and practical reasoning.”143  Beliefs, at a given time, can be represented by a set of credal 
functions Ct (i.e., a credal state).  To each proposition X and condition Y, for each 
element in Ct, there is a credence function that assigns a unique real number 0 ≤ c (X|Y) 
≤ 1.144  Credences obey laws of probability.  This makes how strongly one believes a 
proposition X expressible in real numbers in an interval between 0 and 1.  The degree of 
truth of a CMJ can vary in concert with its degree of justification.  In general, the higher 
the credence level, the higher the degree of justification.145 
 Continuing to explicate these terms along Bayesian lines the next three terms 
(balance, weight and specificity) concern how a person’s subjective probabilities 
(credences) reflect a person’s total evidence.  In a given credal state a person’s 
unconditional and conditional probabilities can reflect one’s total evidence or what it is 
reasonable to believe given one’s total evidence.  Proposition X increases evidence for 
another proposition Y as long as the probability of X conditional on Y surpasses the 
unconditional probability of X.  Balance, weight, and specificity explain how 
probabilities can reflect total evidence.146  
 Balance is connected with individual probability values.  The balance of the 
evidence determines how firmly the evidence counts for or against a proposition, 
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  Joyce 2005: 154. 
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  Ibid: 156. 
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  Keep in mind, that credences equal credibilities (i.e., degrees of warrant or justification) after an 
external standard has been applied to the credences to identify propositions with subjective credences that 
are credible.  This is how the subjective is identified as objective, as something that corresponds to more 
than what one is disposed to affirm. 
146
  Joyce 2005: 154. 
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hypothesis or theory.  Balance is a valance notion that tells in what direction the evidence 
points. 
 Weight indicates how substantial the evidence is.  The weight of evidence increases 
as one’s evidence increases.  Weight can be thought of as a measure of the sum of 
evidence on which the probabilities are founded.  New evidence increases the weight of 
evidence, but it may decrease the probability of the proposition being true—it may 
decrease the balance of evidence.  So, if the evidence for a proposition, hypothesis or 
theory is weighty this does not necessarily mean it is more likely to be true than a 
proposition, hypothesis or theory that is less weighty.147 
 Distinguishing weight from balance can be done using an example.148  The following 
example is a case where one acquires more evidence, thus more weight of evidence, but it 
does not change the balance of one’s evidence.  Imagine one randomly grabs a coin, flips 
it once and it lands on tails.  One flips it again and it lands on heads on the second flip.  If 
the coin is flipped two years from now how much credence should one put in the 
proposition that the coin will land on tails at that time? Given the current evidence, it is 
reasonable to assign a credence of .5 to the proposition.  If the coin is flipped a thousand 
more times and one keeps careful records about the outcomes and the evidence is in-line 
with the coin being fair, then one should still assign .5 to the proposition that the coin will 
land tails two years from now.  The balance of evidence has not changed, but the weight 
of evidence has substantially increased.  A few conclusions can be drawn.  Balance 
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  This consideration highlights a problem with using weight in the metaphorical sense whereby higher 
weight equals higher probability.  The confusion it creates is in situations whereby the weight of evidence 
is increased, but the balance of evidence (valence) has not changed. 
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  I borrow this example from Kelly 2008: 2. An early treatment of the difference between weight and 
balance is found in Keynes 1921: 71-78. 
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concerns how confident it is reasonable to be that a proposition is true given one’s total 
evidence.  Weight is not reflected in the confidence it is reasonable to have toward a 
proposition.  Weight is what it is reasonable to believe in light of new evidence.  The 
weight of evidence shows up in the resilience of credences in light of new evidence.149  
As James Joyce says: 
Increasing the gross amount of relevant evidence for X tends to cause credences 
to concentrate more and more heavily on increasingly smaller subsets of chance 
hypotheses, and this concentration tends to become more resilient.  As a result, 
the excepted chance of X comes to depend more and more heavily on the 
distribution of credence over a smaller and smaller set of chance hypothesis.150 
 Weight of evidence for a hypothesis is reflected in the stability of X’s credences 
across a credal state.  The specificity of evidence for a hypothesis is reflected in the 
spread of credence values across a credal state.  Specificity is, “the degree to which the 
data discriminated the truth of the proposition from that of alternatives.”151  Ambiguity or 
incompleteness in the evidence determines the spread in the credence values.  As 
evidence accumulates, weight and specificity tend to increase together, but they can come 
apart.  It is possible to gain in specificity without gaining in weight.152  
 The weight of evidence for a proposition relative to the evidence can be expressed 
formally and metaphorically.  The formal Bayesian expression of the weight of evidence 
is in terms of stabilizing credences on a small set of chance hypotheses.  If there is a high 
weight of evidence, adding new evidence E it will not tend change a proposition X’s 
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  Joyce 2005: 167. 
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  Ibid: 174. 
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  For a good example of this see Ibid: 174-175. 
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probability conditional on the chance hypotheses.  The difference between the credence 
for the proposition conditional on the new evidence c(X|E) and the unconditional 
probability of the proposition c(X) will be small.  What is stabilized is the distance 
between X’s credence and X’s chance hypotheses.  The weight of evidence for X relative 
to E can be can be captured by a formula.153  The formula shows that the overall weight 
of the evidence for X relative to E [w(X,E)] will be smaller in relation to how weighty the 
evidence for X is.  Another important idea the formula captures is that weight has no 
evidential valence.  This means the weight is the same for X as it is for ~X.  Looking 
only at the statistical version of weight of evidence would make the title of this thesis 
moot.  On this account, weight is not a concept for or against a proposition.  It is a 
measure of the stability of the proposition when introduced to evidence.  It is not a 
measure of the evidential valence of the proposition, which is often presupposed when 
weight is used in other contexts. 
 There are additional ways weight of evidence is used.  The metaphorical use of the 
term weight of evidence typically stands for a summary interpretation or synthesis of the 
evidence.154  When weight of evidence is used in this sense or when the term weight (or 
weighty) is used in this regard there is no accompanying methodology.155  The author 
could be using the following phrase, “in my all-things-considered estimation the 
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  The formula is: w(X,E) = Σx|c(Ch(X) = x|E) • (x – c(X|E))2 – c(Ch(X) = x) • (x – c(X))2.  X is a person’s credence 
of X that is the person’s estimate of its objective chance.  A fixed partition of chance hypotheses is [Ch (X) = x], and E 
is a possible item of data.  From Ibid: 166. 
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  Weed 2005: 1546. 
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  One example of this is when Tom Kelly is responding to Timothy Williamson’s intuition that a person 
in the bad case is as equally justified as a person in the good case in terms of his evidence or beliefs.  As 
Kelly wonders, “In deciding whether to accept or reject the phenomenal conception of evidence, how much 
weight should one give to this intuition, relative to considerations which seem to count against the 
phenomenal conception, e.g., considerations having to do with publicity?” (Kelly 2008: 20). 
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proposition X is significant relative to E to a certain degree.” There is not an explicit 
weighing of the evidence but more of a gut-reaction to what seems to be the case given 
total considerations.  Weight of evidence can also be referred to as a methodology.  A 
contrast can be made between the strength of evidence, which covers statistically positive 
and significant results from a subset of the evidence, with the weight of evidence that 
looks at all evidence—positive and negative, significant and insignificant.156  Weight of 
evidence can also take-on a theoretical meaning.  In legal theory weight of evidence can 
be given a conceptual framework.  Four concepts of this framework include: 
1. Relevance: the extent to which any single piece of evidence could have the 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable.   
2. Reliability: the extent to which the evidence is of a sort reasonably relied 
upon to form an opinion or inference. 
3. Sufficiency: the threshold “weight” of the totality of the evidence needed to 
infer a claim. 
4. Standard of Proof: levels of proof needed for the sufficiency of different 
types of legal opinions or inferences, e.g., in civil versus criminal cases.157 
 The four theoretical concepts cover important aspects of weight of evidence.  They 
are qualitative in nature or left up to the intuitive judgment of a competent judge.  
Relevance concerns how a single piece of evidence contributes to the probability of a 
fact.  Like the Bayesian notion of balance it is a matter of how the evidence is reflected 
in the individual credences.  If a single piece of data has a relevant weight of evidence, it 
will tend to make a fact more or less probable.  The distinction between relevance and 
balance is that relevance is a notion that is less rigorously statistical and it highlights 
whether a bit of data has the ability to support or detract from the probability of a fact.  
                                                 
156
  Weed 2005: 1548. 
157
  Ibid: 1552. 
90 
Balance, on the other hand, indicates the direction that the bit of data actually points and 
the degree to which it points in that direction.  Relevance indicates the possibility of 
valence, whereas balance is equal to the valence (credence).  Reliability is the extent to 
which it is rational to form an inference based on the evidence or proposition.  CMJs are 
often attacked as not being reliable because they are not stable or truth-conducive.  
However, if evidence has a dimension of balance then one has a measure of how 
confident it is reasonable to be that a proposition is true given one’s total evidence.  The 
higher the balance of evidence is in favor of a proposition the more reasonable it is to rely 
on the proposition in situations of inference.  Sufficiency concerns whether the total 
evidence passes a threshold whereby the evidence is sufficient for inferring a claim.  
Standard of proof recognizes that different moral claims might require different degrees 
of sufficiency.  The four theoretical concepts just mentioned are more qualitative than 
quantitative because there is no precise formula that indicates how to calculate each 
dimension.  Weight of evidence in this regard informs an inquirer how she should look at 
individual and total evidence to estimate the importance of the evidence to the 
proposition at hand. 
 I have covered the Bayesian, metaphorical, methodological and theoretical uses of 
the term weight of evidence to arrive at a more precise formulation of the phrase.  I will 
use the phrase weight of evidence or evidential weight to cover both a qualitative 
dimension of intuitive judgment on the importance of the evidence and a quantitative 
dimension that estimates the likelihood of the truth of the evidence and how stable the 
91 
evidence is when presented with new information.  As a result, the evidential weight of a 
body of evidence can be defined as follows: 
Evidential Weight: Quantitatively, it is a statistical measure that is reflected in 
the concentration of credences around a group of chance hypothesis, and, thus, 
stability in light of new evidence (weight), and the balance of evidence in favor of 
a proposition as represented by the proposition’s credence values (balance).  
Qualitatively, it is a method of intuitively weighing individual or total evidence in 
accordance with the degree to which four theoretical concepts are attributable to 
the evidence—relevance, reliability, sufficiency, and standard of proof.   
 The quantitative and qualitative aspects of evidential weight are two modes of 
inquiry.  One could be rigorous and apply credence values to propositions (CMJs).  This 
allows for precision when revising beliefs within one’s belief-set.  If the balance of total 
evidence in one’s belief-set favors proposition X over proposition Y and one is trying to 
decide between the two proposition one rationally ought to favor X over Y.  In situations 
of conflict one ought to be prone to revise Y before X to resolve the conflict.  This means 
revising the lower credence values as compared to the higher credence values relative to 
the total evidence.  Using the quantitative measure also helps an inquirer to know when 
the credences are stabilizing.  As the weight of evidence mounts the credences tend to 
settle around a small group of chance hypotheses.  As one exposes one’s belief system to 
conditions that upset equilibrium one will gain in stability until new evidence no longer 
upsets equilibrium because the credences are sufficiently resilient.  This helps an inquirer 
to know when to stop reflection and when one’s evidence has acquired an acceptable 
degree of weight.  Evidential weight can also be evaluated intuitively based on how it 
seems the evidence tends to make a fact more or less probable, how reasonable it is to use 
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the evidence as a premise in inference, the threshold of the weight needed to infer a 
claim, and the sufficiency of different types of inferences. 
5.4 FRAMING THE INPUT OBJECTION IN KEY TERMS 
 Using the key terms detailed in the last section it is possible to gain clarity on the 
input objection.  The objection finds sharp expression in Brant’s A Theory of the Good 
and the Right.158  Brandt attacks the legitimacy of appeal to ethical intuitions or 
considered moral judgments (CMJs).  According to Brandt moral intuitions are firmly-
held moral beliefs.  They are indicated by dispositions to affirm specific normative 
statements.  They are non-inferential because they are not held based on logical relations 
to other beliefs (e.g., holding a belief that a mass killing at a school is wrong because it is 
an instance of a general principle that one already accepts, such as, murder is wrong).  
Brandt mentions the other standard features of a CMJ: made in moments of calm, not 
distorted by self-interest, and includes any level of generality (i.e., from a particular 
action to a whole class of actions).  How committed an inquirer is to a normative 
statement can be placed on a scale from 0 (no inclination to belief) to 1 (strongest 
possible belief).  A degree of belief in a non-inferential intuition determines the person’s 
initial credence level.  Initial credence levels allow one to choose between normative 
beliefs with the purpose of maximizing initial credence levels.  This is where the 
coherence theory of justification enters Brant’s interpretation of Rawls’ procedure.  
Proposed normative principles are tested against intuitions, and specific intuitions are 
tested whether they can be included in a system that maximizes initial credence levels.  
                                                 
158
  Brandt 1979: 16-23. 
93 
The problem with this requirement is that requiring consistency does not provide much 
guidance for the process of belief revision.  It might turn out that beliefs are true or false 
and that one could make consistent a set of falsehoods.  Revising to preserve initial 
credence levels does not assure initial credences correspond to credibilities unless there is 
good reason to think that the initial credences are truth apt. 
 The quickest way to respond to Brandt is by noticing that I have revised RE to be a 
foundationalist procedure.  The foundations express initial credibility not merely degrees 
of commitment.  Taking this response a step further in light of the taxonomy of terms one 
can see that credence is an estimate of the truth-value of a belief.  Credence is a 
probabilistic notion that allows for a precise specification of the subjective estimates of 
the degrees of belief in a proposition.  Though, credence is not a purely subjective 
measure because credences are assigned in relation to relevant evidence.  Evidence is that 
which can increase or decrease the likelihood of the truth of a belief.  It is rational to 
assign credences to beliefs based on the strength of one’s evidence.  Evidence can be 
reflected in the credence values along the lines of weight, balance and specificity.  
Against this idea, it seems that inference could guide the assignment of credence values, 
which undercuts the non-inferential character of CMJs. 
 Against the objection above it is possible to argue that evidence does not entail 
inference.  Matthew Bedke argues against the assumption that evidence entails inference 
and holds that intuitions can have evidential value without being inferred from 
evidence.159  A direct realist like Huemer can hold that awareness of external objects 
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provides evidence for propositions about those objects.  The belief about the object must 
be based on the intuition in order to be justified, but the basing relation does not have to 
be inferential.  It can be a causal chain of a certain type whereby the direct awareness of 
the object causes the intuition.  This also allows one to overcome Brandt’s objection that 
it is not clear what kind of facts normative claims express.  A normative fact is not just a 
disposition to affirm a non-inferential intuition; rather, it is a relation a non-inferential 
intuition bears to an object of intuition.  If Rawls had adopted such a stance on intuitions 
and avoided a strict coherentist/holist conception of justification his claim that, “[t]here is 
a definite if limited class of facts against which conjectured principles can be checked”160 
would have been less confusing, and he would have avoided objections like the input 
objection as raised by Brant. 
 Brant’s objection also includes a concern about cultural indoctrination.  Because the 
beliefs we happen to have, and tend to affirm upon reflection, might be influenced by the 
culture in which we were raised a procedure that systematizes such beliefs may only be 
“no more than a reshuffling of moral prejudices.” Across cultures there is great moral 
disagreement.  Some cultures embrace child infanticide as a form of spiritual sacrifice.  
Some cultures embrace the efficient slaughter of cows as a food source.  Other cultures 
view the cow as sacred and prohibit killing of the cow for mere consumption.  When 
different equilibria between contemporary and traditional cultures conflict there is no 
easy way to choose between the belief systems.  The rational or moral action to perform 
in a given case might be culturally relative.  Antecedent moral commitments do not 
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provide a way to resolve moral disagreements unless there is some reason to think that 
the subjective probabilities are not biased or that there is a robust way to handle bias 
within a system of subjective probability. 
 On the Bayesian account is it possible to handle bias.  Joyce has illustrated this point 
as follows: 
Bayesians are often portrayed as radical subjectivists who reject any meaningful 
epistemic distinction between evidence and biases.  On a subjectivist picture, a 
person’s biases merely reflect her ‘prior’ judgments of credibility about various 
propositions, while her evidence is the ‘posterior’ information she gains from 
experience.  This suggests a model in which a person starts off with a prior 
probability C0 that reflects her initial judgments of credibility (sophisticated 
treatments make this a set of priors), and learning proceeds by updating the priors 
in light of data.161 
 This quote makes it seem that there is something right about the input objection.  It 
seems right to call CMJs biases.  Of course, one mitigates bias by forming CMJs under 
ideal conditions, but, nevertheless, CMJs are prior credibility judgments that may reflect 
certain biases.  The problem with the input objection is that it is not the whole story.  One 
is not simply reshuffling priors to maximize initial degrees of commitment.  Priors on the 
foundationalist model have a greater degree of contact with reality, especially when 
direct realism is assumed, and they are subjected to experience so that the posterior 
information which is brought into reflective equilibrium has sufficiently weeded out 
propositions that seemed credible initially but which turned out to not be credible upon 
further reflection and exposure to experience.162  This is why CMJs possess prima facie 
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  This captures the idea that most people have biases in their belief system because they have not 
subjected their beliefs to tests of consistency, systematization and critical scrutiny.  Most people’s beliefs 
are largely unexamined.  Such beliefs are more likely to reflect prejudices, which are beliefs accepted 
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credibility and are not ultima facie credible or are not taken to be infallible, incorrigible 
or indubitable.  In this regard, it is reasonable to use CMJs even though it is possible that 
some CMJs reflect some degree of cultural and familial indoctrination that is non-
veridical. 
 Now I will solve the input objection by going through each component in the RE 
process that enables CMJs to possess positive epistemic status and to be put to good use 
in a methodological role of moral justification.  These components are as follows: 
architecture, general procedure, competent moral judge, intuitions, standard filter criteria, 
upgraded filter criteria, credences, principles, and revision procedures.  My new 
interpretation of RE is called moderate-RE (MRE). 
5.5 ARCHITECTURE 
 MRE possesses an architecture consisting of modest foundationalism and minimal 
coherentism.  On this perspective one starts with beliefs that are non-inferential or 
credible independently from their fit with other beliefs.  Bringing these beliefs into 
coherence increases the credibility of the beliefs, but coherence is not sufficient for the 
justification of the beliefs.  Instead, modest foundationalism claims that, “a moral belief 
can be justified independently of its inferential relations with other moral beliefs.”163  
Despite this, MRE can accommodate the idea that mutual support between beliefs is a 
desirable and necessary feature.  Mutual support may increase the justification of beliefs, 
and be necessary for the ultima facie justification of beliefs, but coherence is not 
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self-examination.  Moral philosophy is Socratic” (Rawls 1971: 48-49). 
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sufficient for justification because some beliefs can be prima facie credible or justified 
independent from coherentist requirements.164  On this account, “a belief is [ultima facie] 
justified just when it belongs to that highly coherent belief-system which coheres best, on 
the whole, with these modest foundations.”165  MRE is a search for a coherent system that 
best accommodates modest foundations.  CMJs serve as modest foundations. 
  There are several motivations behind the modest foundationalist architecture in 
MRE.  Pure coherentism maintains a counterintuitive proposal on the credibility of 
beliefs.  It is reasonable for a coherentist to hold that if there are two theories that are 
equally good in every regard but one aligns better with independently credible beliefs, 
then the one that accords with the independently credible beliefs is a better theory.  It is 
counterintuitive to hold that fit with independently credible beliefs is a good thing, but 
beliefs are only justified in relation to other beliefs.  Brad Hooker captures this 
awkwardness as follows: 
So, for coherentists, an independently attractive moral belief, although itself 
unjustified unless or until it is connected to other moral beliefs, can play a 
decisive role in an argument for one moral theory against another.  This seems to 
me an awkward position to maintain.  If some well-informed moral belief seems 
independently attractive to us, and if a moral theory’s accordance with this belief 
counts in favour of the moral theory, why hold back from calling the belief [prima 
facie] justified.166 
 Aside from the awkwardness of the pure coherentist rendering of RE there is another 
reason to move away from pure coherentism.  Thomas Pogge points out that CMJs (i.e., 
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firmly-held convictions) can increase in credibility when they cohere with other firmly-
held convictions.  An analogy to legal theory can be drawn such that, “If two material 
witnesses give independent and matching descriptions of events, each of their testimonies 
becomes more credible than it would have been on its own.”167  The analogy to legal 
reasoning is telling because a similar analogy is used to argue against coherence theory.  
As already noted in chapter 4, formal epistemology has produced impossibility results 
that indicate pure coherence theory is not truth-conducive.  If a pure coherentist approach 
to RE is assumed, coherence must be able to create credibility from scratch.  That is, a 
series of beliefs that are not independently credible when brought into coherence ought to 
be capable of creating credibility.168  If one takes the don’t worry strategy there is no 
guarantee that beliefs that are not independently credible, and not merely believed, can 
lead to a credible system of beliefs in the end.  If one assumes that beliefs are 
independently credible, one has assumed those beliefs are foundations of some stripe; so, 
one has already moved away from pure coherence theory.  These technical results 
corroborate the idea that firmly-held convictions (or the testimony of credible witnesses) 
can only generate credible conclusions or increase credibility because the convictions are 
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  An objection might be that coherence is just a property of a coherent system and, as a consequence, 
there is nothing possessing independent credibility needed to appeal to.  The individual beliefs do not need 
to be credible because truth is a property of a system, not independent beliefs.  However, the system-wide 
property that generates truth is coherence.  If individual beliefs cohere (or, because they cohere) a 
coherentist thinks the beliefs are credible.  Yet, if coherence cannot generate credibility, unless credibility 
pre-existed in the beliefs brought into coherence, then system-wide coherence is not adding to the 
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debate see Olsson 2002 and Shogenji 2005.  I, of course, endorse Olsson’s results.  For his detailed 
treatment see Olsson 2005a. 
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independently credible.169  Credibility has to get into the system somehow and pure 
coherence theory is unable to account for this fact.  Matching testimonies of unreliable 
witnesses will not, necessarily, result in information that is credible.  Coherence alone of 
different testimonies or beliefs is not a sufficient condition for directing a jury or a moral 
inquirer toward truth.170  However, if modest foundations possess independent credibility, 
then bringing them together can increase the warrant of the entire system.171 
 Another motivation for modest foundationalism is that RE assumes a foundationalist 
requirement.172  This is the requirement that the judgments that we actually favor play a 
justificatory role in reaching equilibrium.  In deciding between two equally coherent, yet 
mutually incompatible belief systems, imagine I accept the first system as true and, thus, 
believe the second is false.  The first system is true because I favor my favored beliefs.  
This reason plays a self-justifying or foundationalist role and coherentist requirements 
cannot explain my choice because the coherentist chains of justification are contained 
within the belief systems.  If principles and CMJs are coherent, yet they are not actually 
held, then they are not pertinent to the reflective procedure for the person who does not 
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hold those beliefs.  The foundationalist architecture is the ground-floor in MRE, but 
coherentist considerations are used, as needed, to revise fallible foundations, increase 
justification and generate the final state of justification. 
 The final reason that MRE utilizes modest foundations is that RE is compatible with 
such foundations.  The later Rawls allowed for a moderate interpretation of RE whereby 
rational intuitionism or other foundationalist perspectives were not excluded from the RE 
procedure.173  On such an interpretation, “to show that our moral convictions ‘fit together 
in reflective equilibrium’ requires that we demonstrate how our most considered 
convictions about right and wrong are derivable from a moral conception which itself has 
a deductive basis in these abstract rational intuitions.”174  MRE is compatible with 
holding that all-things-considered abstract moral principles are self-evident and can 
provide a deductive basis for moral convictions.175  This deductive basis may only be 
realized after principles are discovered that account for convictions and all elements are 
brought into agreement, but such a basis is possible nonetheless.  One thing that is 
excluded is simply deducing convictions from principles.176  This would make seeking 
                                                 
173
  This moderate perspective is indicated by Rawls statement that CMJs have “a certain initial credibility” 
(Rawls 1974: 8), and it is further explored in Rawls 1993.  Initial credibility is something a weak 
foundationalist may ascribe to a person’s reports about her experience, which would provide evidential 
support for a moral or scientific theory.   
174
  Freeman 2007: 34. 
175
  Scanlon corroborates this conclusion when he states, “the possibility that our conception of justice 
should be founded on self-evident principles is not excluded.  All that the method of reflection equilibrium 
requires is that the self-evidence of these principles be established through the method itself, by their 
demonstrated ability to carry the day against apparently conflicting judgments and alternative principles.  
What the method of reflective equilibrium prescribes is, so to speak, a level playing field of intuitive 
justification on which principles and judgments of all levels of generality must compete for our allegiance.  
It thus allows all possible sources of justificatory force to be considered” (Scanlon 2003: 151). 
176
  Two other things excluded from RE is moral nihilism and moral skepticism (Freeman 2007: 34-35).  
Since I am not using RE to argue against the moral skeptic I avoid the charge of begging the question 
against the moral skeptic.  I am trying to show how it is possible within morality, using elements from 
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RE akin to taking an abstract principle and applying it to specific cases to reach moral 
convictions.  Instead, MRE holds that fit with considered judgments that are 
independently credible is a desirable element of justification, and that a system of beliefs 
can have a deductive basis in moral intuitions while, at the same time, serving as a 
deductive basis for the intuitions.177  Establishing the credibility of the moral convictions 
must not have been done as inferences or deductions from other beliefs.  Although, it is 
possible once the credibility of these judgments is established that one can see how one 
could infer from abstract principles to the moral convictions. 
5.6 GENERAL PROCEDURES 
 This section provides an overview of the MRE methodology.  There are two specific 
objections raised by Tom Regan that MRE must address: prejudice and conservatism.178  
Prejudice implies that intuitions that are not truth-conducive and they may slip into a 
procedure that emphasizes intuitions.  Conservatism holds that moral convictions reflect 
the status quo, as they merely reflect cultural conditioning.  Prejudice will be addressed in 
the section on moral intuitions and the reliability filters and conservatism will be 
addressed in the section on credences.  These objections are addressed as manifestations 
of the input objection. 
 The input objection, as formulated by Brandt, distinguishes subjective credence from 
objective credibility and argues that moral judgments do not count as evidence for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
epistemology, to justify moral beliefs.  A separate, worthwhile endeavor involves using MRE to fend off 
the moral skeptic.  That is not the primary objective of this thesis. 
177
  A helpful understanding of RE is that, “we can rely on our capacities for moral reasoning under 
appropriate conditions, and that our moral judgments are not always arbitrary but are capable of discerning 
and being guided by objective moral principles (Ibid: 35). 
178
  Regan 1983. 
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truth of a theory because they might stem from biases, historical accidents and prejudices.  
Because of this MRE must make sure it is not merely reshuffling moral prejudices.  
Brandt himself rejected the use of intuitions and argued in favor of rational desires that 
survive psychological vetting.  His idea is that one must get outside one’s system of 
beliefs and assess the beliefs in relation to facts of logic and empirical reality.  Daniels 
argues against Brandt’s method at length.179  But Daniels is unable, as I argued in chapter 
3, to address the question of the truth-conduciveness of CMJs.  Daniels brought 
objectivity into the procedure by subjecting beliefs to the widest possible amount of 
critical scrutiny, but he evaded the truth-question by providing a methodological solution 
to an epistemic question.180  To answer Brandt’s objection head-on I propose accepting 
the charge of intuitionism/foundationalism.181  Let’s briefly consider the intuitionist’s 
model. 
 A contemporary version of moral intuitionism finds expression in the work of Robert 
Audi.  The key for Audi is the notion of self-evidence.  A proposition p is self-evident if, 
“an adequate understanding of it is sufficient for being justified in believing it and for 
knowing it one believes it on the basis of that understanding.”182  This makes there a 
relation between understanding p and believing p, and it posits the adequacy of 
                                                 
179
  See Daniels 1996. 
180
  Regarding Daniels’ don’t worry strategy, Shaw plainly says, “that someday we may understand why we 
are justified in relying on our intuitions as a starting point for doing moral philosophy.  This is pie-in-the-
sky unless we can be given some inkling of what that justification might be or some reason to believe that 
the coherence method, even in its wide reflective equilibrium form, is likely to produce a plausible 
‘credibility story’.  Such a theory will require a convincing meta-ethics” (Shaw 1982: 127).  I hold that 
convincing meta-ethics is not found in coherentism/constructivism, but in foundationalism/realism in the 
hand of the contemporary ethical intuitionist. 
181
  James Blachowicz points out that in answering Brant’s objection, “prior credibility might entail an 
intuitionist or foundationalist conception of justification” (Blachowicz 1997: 455).  I accept this burden of 
proof and formulate how such a conception is possible. 
182
  Audi 1999: 206. 
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understanding as it relates to knowledge.  As Audi says about the contrast between self-
evidence and truth, “The application of the concept of self-evidence to a proposition 
explains both how it can be known (roughly, through understanding it) and why its 
justification requires no premises.”183  One might intuitively know that a proposition is 
true without knowing why it is true because one lacks an adequate understanding of the 
proposition.  The truth of a proposition is apprehended through intuition.  As Audi says, 
“the primary role of intuition is to give us direct, i.e., non-inferential, knowledge or 
justified belief of the truth of certain moral propositions.”184  So, for ethical intuitionism, 
intuition provides justified belief of the truth, not the self-evidence, of moral 
propositions.  This distinction is important because the plurality of basic moral principles 
(i.e.  prima facie duties) that intuitionists tend to embrace need not be defended as non-
inferentially self-evident.  Because the truth of intuitions is known based on complex 
relations between concepts, yet self-evidence is known through knowledge about these 
grounds, such knowledge might not be available.  One might recognize the truth of a 
proposition but not recognize the self-evidence of that proposition.185  Intuitions may or 
may not have self-evident propositions as their objects.  I mention these distinctions 
because it allows me to borrow the notion of intuition from the ethical intuitionist without 
thereby being committed to the self-evidence of the propositions intuited.  An intuitionist 
                                                 
183
  Audi 1998b: 18. 
184
  Ibid: 19. 
185
  This contemporary, moderate twist on intuitionism allows one to hold that one is not necessarily 
committed to the self-evidence of a proposition.  Critics of Ross argued that he was committed to 
recognizing the self-evidence of the propositions, then it was shown that the propositions are not self-
evident.  Of primary importance is to defend the truth of the duties, yet establishing the second-order idea 
that the duties are self-evident is of secondary importance.  As a normative theory, moderate intuitionism is 
committed only to there being non-inferential justified beliefs attained through intuition, but it need not 
always be committed to the basic duties possessing the epistemic status of self-evidence. 
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notion of intuition will be used to get at the truth of CMJs—to show how CMJs are 
genuine or objectively valid despite being fallible.  This will provide a direct response to 
Brant’s objection.  Why defend CMJs or moral intuitions as truth-conducive? 
 I must explain how CMJs are truth-conducive because CMJs are the data, the 
evidence, against which principles are evaluated.  Though I provided a specific definition 
of CMJs, the purpose of CMJs could be understood as, “judgments about what actions are 
required, permissible, and/or forbidden in a particular set of circumstances, or about the 
acceptability of a more general moral rule (either absolute or pro tanto) that specifies 
what is required, permissible, and/or forbidden in a range of similar cases.”186  CMJs are 
intuitions about the rightness or wrongness of actions.  In MRE the accent of justification 
is on CMJs.  We ought to select a moral theory based on the considerations that we place 
greatest credence in and these are our CMJs.187  When a group of principles (a theory) 
best accounts for CMJs, then this match counts as evidence for the principles.  
Alternative moral principles (or sets of moral principles) are tested by how well they fit 
with one’s reflective intuitions.  As Michael Huemer, a contemporary intuitionist, has 
stated, “ethical intuitions provide prima facie justification for ethical beliefs.”188  Because 
of the important role CMJs play in justification one must defend their status as truth-
conducive otherwise one is open to the objection that intuitions should not play such an 
important role in the justification of ethical beliefs. 
                                                 
186
  Miller 2000: 157-158. 
187
  Tim Mulgan even claims that, “One primary purpose of a moral theory is to unify and make sense of 
our considered moral judgments or intuitions...A decisive intuition represents a judgment any acceptable 
moral theory must accommodate” (Mulgan 2006: 2). 
188
  Huemer 2009: 232. 
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 Though the accent of justification is on CMJs this account is not committed to the 
factivity of CMJs.  There can be false intuitions.  Even in ideal inquiry conditions it is 
possible to have a false intuition because one’s intuition is biased or distorted by factors 
of enculturation.  Ideal inquiry conditions make it more likely that intuitions are correct, 
but they do not absolutely block against the fact that, “a mere prejudice can masquerade 
as an intuition.”189  MRE is only committed to the idea that our moral intuitions are not, 
en masse, unreliable.  MRE holds that, “our considered moral convictions are sufficiently 
reliable to proceed with a moral theory of justice that at least approximates the correct or 
most reasonable view.”190  This makes CMJs reliable, though not infallible, evidence of 
moral truth.  CMJs posses what Hooker calls independent credibility.191  CMJs are 
attractive without reference to something beyond themselves, but CMJs might turn out to 
be wrong.  In addition, CMJs can accept support from other beliefs, even as they carry 
their own justification or are attractive in their own right.  Through systematization of 
CMJs, and potential revision, there exist resources to correct false or merely apparent 
intuitions.  Over time beliefs should come to track the truth to a greater degree as biases 
and inconsistencies are uncovered and eliminated.  This is part of the process of 
achieving greater moral maturity.  One comes to see with greater clarity what is true 
regarding moral and immoral actions.   
 This is also how MRE solves the weak version of the input objection.  The weak 
version of the input objection holds that there is no reason to think CMJs are true.  MRE 
                                                 
189
  Audi 2004: 66. 
190
  Freeman 2007: 35. 
191
  Hooker 2002: 165. 
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shows how CMJs possess evidential weight and this explains why it is reasonable to think 
that CMJs are true.192  Though it is possible that some CMJs are false, as MRE proceeds 
the probability of there being false CMJs in one’s belief-set continues to diminish. 
 MRE is a process of deliberately inducing conditions for the moral development of 
an individual.  Often, one’s moral beliefs settle into an unhealthy homeostasis.  This 
occurs when one’s belief-set contains biases, inconsistencies or explanatory inadequacies 
that go unchecked.  Uncertainty, instability or new experience can upset a homeostasis 
and lead to a new equilibrium point.  The general flow of MRE is to establish 
equilibrium, upset equilibrium, allow beliefs to settle, then self-induce uncertainty 
through self-examination or increased experience.193  This captures the intuition that 
people only typically re-examine their moral beliefs when their world is shaken by 
personal or social tragedy and suffering.  In this regard, MRE aims to be proactive belief-
formation and moral maturity methodology.  Now I will review the standard RE 
procedure and indicate how MRE differs from this procedure. 
 In typical RE methodology one begins with a set of moral intuitions.  These 
intuitions are examined and only intuitions that one can confidently affirm are retained.  
Grounds for dismissal include suspicious formative factors or occasional epistemic 
distorting factors that generate instability and vagueness in a moral judgment.  The 
retained intuitions become CMJs because they are judgments one is inclined to adopt 
                                                 
192
  By way of situating MRE historically it is possible to locate the original expression of this idea in Fries 
1937.  Fries tried to establish a method of proving moral realism by articulating how moral judgments can 
be put forward and revised in a way that makes them likely to be true. 
193
  As Dan Bonevac has stated, “Judgments at equilibrium are not immune to all revision, they remain 
stable unless ‘expanding experience’ alters them” (Bonevac 2004: 363 n.2).  New commitments can occur 
through experience or seeing what is entailed by what one believes. 
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under conditions conducive to good decision making.  From the CMJs, principles are 
inferred or conjectured that might account for the CMJs.  Working from both ends one 
revises principles and CMJs until they are mutually supportive.  From narrow-RE one 
proceeds to wide-RE whereby different background theories are introduced to test the set 
of CMJs and principles under different conceptions.  These conceptions are arguments 
for and against the current set of beliefs and act as further evidence against which beliefs 
are revised.  When CMJs, principles and background theories are harmonized one has 
achieved wide-RE.194  As already argued, wide-RE does not constitute a theoretical 
advantage or an increase in justificatory force over and above narrow-RE.  For this 
reason I will continue to focus on narrow-RE and defend it against the charge that it is 
fundamentally conservative (i.e., matches principles with relatively fixed CMJs).  By 
contrast, the MRE method might be outlined in the following steps, which will be 
elaborated in forthcoming sections in this chapter:195 
1. Ensure that one is a competent moral judge. 
2. Collect all moral intuitions. 
3. Validate the genuineness of each intuition by verifying four requirements are met: 
non-inferentiality (or directness), firmness, comprehension, and pretheoreticality. 
4. Discard intuitions that are not genuine. 
a. This includes propositions that are not beliefs but are mere inclinations to 
believe (i.e., held with less than .5 degrees of confidence).196 
5. Validate that genuine intuitions are genuine CMJs by putting the intuitions 
through three filters: occasional epistemic distorting factors (OEDF), suspicious 
formative factors (SFF), and the mixed error menagerie (MEM). 
a. This is where the data is validated as veridical.   
                                                 
194
  Implicit in this formulation is Daniels’ independence constraint whereby the judgments supporting the 
background theories must be disjoint from the CMJs supporting the principles. 
195
  The impetus for specifying the MRE process is capturing Bonevac’s intuition that, “Without a precise 
characterization of the Rawlsian revision process, it is impossible to achieve any results” (Bonevac 2004: 
386). 
196
  This distinction expresses the idea that confidence is related to degrees of belief, whereas credence is 
related to the truth value of the beliefs.  Evidential weight covers both of these dimensions. 
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b. MEM is a mixed filter that includes some elements in previous filters, but 
it also includes other elements not found in previous filters.  Such 
redundancy generates greater purity of filtration. 
6. Disregard CMJs that fail any of the three filter tests.197 
7. Apply credences to the remaining intuitions (the CMJs) according to the strength 
with which one is attracted to assent to the truth of the intuitions.198 
a. These assertions might have the following form: Moral judge X judges 
that p is the case to degree of strength c. 
b. This is assigning evidential weight to the CMJs. 
8. Rank the CMJs according to their credence values. 
9. Infer or conjecture from the CMJs to principles that account for the CMJs. 
10. Revise the principles in an effort to discover the set of principle that best cohere 
with the modest foundations (the CMJs).199 
a. This is how the accent is placed on CMJs.200 
b. To decrease the risk of accidental generalization, favor principles that 
have the greatest degree of explanatory power. 
11. In situations of conflict where principles are recalcitrant to revision (i.e., they 
resist revision or keep reappearing while seeking inference from CMJs and 
coherence with them) revise some CMJs so that they are in-line with the resistive 
principles. 
12. When revising CMJs be more willing to revise CMJs with lesser evidential weight 
and be less willing to revise CMJs with greater evidential weight.201 
a. In a case where one holds CMJ1 with .5 credence and CMJ2 with equal 
credence, and there are no CMJs held with lesser credence, then one may 
                                                 
197
  This step overcomes a doxastic conservative stance whereby anything a subject believes has some merit 
counting in its favor, which might include products of superstition or wishful thinking.  For an example of 
such a position see Elgin 1996: Ch. 4. The inquirer must not only have a genuine belief or intuition but the 
belief must also seem to be the case.  The filters eliminate things that seem to be the case but really are not 
the case.  Products of superstition and wishful thinking are filtered out.  This step aligns MRE with 
phenomenal conservatism whereby things that seem to be veridical have a presumption in their favor, 
which includes but is not limited to things that are believed.  This is not, however, pure phenomenal 
conservatism because things seem true in relation to certain filter criteria, not simply by seeming to be the 
case to the person. 
198
  This use of credence, which covers ‘degree of belief’, is echoed in DePaul 2006: 620 n.13. It 
corresponds to how likely is seems to the agent that the proposition intuited (believed) is true. 
199
  This can be instantiated in terms of explanatory power. 
200
  It is interesting to note that the accent on CMJs reverses the consequentialist impulse to put more 
weight on abstract principles and less weight on intuitions about specific cases.  Intuitions can be at any 
level of generality, but they tend to be about specific cases.  The bumper sticker for MRE reads: trust your 
intuition. 
201
  Notice that all judgments with credence values are allowed into consideration.  This avoids the problem 
of the confidence constraint whereby one eliminates CMJs that possess lesser evidential weight.  Even 
judgments that one is not fully confident in are considered, but they are considered in accordance with the 
confidence it is reasonable to put in them in relation to the evidence in their favor.  This captures Scanlon’s 
suggestion to consider all judgments with credence values (Scanlon 2003: 144). 
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resolve the conflict using the criterion of intuitiveness for which the CMJ 
that elicits a greater sense of non-inferential credibility is revised last. 
b. Repeat steps 10-12 until CMJs and principles are brought into a state of 
mutual support or maximal coherence. 
13. Consider other hidden assumptions or background principles that one finds 
intuitive in relation to the set of CMJs. 
14. Apply these background principles to the belief set and revise the CMJs, the 
principles, or the background principles as needed.202 
15. When CMJs and principles are maximally coherent one has achieved moderate 
reflective equilibrium (MRE). 
16. As new experience (empirical or informational) is encountered revise current 
commitments in light of new experience to achieve a belief set that is more 
comprehensive and fully justified.  Also, revise beliefs as one intuits new moral 
convictions and infers or conjectures principles from these convictions.203 
 There are several points worth mentioning about the MRE procedure.  The MRE 
procedure invites an inquirer to establish and defend why credences are equal to 
credibilities.  It allows an inquirer to explain and rank what seems true according to 
degrees of commitment.  It then asks the inquirer to apply external filter criteria to 
credence values that are subjectively weighted.  This challenges the inquirer to make the 
subjective more objective.  The external filter criteria are independently credible because 
they are standards that address typical ways in which intuitions can be mistaken.204  
Credences are validated and one is warranted in putting the credence one does in one’s 
                                                 
202
  These background principles are not the same as the background theories of wide-RE.  They are not 
required to be a systematic conception that is applied to the current set of beliefs.  It is assumed that a 
reasonable conception has already been generated.  The background principles may produce slight 
alteration in one’s current moral conception, but these are likely to be refinements instead of radical 
departures from current commitments. 
203
  There is not a mandate that people seek formative experiences, as is mandated by DePaul 1993.  It is 
assumed that one must remain open to experience and seek to revise beliefs in light of experience, which 
means that the person is a competent judge.  Unless one is completely isolated from society one will have 
ample feedback for the revision of beliefs.  If one is in isolation, then imagination can proxy for the role of 
experience. 
204
  The filter criteria come from ethical intuitionism’s attempt to explain moral disagreement.  If moral 
beliefs are facts, then how come there is so much disagreement? Intuitionists, like Huemer, explain 
disagreement by showing how people go wrong in reasoning, how distortions stem from errors common to 
reasoning in general and morality in particular. 
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CMJs because the CMJs have survived filtration.  In addition, the CMJs themselves are 
genuine intuitions.  They meet four requirements for being properly formed and held by 
an inquirer.  As such, CMJs are likely to be truth-conducive because the conditions and 
constitution of genuine intuitions has been satisfied.  This makes it rational for one to put 
the evidential weight one does in the CMJs.  A competent judge who follows MRE will 
tend to reach justified moral beliefs.  Akin to observation reports, the competent judge 
will tend to veridically apprehend moral matters.  For example, one might be able to see 
that under certain factual circumstances it is very likely one should keep one’s promise.  
This is similar to claiming that a competent perceiver, under conditions favorable to good 
perception, will see an orange on the kitchen counter when there is in fact an orange on 
the kitchen counter.205  This is why the first step in the procedure is important.  If one is 
not a competent moral judge, then one might not be able to apprehend moral truth.  A 
color-blind perceiver may be unable to apprehend the truth of certain color perceptions.  
Similarly, if one is highly self-interested, closed-minded and unwilling to use the 
intuition requirements and filter criteria that lead to good moral judgments, then one may 
not see the true moral propositions.  If the agent is defective in terms of moral 
competence, then moral truth is not likely to be apprehended and false judgments are 
likely to result.  For this reason I will re-introduce the notion of a competent judge back 
into the RE procedure. 
                                                 
205
  Relating this example to intuitions, the constitution conditions on the intuitions make sure that what one 
is receiving through one’s epistemic channel is in fact a genuine intuition.  It separates, for example, 
emotional reactions from reflective seemings.  The favorable conditions (e.g., good lighting) are akin to the 
filter criteria that ensure the conditions under which genuine intuitions are formed are conducive to forming 
veridical judgments. 
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5.7 COMPETENT MORAL JUDGE 
 From Rawls’ first articulation of a “decision procedure” in ethics (1951) to his 
embedding of a similar procedure in his theory of justice (1971) the notion of a 
competent moral judge was dropped.  It is possible to speculate why this occurred.  One 
possibility is that Rawls dropped the notion of a competent judge under the sway of 
Quinean epistemology.  Instead of focusing on the agent making the judgments, the focus 
changed to the beliefs themselves.  In A Theory of Justice the make-up of the agent 
bringing the judgments into reflective equilibrium is not central as long as the beliefs 
themselves are mutually supportive.  The shift to focus on beliefs accords with the shift to 
a holistic, coherentist reading of the procedure.  Another possibility is that Rawls’ 
original position is thought to embody many of the characteristics of a competent judge.  
It is possible to assume that behind the veil of perception one would be a competent 
judge.  Regardless of the possible reasons for dropping the competent judge I will re-
insert the competent judge into the procedure to guard against person-centered mistakes 
in making moral judgments. 
 Whether or not RE contains a provision on the inquirer being a competent moral 
judge impacts the justificatory force of a CMJ within RE.  When Rawls dropped the 
competent judge it had the effect of weakening the notion of a CMJ.  This exposed RE, as 
found in A Theory of Justice, to the objection that the data of RE lack credibility.  Thus, 
the credibility of CMJs is going to be restored, in part, by reintroducing the competent 
judge and the more stringent notion of a CMJ.   
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 The notion of a competent judge has two categories of characteristics—general 
knowledge capacities and moral knowledge capacities.  The first category includes the 
following features: average intelligence, general knowledge of the world and the 
consequences of actions, knowledge of the facts of specific cases where one is called to 
judge, a willingness to use logical reasoning to determine what one should believe, and 
an open-minded when it comes to re-examining options in light of further evidence.  In 
the second category are characteristics attuned to capturing moral knowledge.  For 
example, a competent judge, “knows, or tries to know, his own emotional, intellectual, 
and moral predilections and makes a conscientious effort to take them into account in 
weighing the merits of any question.”206  This self-knowledge is important because it 
results in the ability to account for one’s prejudices and biases.  Though biases may 
influence one’s judgments, such biases do not determine the outcome of one’s judgments 
because one is insufficiently aware of their influence.  A competent judge must also have 
a sympathetic knowledge of human interests that tend to conflict and create moral 
dilemmas.207  Experience is important in gaining knowledge of human interests.  Where 
experience is incomplete Rawls’ admits the importance of imagination.  Through 
“imaginative appreciation” the competent judge can imagine how interests can 
conflict.208  The judge can then lay before himself, “all the interests in conflict, together 
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  Rawls 1951: 179. 
207
  This is called perceptive equilibrium by Martha Nussbaum 1990: 25-26. As Charles Harris summarizes 
this notion, “We must place ourselves in the position of another as fully as we can in order to determine 
what moral judgment is proper” (Harris 2005: 73). 
208
  A contemporary take on this idea is the notion of hypothetical retrospection (Hansson 2007).  This is 
where one imagines a future possibility has materialized.  One does this to minimize risks and 
uncertainties.  The correct course of action is the alternative that is morally permissible according to all 
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with the relevant facts of the case, and to bestow upon the appraisal of each the same care 
which he would give to it if that interest were his own.”209  Imaginatively taking-on the 
interests of others as if they are one’s own serves the end of impartial judgment.  A 
competent judge is impartial and reasonable in the appraisal of moral matters. 
 MRE’s adoption of the notion of a competent judge has the effect of sharpening the 
notion of a CMJ.  DePaul summarizes the notion of a CMJ in relation to Rawls’ notion of 
a competent judge as follows: 
(1) the judge does not stand to be punished for making the judgment, (2) the judge 
does not stand to gain by making the judgment, (3) the judgment concerns a real 
case where real interests are in conflict, not a merely hypothetical case, (4) the 
judgment was preceded by careful inquiry into facts and fair opportunity for all 
concerned to state their side, (5) the judge feels sure of the judgment, (6) the 
judgment is stable for the judge across time and shared by other competent 
judges, and (7) the judgment is intuitive, in the sense that it was not formed as a 
result of the conscious application of moral principles.210 
 This more restrictive notion of a CMJ details the type of judgment a competent judge 
is likely, willing and required to make.  Competent judges possess characteristics 
conducive to the generation of CMJs as outlined in the preceding quote.  On this account, 
CMJs are impartial, grounded in facts and fair inquiry, firmly-held by the judge, stable 
and intuitive, and reflect real human interests—either present day or historical.  Once 
these characteristics are brought to light it becomes evident why CMJs are initially 
credible, not merely initially believed.  Though CMJs have subjective qualities, they are 
far from purely subjective judgments that lack precedence, reflect instinct or 
                                                                                                                                                 
hypothetical retrospections.  This is a way of sharpening intuitions and considering moral alternatives and 
human interests.  It can aid in developing sympathetic knowledge. 
209
  Rawls 1951: 179. 
210
  DePaul 2006: 620 n.15. 
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enculturation or are biased by ulterior motives at the hands of self-interest.  These 
qualities find parallels in the intuitionist’s notion of an intuition.  The next section will 
explore in what sense a CMJ is an intuition that one affirms under ideal conditions. 
5.8 MORAL INTUITIONS 
 MRE adopts four requirements outlined by Robert Audi as requirements an intuition 
must embody to be counted as a genuine intuition.211  While describing the four 
requirements I will show how the notion of a CMJ, which is grounded in the notion of a 
competent judge, meets these criteria. 
 The first requirement for an intuition to count as a genuine intuition is the 
requirement of non-inferentiality (or directness).212  This is the requirement that intuitions 
are foundational beliefs because what is intuitively known is not evidenced by inference 
from premises.213  This means that a genuine intuition must not be arrived at as a 
conclusion of inference.  It can, however, be arrived at as a conclusion of reflection 
whereby one reflects on the content of a proposition from a global perspective in relation 
to its context.  That a genuine intuition cannot be inferred from premises coincides with 
the requirement that a CMJ is intuitive with regard to ethical principles.  A CMJ cannot 
be arrived at by a conscious application of principles.  If CMJs are to be something 
against which principles can be tested, they cannot be inferred from the principles they 
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  I am using the term ‘genuine intuition’ as an intuition that meets Audi’s four requirements. 
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are supposed to validate.  This would threaten the method with justificatory circularity.  
This is also consistent with CMJs being conclusions of reflection because, as Rawls 
states, “An intuitive judgment may be consequent to a thorough inquiry into the facts of 
the case, and it may follow a series of reflections on the possible effects of different 
decisions....What is required is that the judgment not be determined by a systematic and 
conscious use of ethical principles.”214  The goal is to reach principles that can justify 
moral beliefs and can be shown to be justified.  CMJs are the anchor against which this 
process is elaborated.  This requires CMJs to be arrived at with sufficient distance from 
the principles that might later elaborate or intuitively express the CMJs.    
 The second requirement for a genuine intuition is the firmness requirement.  An 
intuition is not merely an inclination to believe because it is typically a case of belief.  
Something can be intuitive without being an intuition.215  An intuition must be a 
proposition that is thought to hold, and it “tends to be relinquished only through such 
weighty considerations as a felt conflict with a firmly held theory or with another 
intuition.”216  This account aligns with Rawls’ requirement that a CMJ be firmly-held.   
 The third requirement for a genuine intuition is that an adequate understanding of the 
propositional content must be part of the formation of the intuition.  This is the 
                                                 
214
  Rawls 1951: 183. 
215
  Audi makes this distinction with reference to perception.  Regarding that which is merely intuitive, “the 
data would be less clear, just as a view of an unexpected island in the fog is less clear than it would be in 
sunlight and provides less reason to alter one’s map” (Audi 2004: 34).  I part ways, however, with Audi by 
reserving the term evidential weight for degrees of confidence (belief) along with credence (likelihood of 
truth); whereas, Audi mentions that evidential weight need not be denied to intuitive propositions, but that 
intuitions proper have much more evidential weight.  I hold that genuine intuitions have degrees of 
confidence, but they only possess evidential weight once their tendency toward truth has been assessed.  It 
is possible that being held firmly or confidently can increase the evidential value of the intuition, but both 
confidence and truth must be present for the intuition to have evidential weight. 
216
  Ibid: 34. 
116 
comprehension requirement.  When considering a proposition an intuition may quickly 
arise in response, but when there are many conflicting human interests reflection may 
take awhile to properly understand the proposition.  Adequate understanding is a gradable 
notion and a minimal amount of adequate understanding is required for a proposition to 
be genuine.  The upshot of this is that, “this kind of basis of a belief tends both to produce 
cognitive firmness and to enhance evidential value.”217  Understanding can add to the 
evidential value of an intuition, and it can produce a firmness with which an intuition is 
held.  This connects to the notion of a CMJ because one is required to feel sure of the 
CMJ.  Feeling sure results from cognitive firmness—the fact that one has a firm grasp of 
the content of the proposition. 
 The fourth requirement of a genuine intuition is the pretheoreticality requirement.  
This means that intuitions are not, of necessity, ground on theories for their support, and 
intuitions are also not held as theoretical hypotheses.  To avoid confusion it is important 
to recognize that it is possible for the content of intuitions to be inferentially justified or 
held on the basis of a theory.  Non-inferential justification is not the only type of 
justification that can justify an intuition.  However, for the intuition to be genuine the 
intuition must not be held as a theoretical hypothesis or based on a premise.  The crucial 
question is, “How is the intuition in fact held?”218  This links-up with the notion of a CMJ 
in that a group of principles can constitute a theory and a CMJ cannot be evidentially 
ground in a principle to receive its prima facie justification, its initial credibility. 
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 These four requirements act as a baseline for testing the genuineness of intuitions.  
Intuitions that meet all four criteria continue on to the next round in the MRE process.  
The baseline for being an intuition does not exhaust the requirements for being a CMJ.  
This is why genuine intuitions must continue to the next stage where they are validated as 
being veridical.  The four requirements of a genuine intuition ensure that the belief is held 
in the right way to count as an intuition.  Aspects of a CMJ that the four requirements fail 
to capture are: that the outcome of the judgment is not tied to merit and demerit incurred 
by the judge, the judgment concerns an actual case (either current or historical) with real 
human interests in conflict, the judgment was made with a reflection on all the facts of 
the case, and the judgment has precedence and is shared by other judges.  This is why the 
four requirements for being a genuine intuition is a test appropriate to the confidence it is 
reasonable to have in a belief, but it is not appropriate to the truth of the belief because 
the belief has not survived a vetting process aimed to identify purely subjective 
judgments that are likely to reflect suspicious formative factors and distorting epistemic 
factors.  As Audi mentions, “absence of all bias is apparently not part of the concept of 
an intuition.”219  The same holds for the concept of a CMJ.  Though all bias is not 
eliminated during the filtration process there is a progression toward less bias and the 
elimination of purely subjective judgments.  Bias can also be identified and corrected as 
CMJs are extended in the form of principles.  It is reasonable to view MRE as a process 
of the successive elimination of biases as CMJs are systematized and brought into a state 
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of ultima facie justification.  With this thought in mind I proceed to the next section 
where the three filters are explained. 
5.9 THE THREE FILTERS 
 Once a proposition is firmly held, adequately comprehended, and pre-theoretically 
and non-inferentially formed it is ready to pass through a series of filters on its way to 
becoming a full-fledged CMJ.  Now I will motivate the move from the traditional RE 
filters to the robust three-fold filters. 
 As traditionally understood, there are two general conditions RE filters are thought to 
capture.  The first condition can be formulated as the principle of general reliability 
(PGR).  The principle can be stated as follows: 
(PGR)  Moral beliefs formed under conditions generally conducive to the formation 
of true beliefs will be more reliable than moral beliefs not formed under these 
conditions.220 
 PGR assumes that a belief, when formed under the right conditions, will be reliable.  
To be reliable is to be truth-conducive.  So, a belief formed under conditions of general 
reliability is more likely to be true.  These conditions capture a great deal of what it 
means for an intuition to be a CMJ.  Generally reliable cognitive conditions have the 
following traits: good inference patterns, based on nonmoral evidence (i.e., well-
informed), not distorted by prejudice or self-interest, held with confidence, made in a 
moment of emotional equanimity and stable over time.221  When a further condition is 
added to the principle of general reliability all of the outstanding elements, which were 
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not captured by the notion of a genuine intuition, are captured to make an intuition a 
CMJ.  This is the requirement for impartial and imaginative consideration of the interests 
of the relevant parties in a given case.  Greater reliability is generated when a competent 
judge uses her capacities for imaginative consideration of the interests of others and from 
that impartial perspective formulates a judgment about the case.   
 The two general conditions of reliability alone do not produce an intuition with 
probative force.  To cite one example, intuitions formed in an emotionally calm moment 
are not always evidential.222  Calmness cannot always ascribe credibility to CMJs 
because there are cases where arousal of moral emotions can lead to the correct 
judgment.  If one discards an intuition formed when one has an overwhelming sense of 
moral indignation and disgust this can lead one away from the correct moral assessment 
of the situation.  Indignation may have non-inferential evidential value.  As Audi 
indicates, “This is certainly possible where the emotion is produced as an appropriate 
response to the relevant base properties, such as flogging or lying, properties that would 
directly support the corresponding moral judgment.”223  Adding an intuitionist 
perspective to the filter conditions allows for a more accurate assessment.  Instead of 
requiring emotional equanimity as a condition of reliability what is required is a 
fittingness relation between the emotions and the base properties, which may be 
perceptually ground or ground in certain cognitions (i.e., memorial impressions).  With 
this revision to the emotional component the first filter is established.  It is called the 
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occasional epistemic distorting factors filter.224  It recognizes that certain factors can 
interfere with one’s ability to correctly form epistemic judgments.  If an intuition is made 
under conditions of insufficient information, intoxication, inattention, bias, haste or lack 
of fittingness between emotions and base properties, then it is likely to be false or 
misguided.  Despite the first layer of protection against misguided intuitions becoming 
CMJs there is another filter that is needed.  This filter specializes in uncovering bias and 
prejudice that emanates from enculturation or a tainted source. 
 A common element in the input objection is insistence that CMJs may merely reflect 
familial and cultural indoctrination that could have been different if one had been raised 
in a different family or lived in a different culture.  Our moral intuitions may be 
subjective in that they simply reflect views that have been, “inculcated into us by parents, 
teachers and society from childhood.”225  Brandt agrees with Singer and Hare’s 
assessment and argues that our goal should be to step outside our own tradition and 
objectively access the facts of the case.  Against this idea Scanlon argues, “The aim of 
Moral Enquiry is not to justify our ‘considered judgments’ with reference to some new 
and independent standard, but to clarify the reasons that we already had for believing 
them to be correct and to determine whether, in the light of reflection, we still find them 
persuasive.”226  The ultimate credibility of our CMJs is not going to be found in an ever-
elusive culturally-neutral vantage point.  The goal is not to seek a culturally-neutral 
standard, but to use a standard that is capable of sorting good from bad enculturation.  
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The goal is to minimize the influence of pernicious prejudice and bias by using a standard 
that stands outside, yet is implied within, the system of beliefs being evaluated.  To 
address this concern I turn to the next filter. 
 The next filter is the suspicious formative factors filter.  This filter seeks to further 
mitigate the influence of inadequate familial and cultural training.  It is important to 
realize that not all formative factors are negative.  Some familial, cultural and religious 
training is consistent with forming CMJs that are truth-conducive.  Moral disagreement is 
a related topic, but it can be addressed apart from factors that tend to degrade the quality 
of moral judgments one tends to make.  To mitigate the influence of negative formative 
factors on one’s judgments it is important to generate sensitivity to the factors that 
negatively influence one’s cognitive attitudes.  These factors decrease the flexibility of a 
judge’s cognition in a given situation, making it rigid to the point of missing the truth of 
the situation.  These factors cloud one’s apprehension of objective moral truth.227  A 
judge’s cognitive flexibility is influenced by the degree to which: 
• One’s early moral training and environment were authoritarian. 
• One is stubborn. 
• One is intellectually self-confident, or has intellectual courage. 
• One is able to admit error to others and to oneself. 
• One is influenced by authority. 
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122 
• One’s interests and the interests of one’s fellows depend on the general 
acceptance of one’s views.228 
 Copp posits these factors and claims that conservative foundationalism cannot deal 
with these factors because, “there is no fact of the matter as to what our considered 
judgments would be like were our early moral training not to have been at all 
authoritarian, and were our moral views not to have been at all influenced by anyone’s 
self-interest, by our class background, or by the culture of our society.”229  Copp is right 
that there is no absolute fact-of-the-matter as to what our judgments would be if they 
were free from the influence of any distorting factors.  CMJs still operate within the 
realm of fallibility and what appears to be the fact-of-the-matter at one time may appear 
to not be the fact-of-the-matter at another time.  However, if one is sensitive to the 
influence of one’s early moral training and how an authoritarian upbringing makes one 
more prone to blind submission to authority, then one is able to recognize the influence of 
this attraction to assent to propositions that favor one’s upbringing in this regard.  This 
may produce a heightened need for reflection on intuitions that take authority at face 
value or true in virtue of emanating from an authoritative source.  This covers two of the 
formative factors mentioned by Copp.  The other factors one must screen for in one’s 
intuitions are low intellectual self-confidence, stubbornness, pride and the desire for 
acceptance.  These factors can cloud one’s ability to see moral situations for what they 
are and form correct judgments.  For example, if a judge was raised by parents who 
struggled with obvious pride issues, then one may be more inclined to lie in situations 
                                                 
228
  Copp 1984: 153. 
229
  Ibid: 154. 
123 
where one has the opportunity to admit one has made a mistake.  The judgment that one 
must lie to protect one’s sense of self and reputation is emanating from a place 
conditioned by negative formative factors.  The true moral judgment is that one ought to 
tell the truth and take responsibility for one’s actions and the harm one’s mistakes may 
have caused.  This is because lying to protect one’s pride only tends to perpetuate more 
problems and not allow for an accurate assessment of what happened and why it 
happened.  The desire for acceptance, the trait of stubbornness and low intellectual self-
confidence can produce similar false judgments of situations where one is confronted 
with moral issues or human interests that conflict.  Though there may be a fact-of-the-
matter with regard to what is morally true one cannot reasonably expect that by making 
judgments under ideal conditions one will reach CMJs that are all free from distorting 
factors.230  One would need something like perfect cognition, if not omniscience, to be 
able to apprehend all facts-of-the-matter under idealized conditions.  One’s cognitive 
capacities are limited and the complexities of actual human interests far outstrip one’s 
ability to perfectly apprehend and judge the moral truth in a given situation.  Despite this, 
the cognitive filters mitigate against gross errors of judgment.  They also progressively 
allow one to triangulate on the moral truth as one discards judgments that are distorted.  
CMJs may not ever totally capture the moral fact-of-the-matter, but they can serve as 
evidence of objective moral truth and in that regard credibly serve as foundations for 
one’s normative theorizing and normative conclusions. 
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 The final filter is the mixed error menagerie.231  This last filter aims at addressing 
wide-spread sources of error that lead to disagreement.  If beliefs and intuitions aim at 
truth, then people will tend to agree with each other when they see the truth; yet, in the 
moral realm great disagreement persists.  Disagreement persists because error exists and 
people are fallible human agents.  Michael Huemer summarizes this point as follows: 
People seldom satisfy ideal conditions for reasoning, and even the best of 
cognitive conditions do not render humans infallible.  The causes of our beliefs 
can be highly complex and largely hidden from us.  We often cannot articulate 
some of the reasons for our beliefs.  The intuitionist can no more produce an 
algorithm for computing the correct moral theory than we can produce a general 
algorithm for computing correct empirical theories.232 
 MRE is not a decision procedure or an algorithm for computing moral truth.233  It is a 
procedure that when followed tends to produce beliefs more likely to be true and 
justified.  A competent moral judge is competent in virtue of possessing capacities for 
reasonableness.  A competent judge, however, is not immune from errors that can occur 
during the procedure.  A competent judge is, however, disposed toward looking out for 
such errors and correcting such errors when they are discovered.  Now I will discuss the 
details of the mixed error menagerie.   
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 The mixed error menagerie affords the competent judge a last opportunity to screen 
the set of CMJs for mistaken CMJs.  The competent judge is to screen the CMJs with an 
eye for eliminating CMJs that may reflect the following errors: bias, miscalculation, 
confusion, misunderstanding and lack of understanding, oversight, hasty judgments, false 
or incomplete information, unarticulated assumptions, stubbornness, fallacies, 
forgetfulness, intrinsic difficulty of issues, inarticulate evidence, and mental defects.  The 
mixed error menagerie contains some elements in the previous two filters, and it also 
contains greater specificity of some previous filter criteria.  There are also new criteria in 
the filter and some criteria that touch on the four requirements that make an intuition 
genuine.  This filter acts as a final validation before the set of moral intuitions that 
survive the filtering process are coined prima facie credible and ready to be used to 
justify moral principles.  I will paraphrase each criterion in the filter as articulated by 
Huemer and connect the criterion with previous steps in MRE.234 
 Bias toward self-interest often results in error in apprehending moral truth.  This can 
occur when one wants to believe what it is in one’s interest to believe.  It can also occur 
when one does not want to believe something that is true.  Bias can be shaped by pride, a 
yearning for acceptance by a community, or wishful thinking concerning what one wants 
to be true.  This filter criterion connects with being a competent judge because being a 
competent judge requires considering the interests of others, not just what it is in one’s 
interest to believe.  Bias also connects with the occasional epistemic distorting factors 
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and the suspicious formative factors filters.  Notice the strength with which MRE 
combats bias and prejudice. 
 Miscalculation occurs when a judge makes a mistake.  Despite being a competent 
judge this can occur when one makes a mistake in reflecting on the dynamics of a moral 
case.  Confusion occurs when one fails to distinguish two things that seem similar.  An 
example of this error is someone who thinks that talking requires using language so one 
cannot talk about the language-independent realm.  Misunderstanding, or lack of 
understanding, occurs when concepts and theories are misunderstood.  A moral judge has 
a genuine intuition when there is proper understanding.  It is possible, though, that an 
intuition masquerading as a genuine intuition has survived to this point in the process.  
This is why it is important for the moral judge to screen for this type of error before the 
intuitions become CMJs.  Oversight occurs when a judge fails to notice important 
considerations.  This can occur when judgments are made but an important element is 
overlooked or it can occur from selective attention.  Hasty judgments occur when a judge 
makes a judgment based on an initial impression or gut-reaction.  This punctuates the 
importance of using non-inferential reflection to attain adequate understanding.  Errors 
from false or incomplete information occur when not all facts relevant to making a 
judgment are known.  An example of this is two judges discussing abortion.  One judge 
has consulted pro-life literature and one has consulted pro-choice literature.  Some of the 
information might be false, and both judges do not possess complete information about 
abortion.  Unarticulated assumptions occur when an assumption is operating in the 
background and controlling the judgment.  If, for example, a judge is arguing for pro-life 
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when it comes to abortion and the other is arguing against pro-life, they may be arguing 
past each other because the pro-life judge is operating under the assumption abortion is 
murder while the other judge is operating under the assumption it is terminating a cluster 
of cells.  Stubbornness can impact willingness to examine old beliefs in light of new 
evidence.  Perhaps an intuition stems from a refusal to reflect on the evidence at hand.  
This criterion is also covered by the notion of a competent judge and the suspicious 
formative factors filter.  Fallacies occur when poor forms of reasoning guide judgment 
making.  Examples include, denying the antecedent, equivocation, begging the question 
and non sequitur arguments.  This criterion is not as relevant to intuitions because they 
are largely based on reflection and not explicit inference, but is it possible that, say, the 
naturalistic fallacy has been committed when one has the intuition that because 
something is natural it is good.  Forgetfulness can occur when one fails to remember 
important factors in the process of reflection.  Leaving such factors out can lead to 
incorrect judgments.  Errors can also result from the intrinsic difficulty of issues.  Some 
propositions with complex content require a great deal of reflection before they can be 
properly understood and intuited.  If one stops the process of reflection prior to grasping 
an intrinsically difficult issue or fails to reflect on the interests of all relevant parties, then 
one’s resulting intuition about the case may be in error.  Inarticulate evidence occurs 
when there are grounds for a belief that one is unable to articulate.  This kind of evidence 
often occurs when one is forming an intuition and one is unable to articulate the basis for 
the intuition.  The point is not to eliminate intuitions that one cannot recognize the 
evidence for; rather, the point is to recognize those intuitions that one cannot articulate 
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the evidence for and ensure that one still has confidence in those intuitions.  Mental 
defects are hedged against by the first step in the MRE process.  Part of being a 
competent moral judge involves having average intelligence and good cognitive 
functioning.  If, for example, one is a paranoid schizophrenic it will be difficult for that 
person to distinguish delusions from veridical judgments. 
 Huemer detailed the menageries of error to show how disagreement is possible 
within an intuitionist framework.  I packaged the criteria into the mixed error menagerie 
and deployed it in the service of vetting intuitions prior to them becoming CMJs.  This 
move is strategic because it puts MRE well on the way to addressing the problem of 
disagreement.  It embeds criteria for identifying common sources of error that lead to 
disagreement in the criteria for what it takes to become a CMJ.  This means CMJs are 
less likely to be the kinds of things people disagree over.  If disagreement persists then it 
is possible to look at the filters and identify how one of the judges made a mistake.  This 
facilitates a convergence toward truth, and it solves the problem of explaining the 
credibility of CMJs prior to the end-point of RE.  The story that can be told is that people, 
even competent moral judges, are prone to error, and CMJs are credible to the degree that 
the judge mitigates these errors from creeping into the set of CMJs.   
 In closing this section, given the four requirements for constituting an intuition and 
the three filters an intuition must get through to become a CMJ, a CMJ cannot be readily 
equated with a prejudice or a mere subjective reflection of cultural and familial 
indoctrination.  The reason this objection is commonly leveled against RE is because the 
method only uses the first filter (i.e., occasional epistemic distorting factors) in its 
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unrevised form and a confidence index as the sole factors bestowing credibility on CMJs.  
By contrast, on many different levels, a CMJ is evaluated and benchmarked against 
general and moral standards that vindicate placing confidence in the CMJ and vindicate 
believing that the CMJ is likely to be true.  Judgments are not certified as credible simply 
by the confidence we place in them.  Given these considerations, MRE has undermined 
the claim that CMJs represent prejudices or mere subjective judgments that may have a 
status no better than fictions.235 
5.10 ASSIGNING EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT 
 Now that CMJs are established as credible they are ready to be assigned credence 
values according to how likely they are to be true.  CMJs arrive at this stage in the 
process with a certain degree of belief or confidence attached to them.  The credibility of 
the CMJs stems from having subjective degrees of confidence validated in a searching 
and objective way.  Filters act to instill a measure of objectivity into the process.  In this 
stage the competent judge takes another look at the CMJs and prepares them for the 
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revision process by assigning to them credence values in relation to the estimated truth-
value of the beliefs.  This involves putting a number or a relative ranking on a person’s 
degrees of belief.  The higher the credence level a CMJ enjoys the higher the degree of 
justification it possesses.  CMJs with higher credence values will impact principles 
differently than CMJs with lower credence values. 
 An inquirer assigns a probability value to each CMJ according to the level of 
confidence the inquirer has in the truth of the judgment.  These assertions might have the 
following form: moral judge X judges that p is the case to degree of strength c.  This is 
assigning evidential weight to the CMJs.  Such a procedure is warranted because of the 
capacities of the moral judge and the constitution of the CMJs being assessed (i.e., 
genuine intuitions made under ideal conditions that have survived filtering).  This is why 
credences correspond to credibilities.  After assigning credence values to the CMJs the 
CMJs are ranked relative to each other according to their credence values.236  Now that 
these values are assigned it is important to consider a common objection to RE and to the 
idea of assigning subjective probability values to beliefs. 
 The charge of conservatism against RE takes many forms.  The most general 
objection of conservatism is the idea that moral convictions simply reflect the status 
quo.237  It is clear that this version of conservatism is not problematic for MRE.  Most 
CMJs are not formed on the basis of cultural and familial indoctrination.  They are not 
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held because they are what one was taught to believe or what one was modeled while 
growing up.  They are held because they pass extensive filter tests that separate pre-
reflective from reflective intuitions, biased intuitions from unbiased intuitions, and false 
intuitions from true intuitions.  It is highly likely that beliefs in the set of initial CMJs are 
not made on the basis of reflecting the status quo or cultural conditioning.   
 Another variety of the conservatism charge is made against conservative 
foundationalism, which MRE seems to be a version of at first glance.  Conservative 
foundationalism would, “portray our idealized considered moral judgments as 
epistemically basic beliefs that, together with other basic beliefs, provide the basis for 
any other justified beliefs but are justified themselves without need of grounding.”238  
The modest intuitionism adopted by MRE guards against this claim because basic beliefs 
(CMJs) are not “without need of grounding” they are simply without need of grounding 
in other beliefs.  Instead, they are ground in one’s ability to intuit non-inferential beliefs.  
Further, the charge of conservatism has its greatest force in relation to coherence theory.  
As Copp states: 
Conservative coherence theories of moral justification face a dilemma.  On the 
one hand, unless there is a prior reason to think that considered moral judgments 
in ideal circumstances would be credible, there is not reason to treat them as a 
standard of justification....On the other hand, if there is a justification of them that 
is prior to the account provided in the conservative theory, then the theory is not a 
fully general account of the justification of moral judgments.  Hence, even if such 
a prior justification is avoidable, it would be an error to build a conservative 
constraint into a theory that is intended as a general theory of moral 
justification.239 
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 The dilemma Copp poses is not as pressing for conservative foundationalism as 
embraced by MRE.  This is another benefit of going the foundationalist/intuitionist route: 
it is quickly able to discharge the objection of conservatism.  This has the added benefit 
of being able to nullify DePaul’s move towards a radical, as opposed to a conservative, 
interpretation of RE. 
 DePaul held that the input objection shows that the conservative version of RE is 
untenable.  This is because moral beliefs have truth-values and persistent moral 
disagreement shows that many moral beliefs are false and not credible.  This means 
initial credence levels are not credible.  As discussed in the previous section, moral 
disagreement is the result of errors and the mere fact of moral disagreement does not 
impugn holding that moral beliefs are truth-conducive and credence values, expressing 
evidential weight, correspond to credibilities.  DePaul thought that a method that used 
credence values cannot reliability generate credible beliefs, so a radical interpretation of 
RE was called for so that prior degrees of commitment to beliefs do not hold sway in the 
revision process.  One could have a conversion experience and disregard credence values 
all together.  One could radically alter one’s belief-set without paying homage to prior 
commitments.240  The move to radical-RE is founded on a lack of explanation of the 
variety of ways moral disagreement can occur and embedding those ways into a 
heightened sensitivity to those factors prior to one assigning credence values.  DePaul’s 
                                                 
240
  While DePaul’s method sounds plausible it leads to a Wild West of moral belief formation and 
justification.  Without clear steps or guidelines and simply leaving it up to the inquirer to determine what 
standards to apply and licensing the undermining of all prior commitments in an instant leads to a theory of 
moral justification that is highly random and subjective.  DePaul tries to provide some levity to the 
procedure by urging people to seek out formative experiences like reading a good book or poetry, but this is 
DePaul imposing a constraint of what constitutes a good experience and what constitutes a bad formative 
experience.  Again, this is an external standard that, from within his version of RE, should be ignored. 
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book length treatment of RE and his adoption of the radical version of RE is founded on 
this mistake.  MRE, however, has corrected this mistake and held it is reasonable to use 
credence values in RE and that credence values correspond to credibilities.   
 MRE embraces conservatism or degrees of commitment as an operating cost of 
proposing a method of reflection in the mold of RE.  It uses this factor in a productive 
way and avoids the objection that using a mere confidence index does not produce 
credibility.241 
5.11 PRINCIPLES 
 Now that the set of CMJs is established the next stage involves formulating 
principles that match the CMJs.  These principles can be inferred as premises from the 
CMJs.  By applying these premises one can see if one is led to the CMJs they seek to 
account for.  Another way to formulate principles is to conjecture principles that one 
thinks may account for the CMJs.  Inference may work in cases where the set of CMJs 
lend themselves to an obvious set of principles whereas conjecture may work in cases 
where one is unsure how a general principle can be inferred from a specific CMJ or a set 
of CMJs.  This use of principles matches the intuitionist model of justification and raises 
an objection. 
 An objection to the incorporation of intuitionist elements in MRE hinges on the 
directionality of justification.  For many intuitionists, “knowledge of singular moral 
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  This also avoids dropping the confidence constraint all together because it is not a reliable guide to 
revision.  Knight 2006 drops confidence and allows in all judgments that meet general conditions of 
reliability.  MRE generates greater precision of judgments.  This acts as a guide to revision when 
comparing a bunch of judgments one has little confidence in with a single judgment one has great 
confidence in.  The individual has actual numbers or comparative rankings to determine whether the group 
of judgments possesses greater evidential weight than the single weighty judgment. 
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judgments is epistemically prior to knowledge of moral principles.”242  This reflects a 
particularist orientation to the discovery of moral truths.  According to the objection, if 
principles are ground in the capacity to form singular judgments, then it is possible that 
principles will only reflect the CMJs of the judge going through the process.  In such a 
case, there would be as many valid moral principles as there are different judges with 
different CMJs.  This represents another variety of a subjectivist objection to RE because 
there is no guarantee that generally held principles will ever be reached.  The first 
response to this claim comes from within MRE.  One of the requirements of the 
occasional epistemic distorting factors filter is the requirement for impartial and 
imaginative consideration of the interests of the relevant parties in a given case.  Though 
CMJs are particular judgments, which are made at all levels of generality, they are not 
exhausted by the interests of the judge making the judgment.  Part of the definition of a 
CMJ is that the judgment is stable for the judge across time and shared by other 
competent judges.  Thus, MRE is capable of handling the objection that there would as 
many valid principles as there are moral judges. 
 Another way of responding to the subjectivist charge against MRE’s moral principles 
is by drawing a distinction between establishing ethical principles as valid and knowing 
ethical principles are valid.243  A moral judge can claim that principles are valid for all 
people, but not know that the principles are in fact valid for all people.  It could turn out 
that the moral judge is mistaken.  However, as Regan clarifies, “Having admitted my 
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  This distinction is made by Regan 1983: 138-139. 
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fallibility, it does not follow that I am advocating principles valid for me alone.”244  
Fallibility need not lead to subjectivism.  If a competent moral judge correctly follows the 
MRE procedure that judge can reasonably claim those principles are binding on all 
because the principles account for generally shared intuitions and the interests of the 
relevant parties to the moral dilemma.  It is reasonable for one to claim that competent 
judges who make ideal moral judgments about which principles to accept would reach a 
consensus about which principles are binding on all people.  What the competent judge 
cannot claim is that she would know what principles any or all competent judges would 
choose.  Despite not knowing that the universal application of the principles is validated, 
due to fallibility, competent judges still can claim the principles arrived at are binding.  In 
closing this section it is important to consider another way MRE is similar to yet different 
from intuitionism. 
 In relation to moderate intuitionism MRE allows that moral principles can become 
intuitions, but it does not endorse the self-evidence of moral principles.  If MRE endorsed 
self-evidence it would be possible to simply apprehend the truth of moral principles 
without going through CMJs.  This would defeat the purpose of principles being ground 
in CMJs.  The way RE is typically mentioned as being compatible with a moderate 
intuitionist schema is as an additional (optional) method that can be used to increase the 
justification of moral principles, but RE itself is not necessary for the justification of 
moral principles.  MRE, by contrast, requires moral principles to be validated as ultima 
facie justified in reference to moral intuitions.  Locating the set of principles that best 
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cohere with the modest foundations produces ultimate justification, not simply 
apprehending prima facie duties (principles) and applying the principles to a given case 
to discover the resultant duty that justifies the correct action in a given case.  For the 
intuitionist, RE is an additional procedure that can add to the justification of the belief-
set, but it is not, of necessity, integral to generating justification.  Despite this difference 
between a strict moderate foundationalist model and the model of MRE that incorporates 
some intuitionist elements there is a similarity between what the models allow for in 
terms of principles. 
 A principle can become an intuition at a later point in time.  This idea is captured by 
DePaul’s admission that: 
[A] principle originally formulated via inference from a number of intuitive 
judgments about particular cases can come to be an intuition itself.  In such a 
case, the principle would at first, and perhaps for some time, have been believed 
on the basis of its best explaining a range of intuitive judgments.  But at some 
point the principle would come to seem true in its own right, and would be 
believed on the basis of seeming true rather than on the basis of inference.245 
 Under the MRE model a principle can become self-evident, but its self-evidence 
comes via the ground of being properly situated with CMJs.  After a period of being 
situated with CMJs the principle can become self-evident or seem true in its own right.  
However, its self-evidence was precipitated by and dependent upon its role in explaining 
CMJs.  Self-evidence cannot bypass this necessary step on the way to a principle 
appearing true in its own right.  On the contrary, for Audi, the ground of self-evidence is 
first and foremost adequate understanding—looking at the proposition the right way can 
                                                 
245
  DePaul 2006: 619 n.9. 
137 
reveal its truth.246  If this were the case one would not need to go through the process of 
forming principles out of intuitions.  Principles could be justified from the start simply by 
attaining a proper understanding of the content of the proposition.  In such a model, 
understanding is both necessary and sufficient for justification.  On the MRE model, 
adequate understanding is necessary but not sufficient for forming justified beliefs.  The 
intuition here is that one does not adequately grasp a principle until one is able to apply 
the principle or see its consequences in particular judgments in specific cases.  Out of 
apprehending what principles entail, self-evidence emerges; self-evidence emerges out of 
the systematization of CMJs.  There is no shortcut to this process by simply reflecting on 
a principle in the right way.  Principles are conclusions of inference that can become 
intuitive at a later point in time.247 
5.12 REVISION 
 At this point in the MRE process CMJs have been formulated and principles that 
match the CMJs have been inferred or conjectured.  The next stage in the process 
involves revising the principles in an effort to discover the set of principles that best 
cohere with the modest foundations (the CMJs).  This is how emphasis is placed on the 
CMJs.  However, some principles may resist revision or continue to re-appear in the set 
of principles even as one revises or discards the principles to bring the total set of 
principles more in-line with the CMJs.  This is an indication that some CMJs need to be 
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  To further see that Audi and I are in conflict over this point I will mention a related point.  For Audi the 
notion of adequate understanding can be distorted by the type of procedure MRE advocates.  As Audi says, 
“One would have a distorted understanding of the proposition if one took it to require a minimal level of 
confidence appropriate to knowledge and that the entailed belief must be accompanied by the subject’s 
attributing a corresponding numerical probability to the proposition in question” (Ibid: 207). 
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revised.  In this case, one retains the resistive principles and revises the CMJs so that they 
are better in-line with the principles.  As one revises the CMJs one should work from the 
CMJs with less evidential weight toward the CMJs with more evidential weight.  Because 
the CMJs have been ranked according to numerical or lexical standards there is less 
guesswork when it comes to knowing the next proposition to revise.248  Hooker 
illuminates the need for this methodological principle while discussing a competent 
judge’s belief that the principles arrived at in RE should be obeyed, “If the modest 
foundationalist theory of justification is correct then she will still be justified in this 
belief, so long as, in the course of attaining equilibrium between her beliefs, she was most 
willing to revise those beliefs with the least prima facie credibility.”249  What about a case 
where there are two equally credible beliefs in need of revision? In a case where one 
holds CMJ1 with .5 credence and CMJ2 with equal credence, and there are no CMJs held 
with lesser credence, then one may resolve the conflict using the criterion of intuitiveness 
for which the CMJ that elicits a greater sense of non-inferential credibility is revised last.  
The next step involves continuing to work from both ends, revising principles and CMJs 
as needed, until one converges on a state of maximal coherence or mutual support.   
 At this point it is important to consider other hidden assumptions or background 
principles that one finds intuitive in relation to the set of CMJs.  Apply these principles to 
the belief set and revise the CMJs, the principles, or the background principles as needed.  
When CMJs and principles are maximally coherent one has achieved moderate reflective 
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thesis, but I have addressed this issue in a different paper (Cloos n.d.). 
249
  Hooker 2002: 165.  
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equilibrium (MRE).  As new experience, either empirical or informational, is encountered 
revise current commitments in light of new experience to achieve a belief-set that is more 
comprehensive and fully justified.  Also, revise beliefs as one intuits new moral 
convictions and infers or conjectures principles from those convictions.  Now I will 
mention another consideration—simplicity. 
 The consideration of simplicity comes out of a question Brandt mentions: “one might 
say that a ‘coherent’ system is one that maximizes the ‘initial credibility’ (but is this the 
same as degree of firmness?) of the relevant beliefs.  Is there a significant place for 
considerations of simplicity in the choice of what is to be accepted?”250  To answer 
Brant’s question embed in parentheses “initial credibility” or evidential weight cannot be 
equated to firmness, although firmness is one component of a CMJs evidential weight.  
Regarding Brandt’s main question, MRE does allow for considerations of simplicity in 
the choice of what is accepted and revised.  The primary concern is the maximization of 
evidential weight, but a secondary concern might be simplicity.251  The objection raised 
by Brant is that RE’s preoccupation with maximizing initial credibility neglects other 
important epistemic desiderata.  MRE allows for simplicity, for example, to guide 
reflection in cases of conflict where beliefs are equally credible or once initial credibility 
has been maximized to shift to considering the simplicity or elegance of the belief 
system. 
 Another consideration worth exploring is that without the method being a decision 
procedure guaranteed to reach an end-point in a finite amount of time it is not clear that 
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one will ever reach MRE or know when to stop revising.  This objection stems from 
Bonevac taking RE to be a decision procedure and then concluding that, based on logical 
considerations, RE possesses its own halting problem.  This motivated Bonevac in the 
direction of pragmatic intuitionism.  Despite not being able to reach equilibrium it is 
possible on Bonevac’s model to hold that judgments and principles that are stable under 
reflection are true.  These judgments are not stouthearted principles like the ones Rawls 
proposed (i.e., his two principles of justice); instead, they are unruly principles that 
always admit of exceptions and fallibility.  One always seeks normative justification in 
the face of a plurality of competing principles.252  I escape Bonevac’s objection because I 
have shifted in a moderate intuitionist direction and not tried to articulate the process as a 
decision procedure.  The modest foundations are not stouthearted, and the halting 
problem does not apply to a process that is not interpreting sets of beliefs along the lines 
of completeness and decidability.  The competent moral judge determines when the sets 
are decidable and when the process can come to an end. 
 MRE’s adoption of an intuitionist criterion of reflection provides an answer to the 
objection that MRE might be a process that never reaches a state of equilibrium.  Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong raises a similar objection against Audi’s view on reflection when he 
says that knowing when to stop reflecting requires forming a second-order belief that 
reflection is complete.  This would work against Audi’s claim that reflection can non-
inferentially justify beliefs because one would need to infer from a second-order belief 
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that one’s reflection is adequate and one may stop reflecting.  Audi responds to this 
objection in the following way: 
Much as, when we look into a room to see if the table is set, we stop when we see 
enough, we can stop reflecting on whether a poem’s language is artificial when 
we read enough.  This is usually when we reach the judgment we sought to make 
(or some judgment that brings a sense of closure).  Again, we may believe we 
have reflected long enough; but we need neither believe this nor have a criterion 
for its truth in order to reflect enough to make a judgment.  Compare, too, 
recognizing a painting, which may require simply looking at it until its identity 
‘hits us.’253 
 Audi is responding to Sinnott-Armstrong within the context of non-inferential 
reflection that generates prima facie justified intuition.  The same concept applies to the 
MRE process as a whole.  Because MRE involves intuitive judgment throughout the 
entire process, and intuitive judgment involves affirming something when it is 
accompanied by a sense of non-inferential credibility, it is plausible that one could form a 
global intuitive judgment about the non-inferential credibility of the entire belief-set.254  
Similar remarks can be made about knowing when to start reflecting again and when new 
experience should prompt one to revise current commitments.255 
                                                 
253
  Audi 2007: 203. 
254
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painting or a poem and can receive a global non-inferential intuition about the beauty of the painting or the 
originality of the poem one may receive a non-inferential intuition about the completeness of reflection 
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  DePaul makes a telling comment in this regard when considering if one needs to always seek additional 
evidence if the total evidence does not support a normative conclusion, “a person will not be stuck with an 
obligation to acquire evidence endlessly, since in many cases even a small amount of evidence can 
adequately support the proposition that the total evidence will confirm a person’s conclusion.  And more to 
the point, even if a person knows that there is additional evidence that disconfirms his conclusion, the 
person may not fall under any obligation to acquire that evidence.  For the person might have a reason to 
believe that the evidence is misleading” (DePaul 1988: 632).  DePaul must make this statement because his 
requirement that an inquirer seek out formative experiences is particularly open to the objection of endless 
evidence gathering.  MRE, on the other hand, can benefit from DePaul’s comments but is not seriously 
threatened by this possibility.  As stated, the intuitionist elements suffice to receive credible knowledge of 
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6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 UPSHOTS 
 In concluding it will be beneficial to cover some of the upshots of the method.  
Recalling DePaul’s distinction between the epistemic status and the epistemic role of a 
moral intuition, it is now possible to see that MRE is a best case scenario.  It uses moral 
intuitions with a positive epistemic status (i.e., credibility) in an evidentiary role.  
Though, in theory, moral intuitions with a negative epistemic status could be used in an 
evidentiary role those intuitions are epistemically inferior to intuitions with a positive 
epistemic status because negative status intuitions are less likely to point toward moral 
truths or facts (i.e., they are more likely to reflect personal, familial and cultural bias). 
 The next thing to notice is that RE is no longer a mere metaphor.  MRE avoids the 
extremes of making moral justification either an algorithm or a metaphor.  RE is no 
longer an unattainable ideal that is ill-defined and hopelessly imprecise.  Because wide-
RE and radical-RE made the method stretch to the point of being vacuous Daniels, Rawls 
and DePaul were forced to acknowledge that RE is an unattainable ideal, a mere 
metaphor.256  MRE acknowledges that not every agent will have the mental or moral 
                                                                                                                                                 
when to stop and start reflecting, which blocks objections of a non-terminating procedure or an endless 
cycle of evidence gathering. 
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  This avoids having to makes comments like this, “With respect to the consideration of all alternatives, it 
is important to recognize that this is an ideal.  In real life, were we have limited resources, there can be all 
sorts of good reasons for considering certain alternatives, starting with the simple fact that we may not have 
the time to do so.  But it is hard to see what reason could be given for denying that the ideal should be 
openness to the consideration of any alternative” (DePaul 2006: 617).  Openness to any alternative is not a 
virtue of a theory if it makes the theory hopelessly demanding and practically impossible to apply in real 
life.  Whatever gain in theoretical defeasibility is gained through the wide and radical interpretation of RE, 
which I have argued is none to negligible, it is purchased at the cost of precision, non-vacuous constraints 
and pragmatic applicability to actual cases. 
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capacities demanded in order to realize a full justification of one’s moral beliefs.  It also 
restricts the scope of considerations down to a manageable breadth and provides steps for 
a competent judge to follow in going through the process. 
 MRE adopts a moderate intuitionist perspective on intuition.  This allows intuition 
with certain characteristics to be suited for the task of justifying moral principles.  These 
intuitions are pretheoretical, non-inferential, well-comprehended and firmly grasped.  
These intuitions are not inferential judgments, and, as such, they are capable of serving as 
premises for inference.257  The move toward moderate intuitionism makes the intuitions 
suited to serve as moderate foundations.  It does not posit special faculties and 
unrevisable foundations.258  A proponent of MRE can reject special faculties because 
moral intuitions stem from rational capacities, yet a proponent of MRE can embrace 
CMJs as revisable foundations.  But MRE does not stop validating the authenticity of the 
intuitions at this point.  It continues to run the intuitions through three filters that sift out 
intuitions that reflect cultural indoctrination— superstition, bias and mere historical 
accident.  Moral intuitions that survive the filtration process are deemed considered moral 
judgments (CMJs), assigned evidential weight and deployed in the service of discovering 
principles that match these moderate foundations and systematize them in important 
ways. 
 MRE overcomes the input objection because there are reasons at the meta-ethical 
level to consider CMJs as truth-conducive.  Because some, if not most, moral intuitions 
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reject such mysterious faculties.  Indeed, they claim moral judgments are revisable, not foundational.”  
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that become CMJs do not embody distorting factors MRE is moving the competent judge 
toward truth.  As Carl Knight emphasizes, “This may be the case if some kind of realism 
whose truths we are only able to comprehend by means of philosophical reflection is true.  
There are, then, good metaethical reasons for believing that someone’s full reflective 
belief in a moral proposition gives that proposition some credibility.”259  Moderate 
intuitionism is inclined toward moral realism, so beliefs formed through intuitionist 
rational capacities reasonably generate credible beliefs or beliefs that evidence truth.  
Even when trying to create a meta-justification of MRE it, “seems to require MRE must 
be (conditionally) truth-conducive in a way that cannot somehow be reduced to or depend 
upon MRE producing convergence in opinion.”260  Thus, MRE lends itself to realism at 
the meta-level, and, if realism is correct, filtering out distorted CMJs may take a 
competent judge towards moral truth.   
6.2 CORRECT CONCLUSIONS IN THE SLAVERY CASES 
 The final upshot of MRE that I will mention is that it can correctly derive 
conclusions for the two historical cases presented earlier.   
 Case 1 involves an atheist doctor named Dr. B who lives in the South during the time 
of slavery.  He judges or intuits that slavery is morally unjust.  As Dr. B runs this 
intuition through the four requirements it is the case that the intuition is genuine.  As Dr. 
B runs his intuition through the three filters it makes it through the filters because: the 
intuition does not reflect epistemic distorting factors, imaginative consideration of the 
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interests of slaves vindicates that if he were a slave he would deem slavery as unjust, the 
intuition is not distorted by suspicious formative factors and it was not made under 
situations that reflect a menagerie of error.  The only problem with the intuition is that it 
is not widely shared by the immediate community Dr. B lives in.  But, because Dr. B is 
well-read, he knows that his neighbors to the North widely accept his moral intuition as 
credible.  Dr. B infers from his intuition the principle that all people are born free and 
equal regardless of their race.  Slavery reflects forced labor bondage and unequal 
treatment of people due to their place of origin and skin color.  So, that slavery is unjust 
is a CMJ that Dr. B arrives at again through application of the principle that all people are 
born free and equal regardless of their race.  The high credence Dr. B places in this CMJ 
makes it likely that it will survive the revision process and achieve a status of ultima facie 
justified. 
 Case 2 involves a Christian homemaker named Laura living in the South during the 
time of slavery.  Laura has the intuition that slavery is morally permissible.  Laura runs 
this intuition through the four requirements and it is indeed a genuine intuition.  As Laura 
runs the intuition through the three filters there are problems with the first filter.  As 
Laura gives imaginative consideration to the interests of slaves she realizes that if she 
were a slave it would seem that slavery is unjust.  The intuition fails the first filter test, 
and it is discarded.  Even if the first filter did not catch the falsity of the intuition and 
Laura continued running the intuition through the second filter it would still fail.  In the 
suspicious formative factors filter Laura might realize that her early moral training was 
authoritarian.  Her father was a slave owner and ran his household like he did his 
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slaves—with an iron fist that encouraged conformity to authority.  This led Laura to take-
on the moral beliefs of her father who rationalized the immoral treatment of slaves and 
somehow made slavery seem morally permissible.  At this point, Laura would realize her 
moral intuition was not correct and discarded it before it made it to the final stage of 
filtration.  Even if the intuition somehow went undetected as false and made it through 
the mixed error menagerie it would be in conflict with one of Laura’s Christian 
principles, namely, to love your neighbor as yourself.  Because of the weight Laura 
places on her Christian values this principle is likely to be recalcitrant to revision and 
prompt Laura to look into her set of CMJs for CMJs in conflict with this principle.  She 
would discover the morality of slave practices is in conflict with treating another person 
as one would assent to being treated.  So, she would revise the CMJ. 
 These examples show the power with which MRE is able to authenticate the 
credibility of moral intuitions and prompt theory change.261  As intuitions become CMJs 
and CMJs are systematized the ability for the procedure to uncover prejudices and biases 
continues to increase.  MRE’s progression of justification is an upshot of the method that 
counts in favor of the method being capable of justifying moral beliefs and those beliefs 
being truth-conducive. 
6.3 A BRIEF RECAP 
 In this thesis I provided a sensible solution to the input objection to RE.  This 
solution reinterpreted RE along the lines of moral realism, ethical intuitionism and 
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epistemic foundationalism.  My solution to the input objection (i.e., moderate-RE) was 
detailed in the last half of the thesis.  In the first half of the thesis I set up the objection, 
explored potential ways of solving the objection and motivated my specific solution by 
exploring various combinations of architecture and truth.  Moderate-RE was able to 
correctly able to handle CMJs around the historical practice of slavery in the southern 
United States.  Additional upshots of moderate-RE were identified: it uses CMJs which 
possess positive epistemic status in an evidentiary role, it provides steps for a competent 
judge to follow in going through the process, and it takes a competent judge towards 
objective moral truth while avoiding the extremes of making moral justification either an 
algorithm or a mere metaphor.   
REFERENCES 
Achinstein, Peter. 2001. The Book of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Appiah, Anthony. 2008. Experiments in Ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Audi, Robert. 1993. Ethical Reflectionism. Monist 76 (3): 295. 
———. 1993. The Structure of Justification. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1997. Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
———. 1998b. Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment. Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1): 15-44. 
———. 1999. Self-Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 205-228. 
148 
———. 2004. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
———. 2007. Intuition, Reflection, and Justification. In Rationality and the Good: 
Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi, edited by M. 
Timmons, J. Greco and A. R. Mele. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 2008. Intuition, Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics. Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 11 (5): 475-492. 
Bealer, George. 1996. A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical 
Studies 81 (2/3): 121-142. 
Bedke, Matthew. 2008. Ethical Intuitions: What They Are, What They Are Not, and How 
the Justify. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3): 253-269. 
Blachowicz, James. 1997. Reciprocal Justification in Science and Moral Theory. 
Synthese 110 (3): 447-468. 
Bonevac, Daniel. 2004. Reflection without Equilibrium. Journal of Philosophy 101 (7): 
363-388. 
BonJour, Laurence. 1976. The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge. 
Philosophical Studies 30 (5): 281-312. 
———. 1999. Foundationalism and the External World. Philosophical Perspectives 13: 
229. 
Brandt, R. B. 1979. A Theory of the Good and the Right. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
———. 1990. The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium. Ethics 100 (2): 
259-278. 
Brink, David. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
149 
Cleve, James van. 2005. Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate 
Foundationalism. In Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by M. Steup 
and E. Sosa. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Cloos, Christopher. n.d. Reflective Equilibrium and the Dependence Problem. 
http://justiceandjustification.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/redp.pdf (accessed 
9/14/2009). 
Conee, Earl, and Richard Feldman. 2004. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Copp, David. 1984. Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in 
Moral Theory. In Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of 
Ethics, edited by D. Copp and D. Zimmerman. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & 
Allanheld. 
Daniels, Norman. 1979. Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. 
The Journal of Philosophy 76 (5): 256-282. 
———. 1996. Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2003. Reflective Equilibrium. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium (accessed 10/15/2007). 
DePaul, Michael. 1986. Reflective Equilibrium and Foundationalism. American 
Philosophical Quarterly 23: 59-69. 
———. 1988. Naiveté and Corruption in Moral Inquiry. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 48 (4): 619-635. 
———. 1993. Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry. 
New York: Routledge. 
150 
———. 1998. Why Bother with Reflective Equilibrium? In Rethinking Intuition: The 
Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, edited by M. 
DePaul and W. Ramsey. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield. 
———. 2006. Intuitions in Moral Inquiry. In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, 
edited by D. Copp. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ebertz, Roger P. 1993. Is Reflective Equilibrium a Coherentist Model? Canadian Journal 
of Philosophy 23 (2): 193-214. 
Elgin, Catherine Z. 1996. Considered Judgment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Fantl, Jeremy, and Matthew McGrath. 2002. Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification. The 
Philosophical Review 111 (1): 67-94. 
Foley, Richard. 1987. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. New York: Routledge. 
Fries, Horace S. 1937. The Method of Proving Ethical Realism. The Philosophical 
Review 46 (5): 485-502. 
Gensler, Harry J. 1998. Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge. 
Goldman, Alvin I. 2008. What Is Justified Belief? In Epistemology: An Anthology, edited 
by E. Sosa, J. Kim, J. Fantl and M. McGrath. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Goodman, Nelson. 1983. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. 4th ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment. Psychological Review 108 (4): 814-834. 
151 
Hansson, Sven. 2007. Hypothetical Retrospection. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 
(2): 145-157. 
Hare, R. M. 1973. Review: Rawls' Theory of Justice--I. The Philosophical Quarterly 23 
(91): 144-155. 
———. 1981. Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Harman, Gilbert. 2003. Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy. The Journal of 
Value Inquiry 37 (3): 415-425. 
Harris, Charles. 1974. Rawls on Justification in Ethics. The Southwestern Journal of 
Philosophy 5: 135-143. 
———. 2005. Reflective Equilibrium as a Theory of Moral Change. Southwest 
Philosophy Review 21 (2): 67-82. 
Holmgren, Margaret. 1987. Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Objective Moral Truth. 
Metaphilosophy 18 (2): 108-124. 
———. 1989. The Wide and Narrow of Reflective Equilibrium. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 19 (1): 43-60. 
———. 1990. The Poverty of Naturalistic Moral Realism: Comments on Timmons. The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (suppl): 131-135. 
Hooker, Brad. 2002. Intuitions and Moral Theorizing. In Ethical Intuitionism: Re-
Evaluations, edited by P. Stratton-Lake. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Huemer, Michael. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2009. Apology of a Modest Intuitionist. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 78 (1): 222-236. 
152 
Joyce, James M. 2005. How Probabilities Reflect Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 
19 (1): 153-178. 
Kappel, Klemens. 2006. The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium. Ethical 
Theory & Moral Practice 9 (2): 131-147. 
Kelly, Thomas. 2008. Evidence: Fundamental Concepts and the Phenomenal Conception. 
Philosophy Compass 3 (5): 933-955. 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1921. A Treatise on Probability. London: Macmillan. 
Knight, Carl. 2006. The Method of Reflective Equilibrium: Wide, Radical, Fallible, 
Plausible. Philosophical Papers 35 (2): 205-229. 
Lemos, Noah. 1986. Justification and Considered Moral Judgments. The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 24 (4): 503-516. 
Lenman, James. 2007. Expressivism and Epistemology: What Is Moral Inquiry? 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 63-81. 
Lewis, Clarence Irving. 1947. An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. La Salle, Ill: 
Open Court Publishing Company. 
Little, Daniel. 1984. Reflective Equilibrium and Justification. The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 22 (3): 373-388. 
Lyons, David. 1989. Nature and Soundness of the Contract and Coherence Arguments. In 
Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' a Theory of Justice, edited by N. 
Daniels. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
McGrew, Lydia, and Timothy McGrew. 2008. Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual 
Support. Erkenntnis 68 (1): 55-77. 
McGrew, Timothy. 1998. A Defense of Classical Foundationalism. In The Theory of 
Knowledge, edited by L. P. Pojman. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
153 
Miller, Dale E. 2000. Hooker's Use and Abuse of Reflective Equilibrium. In Morality, 
Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader, edited by E. Mason, D. E. Miller 
and B. Hooker. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Mulgan, Tim. 2006. Future People: A Moderate Consequentialist Account of Our 
Obligations to Future Generations. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Nelson, Mark. 1999. Morally Serious Critics of Moral Intuitions. Ratio 12 (1): 54. 
Nussbaum, Martha. 1990. Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Olsson, Erik. 2002. What Is the Problem of Coherence and Truth? The Journal of 
Philosophy 99 (5): 246-272. 
———. 2005a. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
———. 2005b. The Impossibility of Coherence. Erkenntnis 63 (3): 387-412. 
———. 2007. Guest Editor’s Introduction. Synthese 157 (3): 267-274. 
Pappas, George. 2005. Internalist Vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification. 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-
intext/ (accessed 11/12/2008). 
Pogge, Thomas. 2007. John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice. Translated by M. 
Kosch. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Pust, Joel. 2000. Intuitions as Evidence. New York: Garland Publishing. 
Rawls, John. 1951. Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics. The Philosophical Review 
60 (2): 177-197. 
———. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
154 
———. 1974. The Independence of Moral Theory. Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 48: 5-22. 
———. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Edited by E. Kelly. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Scanlon, T. M. 1992. The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory. Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 12 (1): 1-23. 
———. 2003. Rawls on Justification. In The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, edited by 
S. R. Freeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sencerz, Stefan. 1986. Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics. Philosophical Studies 
50 (1): 77-95. 
Senor, Thomas D. 1996. The Prima/Ultima Facie Justification Distinction in 
Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 551-566. 
Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. New York: Clarendon. 
Shaw, William H. 1980. Intuition and Moral Philosophy. American Philosophical 
Quarterly 17 (2): 127-134. 
———. 1982. How to Do Ethics: A Question of Method. Metaphilosophy 13 (2): 117-
130. 
Shogenji, Tomoji. 2005. Justification by Coherence from Scratch. Philosophical Studies 
125 (3): 305-325. 
———. 2008. Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 77 (1): 292-296. 
155 
Sidgwick, Henry. 1907. The Methods of Ethics. 7th ed. London: Macmillan. 
Singer, Peter. 1974. Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium. The Monist 57: 490-517. 
———. 2005. Ethics and Intuitions. The Journal of Ethics 9 (3): 331-352. 
Skyrms, Brian. 1980. Causal Necessity: A Pragmatic Investigation of the Necessity of 
Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Sosa, Ernest. 1998. Minimal Intuitionism. In Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of 
Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, edited by M. DePaul and W. 
Ramsey. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield. 
St. John, Jeremy. 2007. Problems with Theory, Problems with Practice: Wide Reflective 
Equilibrium and Bioethics. South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (2): 204-215. 
Steup, Matthias, and Ernest Sosa, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Streumer, Bart. 2007. Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 74 (1): 1-29. 
Swain, Stacey, Joshua Alexander, and Jonathan M. Weinberg. 2008. The Instability of 
Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 138-155. 
Timmons, Mark. 1987. Foundationalism and the Structure of Ethical Justification. Ethics 
97 (3): 595-609. 
———. 1990. On the Epistemic Status of Considered Judgments. The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 29 (suppl): 97-129. 
———. 2003. The Limits of Moral Constructivism. Ratio 16 (4): 391-423. 
156 
Weatherson, Brian. 2003. What Good Are Counterexamples? Philosophical Studies 115 
(1): 1-31. 
Weed, Douglas. 2005. Weight of Evidence: A Review of Concept and Methods. Risk 
Analysis 25 (6): 1545-1557. 
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
———. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
 
 
